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FROM THE EDITORS
As Thomas-Durell Young trenchantly observes in “NATO’s Selective Sea 
Blindness: Assessing the Alliance’s New Navies,” the U.S. Navy’s long-standing 
profession of commitment to enhanced maritime cooperation with friends and 
allies around the world has not always translated effectively into practice. This is 
especially the case with the small navies of the former communist countries of 
NATO’s east. Young argues that these navies remain far short of the capabilities 
they require to deter an increasingly provocative and threatening Russia, and 
for reasons that are not widely appreciated—including by their own govern-
ments and defense establishments. Above all, the dead hand of legacy Soviet-era 
doctrines and organizational culture has hindered their navies from effectively 
modernizing their maritime capabilities and integrating them within their own 
armed forces, not to speak of their low level of interaction with regional allies. 
Thomas-Durell Young is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.
Joshua Edwards, in “Preparing Today for the Mines of Tomorrow,” addresses 
a war-fighting capability that long has been neglected in naval operational and 
strategic doctrine and planning. At a moment when radically new technologies 
in the undersea domain are on the near horizon, he argues that it is time to take 
a new look at the way the Navy conceptualizes mine “measures of effectiveness”; 
this is especially so with respect to the often underappreciated psychological and 
political effects of mine warfare. Joshua Edwards is an operations research analyst 
at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City Division.
In “Back to Basics: Research Design for the Operational Level of War,” Mar-
garet M. Polski surveys the current state of play within the Navy and the wider 
military research community with respect to the relationship between research 
methodologies and their application to practical problems of contemporary war 
fighting. Over the last several years—as has been noted often in these pages—
there has been a significant revival of interest in war-fighting simulations across 
the defense establishment. Polski underlines the importance of ensuring that 
enhanced attention to the value of wargaming is accompanied by a commitment 
to a realistic assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches 
and the need to apply them with appropriate rigor. Margaret Polski is an analyst 
in the War Gaming Department of the Naval War College.
7310_FromTheEditors.indd   5 5/3/19   9:35 AM
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The U�S� military currently is facing significant challenges in what is now gener-
ally agreed to be a necessary process of growing the force� In “Storm Clouds on the 
Horizon: Challenges and Recommendations for Military Recruiting and Reten-
tion,” Christopher J� McMahon and Colin J� Bernard analyze the societal factors 
complicating this effort, particularly with respect to the groups knows as millen-
nials and Generation Z� They argue that a greater effort is needed both to mitigate 
the liabilities of these generations (such as obesity and criminal history) and to 
appeal in a positive way to their concerns in areas such as family stability� Chris-
topher McMahon currently holds the Maritime Administration Emory S� Land 
Chair of Merchant Marine Affairs at the Naval War College; Commander Colin 
Bernard, USN, is currently an instructor at the United States Naval Academy�
While most attention to China’s maritime ambitions has focused on its activi-
ties in the South China Sea, the Chinese have made clear that they are not satis-
fied with the status quo in the East China Sea either� The main issue concerns the 
competing claims of China (as well as Taiwan) and Japan to the Senkaku Islands� 
In “Origins of a ‘Ragged Edge’: U�S� Ambiguity on the Senkakus’ Sovereignty,” 
Robert C� Watts IV reviews the complex history leading to the reversion of these 
islands from American control following World War II to the Japanese in 1972� 
He argues that the United States may have a special responsibility for ensuring 
that the unresolved issue of the sovereignty of the Senkakus does not escalate to 
armed conflict� Commander Robert C� Watts IV, USN, currently is serving as the 
executive officer of USS John Paul Jones�
That the slow-motion encroachment and intimidation currently being prac-
ticed by the People’s Republic of China in nearby seas represents a strategic 
novelty is a notion that seems to be held widely today� In “‘They Were Playing 
Chicken’: The U�S� Asiatic Fleet’s Gray-Zone Deterrence Campaign against Japan, 
1937–40,” Hunter Stires argues that a very similar scenario played out in East 
Asian waters in the late 1930s, when the then-named U�S� Asiatic Fleet found it-
self in the position of protecting American interests in China in the face of rising 
Japanese encroachment and intimidation� Particularly interesting is his emphasis 
on Washington’s extreme delegation of authority to its representative on the spot, 
Admiral Harry Yarnell, USN, who in turn was an enlightened proponent of mis-
sion command with respect to his own subordinate commanders� Hunter Stires 
is currently a fellow at the John B� Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical 
Research at the Naval War College�
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters 
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W309, 330, 333, 
334, 335)� For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at 
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-
841-2236)�
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   6 5/2/19   11:35 AM
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Rear Admiral Jeff Harley is the fifty-sixth President 
of the U.S. Naval War College. The College is respon-
sible for educating future leaders, developing their 
strategic perspective and critical thinking, and en-
hancing their capability to advise senior leaders and 
policy makers.
Admiral Harley is a career surface warfare officer 
whose sea-duty assignments have included command 
of USS Milius (DDG 69), Destroyer Squadron 9, and 
Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet / Expeditionary 
Strike Group 7 / Task Force 76. During his command 
of Milius, the ship participated in combat operations 
supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and his crew 
won the Battle Efficiency Award and the Marjorie 
Sterrett Battleship Fund Award for overall combat 
readiness.
Admiral Harley attended the University of Minne-
sota, graduating with a bachelor of arts in political 
science, and received master of arts degrees from the 
Naval War College and the Fletcher School of Law 
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Additionally, he 
served as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign 
Relations in New York City.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
HISTORY IS MORE than just a recitation of facts; it is a tool that 
can and should be used to inform the process of effective 
decision-making. In recent months we have taken significant steps to enhance 
the role of historical research and scholarship at the College. In August 2018, I 
announced the establishment of the John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime His-
torical Research. This center is charged with studying history for the purpose of 
educating and informing contemporary practitioners and sea-service profession-
als about the fundamental historical functions of navies. The center supersedes 
the former Maritime History Center that had been active since the establishment 
of the College’s Historical Section in 1919.
The John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research is a unique 
asset that will provide unity of effort among various historically focused func-
tions and related activities on the Naval War College campus and throughout the 
world. More specifically, the Hattendorf Center is responsible for coordinating 
the Naval Historical Collection, composed of rare books and archival documen-
tary collections at the College, and will coordinate our historical missions with 
those of the Naval History and Heritage Command in Washington, DC. As a core 
mission of the College, the study of maritime history supports the institution’s 
defined lines of effort to operationalize, navalize, futurize, and internationalize 
the school.
The center is named in honor of Professor Emeritus John B. Hattendorf, who 
served the school for nearly fifty years, both in uniform and as a civilian scholar. 
Following his combat service in Vietnam, Hattendorf reported to the Naval War 
College in 1972 as flag speechwriter, research assistant, and instructor under 
then-President Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner. He later earned the doctor of 
Enhanced Historical Focus at the Naval War College
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philosophy (DPhil) degree in history at Pembroke College of Oxford University 
in 1977. Through his publications and original documentary research, Hatten-
dorf earned international acclaim for his scholarship in the field of maritime 
history. In recognition of these scholarly contributions, in 2016 the faculty of 
Oxford University endorsed Hattendorf ’s academic promotion from the DPhil to 
the higher degree of doctor of letters (DLitt). We are indeed fortunate that John 
remains affiliated with the College and continues to contribute to the important 
work we do.
Since its inception, the Hattendorf Center has conducted a number of inter-
esting events, ranging from helping to execute a unique war game in the United 
Kingdom to holding a major history conference on our Newport campus. The 
game conducted in November 2018 at the Queen’s House at the National Mari-
time Museum in Greenwich, U.K., was based on the much-studied World War I 
Battle of Jutland. The reenactment employed the same methods and technology 
used a century ago to understand the maritime strategy of what was the largest 
naval surface engagement of World War I, a battle fought between Great Britain 
and Germany off the coast of Denmark in May–June 1916, which resulted in the 
loss of nearly ten thousand lives.
The most recent accomplishment of the center’s faculty and staff was a large-
scale gathering of world-class historians who convened in the College’s Mahan 
Reading Room in mid-March to examine the naval lessons of the Great War and 
discuss how these lessons might inform today’s Navy. The conference’s title—
“The Victory at Sea: Naval Lessons of the Great War and the U.S. Navy of the 21st 
Century”—is a nod to past Naval War College President William Sowden Sims’s 
Pulitzer Prize–winning 1920 book, The Victory at Sea, which chronicled the U.S. 
Navy’s vital role in winning World War I. Speakers at the conference discussed 
Sims’s legacy, the revolution in professional naval education after World War I, 
and the Naval War College’s historical influence as an international forum for 
scholarship on naval strategy. Of particular note was the participation of Admiral 
Sims’s grandson, Nathaniel Sims, and Nicholas Jellicoe, grandson of Admiral Sir 
John Jellicoe, who commanded Britain’s Grand Fleet during the Battle of Jutland.
Another new initiative of note is the Hattendorf Center’s graduate certificate 
in maritime history (GCMH). The GCMH provides students with a deeper 
understanding of maritime and naval history and introduces them to the study 
of history at the graduate level. In a specialized version of the College’s popular 
electives program, GCMH students gain priority enrollment in relevant courses 
and complete a graduate research project based on historical scholarship under 
the guidance of a faculty mentor. They earn two additional graduate credits and 
recognition on their permanent academic record as certificate recipients. This 
7313_President'sForum.indd   10 5/3/19   9:38 AM
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program is voluntary and goes beyond the master’s degree� Selection is limited 
to a small number of highly motivated students and is determined on a case-by-
case basis� GCMH students will be encouraged to submit to the Chief of Naval 
Operations essay contest, sponsored by the U�S� Naval Institute, and to various 
official journals for publication�
The Hattendorf Center builds on the foundations of maritime historical schol-
arship, which long have been a hallmark of the groundbreaking work done at our 
remarkable institution� Today a distinguished team of seven scholars is assigned 
to the center, including Dr� Craig Symonds, the recipient of the Roosevelt Prize, 
the Lincoln Prize, the Morison Prize, and the Dudley W� Knox Lifetime Achieve-
ment Award; and Geoffrey Till, the author of over two hundred articles, books, 
and book chapters, including the revised fourth edition of Seapower: A Guide for 
the 21st Century, which was published in 2018�
More than a century ago the College’s founder, Rear Admiral Stephen B� Luce, 
argued that “shutting our eyes to the lessons of history � � � is to be unscientific 
in one’s own profession, which, in these days, is to be culpably ignorant, if not 
criminal�” This remains true today� Collectively, we must seek to understand his-
tory and how it contributes to the future�
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   11 5/2/19   11:35 AM
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NATO’S SELECTIVE SEA BLINDNESS
Assessing the Alliance’s New Navies
Thomas-Durell Young
 Governments of the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are guilty of inattention to, and sea blindness in, modernizing their 
navies� While among “old” NATO navies this reality is understood and docu-
mented widely, the state of development and readiness of those navies considered 
“new” receives considerably less attention�1 On examination, these new navies are 
deficient in building integrated capabilities, ensuring common operating proce-
dures, projecting battlespace awareness, and accomplishing interoperability in all 
maritime combat domains�
This is because of a combination of three factors: the tyranny of Mackinder-
esque geography; the legacies of the former communist countries that inform 
how forces man, equip, and train for war; and Western governments’ inability 
when proffering advice and assistance to understand fully the operational and 
cultural contexts within which the new navies exist� To date, a focused analysis is 
lacking, not only of the status of development of these navies, but, perhaps even 
more importantly, of the common challenges they face as they modernize their 
respective fleets� This lack of an across-the-board analysis is not necessarily ob-
vious, given the disparities in size of these navies and their different geographic 
locations—the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas, none of which are contiguous� 
However, this lack of attention is no longer prudent in light of Russia’s seizure 
of Crimea and its policy of challenging the post–Cold War international order� 
Those states with shores on the Black and Baltic Seas now find themselves on the 
front line with, or indeed adjacent to, an aggressive Russia� Arguably, because we 
lack a clear conceptual framework, we are hindered in our full understanding 
of those endogenous influences that continue to obstruct the modernization of 
these postcommunist navies�
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This article builds a foundation of understanding that provides a clearer analy-
sis of the many challenges facing new navies in their modernization efforts and 
provides an explanation for these navies’ limited operational capabilities� More 
importantly, it identifies those influences that are inhibiting them from adopting 
the basic and relevant tenets of Western defense and naval concepts�2 This is not 
to imply that these navies should adopt a Western, blue-water rationale; rather, 
there is an overwhelming need for them more systematically to adopt Western-
style mission command and combat readiness, as well as operational and tacti-
cal leadership—practices that support the development of reliable, lethal naval 
capabilities to deter Russian revanchist activities� To achieve this objective, it is 
necessary that they more closely align themselves with Western defense gover-
nance norms and adopt a stronger operational focus through more training and 
exercises and, consequently, more sea time for their forces� Yet, as the author 
argues elsewhere, communist concepts are quite difficult to eradicate even after 
legacy kit is retired and replaced by Western weaponry�3 Thus, a clearer apprecia-
tion of the conceptual and institutional challenges faced by these navies, as well 
as instances where they have been able to overcome them, is applicable within 
central and eastern Europe and beyond�
In its examination of NATO’s new navies, the article addresses four core ar-
eas� First, the best means to assess these navies is through the small-navy school 
of thought—notwithstanding the ostensibly large size of the Polish navy, if one 
counts hulls� An examination of the characteristics of this typology provides 
a clearer understanding of the inherent challenges and operational limitations 
under which these navies must function� Second, on this foundation the article 
describes and analyzes the communist-era legacy institutional and conceptual 
impediments to reform and modernization� That the Baltic States’ navies were 
created from scratch implies that Soviet naval legacies are modest at best; how-
ever, their larger national defense institutions, as in other legacy countries, con-
tinue to harbor atavistic inheritances in their concepts, assumptions, and, indeed, 
institutional logic� Third, the article assesses these navies within the context of 
a resurgent Russia, with its offensive capabilities in the Baltic and Black Seas, 
along with the different challenges that exist in the Adriatic Sea� These chal-
lenges include the current underperforming state of their fleets, the lack of or 
insufficiency of modernization plans, and the policies and planning assumptions 
that are inhibiting them from achieving greater levels of operational capability� 
Fourth, the article assesses the policies, planning assumptions, and programs that 
Western nations and their navies have employed in assisting these new navies to 
modernize and become more lethal, then identifies how such advice and assis-
tance can improve�
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UNDERSTANDING SMALL NAVIES
The small-navy model provides the greatest explanatory power for assessing the 
forces and policies of the navies in the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas� Although 
the model was developed relatively recently, a modest body of useful literature 
has emerged that addresses the characteristics and challenges facing small navies� 
To give an appreciation of the challenges unique to small navies, Till notes that 
a small navy is one with “limited means and aspirations�” He adds additional 
limitations of small navies: “geographic range, function and capability, access 
to high-grade technology, and reputation�”4 Likewise, Germond observes that 
navies can be categorized using the criteria of their reach and projection capa-
bilities�5 Lacking economies of scale (in terms of numbers of platforms), small 
navies with limited numbers of hulls are likely to be disproportionally subject 
to the realities of the iron laws of required refits, which could keep them from 
conducting continuous and cost-effective operations at sea� This complicates op-
erational planning and training, because their availability and readiness rates are 
lower than those of larger navies� At the policy level, the fleets’ small sizes render 
them vulnerable to budget cuts, and this further exacerbates their challenge of 
maintaining operational readiness� In small organizations with correspondingly 
modest personnel numbers, commanders must understand how to exploit lim-
ited opportunities for gaining professional experience at sea and in challenging 
postings� Gaining experience and command at sea—essential to developing and 
growing commanders—is complicated in smaller ships because they have limited 
endurance and therefore spend less time at sea than larger, blue-water vessels�6 
These generic small-navy realities complicate such services’ ability to produce 
leaders who have the credibility to give advice at the national level on what naval 
forces are capable of providing�7
Because small navies cannot achieve the economies of scale that midsize and 
larger navies enjoy, officials must command these forces effectively to provide 
maritime-defense capabilities� For successful recruitment and retention of sail-
ors, small navies must implement effective personnel-management policies to 
create a sustainable career structure that includes a healthy balance between ship 
and shore postings�8 Adding to the personnel-management challenges, small 
navies often must put self-reliant ships to sea—those that operate alone instead 
of within integrated squadrons� Given these stark realities, small navies, depend-
ing on defense policy priorities, often rely on multinational cooperation, develop 
niche capabilities, accept limited operational roles, and accept compromises in 
designs and performance of their ships� With this background in mind, one can 
appreciate better the realities that NATO’s new navies face� All the navies assessed 
in this article can be considered small navies; however, there are moves afoot in 
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   15 5/2/19   11:35 AM
21
Naval War College: Summer 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 1 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Poland that could break the Polish navy out of this classification and expand its 
reach and power projection by increasing the size and capabilities of the fleet�9
CONCEPTUAL IMPEDIMENTS TO REFORM  
AND MODERNIZATION
The continued employment of legacy forces is a key impediment to small navies’ 
adoption of Western naval concepts� Their entire approach to naval architecture, 
weapons, training, and even crew space is vastly different from that characteristic 
of Western concepts�10 Yet it is not only maintaining legacy platforms that has 
slowed the adoption of the Western approach to naval warfare� In these countries, 
all armed forces are built on a family of military concepts that in the case of com-
munist military doctrine were quite coherent and highly integrated�11
Addressing the issue of legacy communist concepts is a twofold problem� First, 
in the rare instance where officials have attempted to retire legacy doctrine, its 
supporting concepts have proved quite resilient� Second, to date, Western of-
ficials and knowledgeable analysts have not acknowledged that the principles’ 
continued use (conscious or otherwise) in an organization presents a major 
impediment to adopting Western defense and military concepts�12 It is essential 
to understand that communist and Western military and naval concepts are an-
tithetical, and therefore incapable of coexistence in the same institution�
Because of their coherence, these legacy concepts remain entrenched firmly 
in practice, in law, and even within organizational sociology� Furthermore, as 
related to navies, these legacy practices have impeded the adoption of Western 
defense and military concepts because the former were designed to ensure that 
senior officers were not permitted to make independent decisions at the tactical 
level� In Western navies, commanders expect their subordinates to use critical 
thinking and their own initiative to solve problems, while in many legacy navies 
commanders are expected only to execute orders and never to take the initia-
tive�13 To a degree almost inconceivable to the Western mind, former communist 
defense institutions not only undermined the ability of commanders to exercise 
command but also centralized decision-making power in ministries of defense, 
both of which all but ensured that the armed forces would struggle to grow com-
manders, in comparison with Western culture�14
While it is true that these legacy concepts continue to exist throughout central 
and eastern Europe, their intensity varies among defense institutions and navies� 
It is instructive to identify key legacy concepts that continue to influence govern-
ments� These include the following:15
1� Policy, as it is understood in the West, often is not accepted in the region 
and many times is confused with politika (partisan politics)� It is rare 
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that a defense institution has been able to formulate even modest policy 
frameworks to express government guidance and priorities and develop 
plans to execute them� Where policy documents do exist, they typically 
are meaningless because it is rarer still that priorities are expressed at 
all, let alone their financial costs (neither short-term nor life-cycle)� 
The observation to political, defense, and military officials in the region 
that in a democracy, policy is money is met all too often with a blank, 
uncomprehending stare�
2� Highly centralized decision-making, often occurring well above the level 
of chiefs of services and even chiefs of defense, is employed for even 
the most mundane issues� This is the case particularly with financial 
decision-making� The norm throughout the region is that most capability 
providers—chiefs or commanders of services—do not possess their own 
operations and maintenance budgets� As a result, collective training and 
overall readiness remain underdeveloped by Western standards�
3� This centralized decision-making continues to dissuade leaders’ critical 
thinking� One observable consequence of this practice is that staff work is 
of low quality, voluminous, and turgid, and it rarely provides leaders with 
the information necessary to make informed decisions�
4� In place of critical thinking, one finds an organizational instinct to rely 
on the legacy of using the algorithmic approach to problem solving� 
Quantification of what are subjective issues, such as day-to-day planning 
and management, allows leaders to avoid individual responsibility 
because the algorithm is always correct—after all, it is “scientific�”
5� Defense planning at the national level throughout the region (including 
by the defense institutions of even such relatively advanced cases as 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltic States) is underdeveloped at 
best and a failure at worst� The region is awash with long-term defense 
plans that are unrealistic, financially unassessed, and therefore not 
feasible�16
6� Legacy platforms, systems, and weaponry do not include the Western 
concept of force management as part of the design process, which further 
weakens defense planning� The result is that force development as a 
concept—which must be inexorably tied to force management—remains 
underdeveloped throughout these armed forces�
7� Lastly, in this summary of remaining antithetical concepts, in central 
and eastern Europe there is an odd absence of either a conceptual 
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understanding of or linguistic cognate for capability. In some Slavic 
languages this is defined as potential, which misses the fundamental 
meaning of such a key concept of modern Western military planning 
and operations� Thus, the concept that a platform is not an asset unless 
its crew is fully trained, exercised, and provisioned is being recognized 
only slowly� The lack of understanding of this key concept throughout 
these defense institutions partly explains why commanders do not have 
operations and maintenance budgets, and therefore cannot reliably 
produce capabilities�
This summary of prevailing legacy concepts should give pause to Western 
officials who have the task of cooperating with these defense institutions and 
navies to introduce them to Western naval concepts� If Western officials fail to 
assist small navies in changing their individual and collective conceptual “souls,” 
those services will remain inhibited from integrating effectively into allied mili-
tary structures� As will be demonstrated clearly, the sale or gift of platforms and 
systems alone has not enabled these navies to adopt modern Western naval con-
cepts, and arguably it cannot in the future�
NATO’S NEW NAVIES: CHALLENGES AND STATUSES
If divesting themselves of communist legacy defense and naval concepts were not 
sufficiently difficult for NATO’s new navies, their leaderships face an additional 
challenge: because they are all continental states, their governments universally 
suffer from acute sea blindness�17 This all-but-universal continental focus, in 
which armies predominate, can be observed in the continued practice of orga-
nizing the armed forces under general staffs, as opposed to transitioning them to 
joint defense staff organizations� Indeed, it is not unusual to find only a few naval 
liaison officers posted to these general staffs, rather than a staff manned from all 
three services� Sea blindness is exacerbated further at the national level because 
few ministries of defense possess institutional knowledge of naval affairs or un-
derstand the requirements for survival in the modern maritime battle space� Not 
surprisingly, naval policy, or endorsed national concepts, hardly exists in either 
written or publicly published form, let alone within the institutional cognizance 
of defense institutions�
Further complicating naval planning is the stark reality that many of these 
ministries of defense lack a methodology for financially assessing even generic 
capability options�18 As a result, naval modernization plans do not receive ad-
equate attention and therefore suffer financially� Modernization plans cannot be 
developed properly, since in almost all these navies naval and fleet headquarters 
are effectively one and the same� The net result can be found in the poor quality 
or complete lack of staff work to support national defense planning� Similarly 
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to their respective ministries of defense and general staffs, these navies do not 
develop accurate costings to support force-development plans and they fail to 
formulate priorities, which results in capability incoherence that is easily observ-
able in many of these fleets (e�g�, platforms absent weapon systems and modern 
sensors)�
Additional evidence of the centralization of decision-making in capitals is 
that few commanders of navies are entrusted with operations and maintenance 
budgets to enable them to train and exercise their fleets in any predictable and 
rational fashion� Or, as in the case of the Latvian navy, the navy commander has 
a budget but lacks authority over maintenance� Therefore, the commander is 
forced to coordinate maintenance efforts with the ministry of defense, which is 
time-consuming and results in lower readiness of the fleet� The net result of these 
conditions has been ships and crews at sea for far fewer days than their older 
NATO navy counterparts—which reinforces the Soviet concept that it is better to 
be ready to go to sea rather than the prevailing Western norm of habitually being 
at sea�19 In addition to limiting the navies’ ability to train crews, these practices 
also preclude them from conducting the normal operations at sea that would 
provide greater opportunities for closer cooperation with more-sophisticated 
navies as a matter of course�
In comparison with new NATO armies, and perhaps even air forces, these 
navies also have suffered from an unintended externality: they generally have 
missed out on the assistance that the other services received during their deploy-
ments to Afghanistan and Iraq� Thus, there is an unintended imbalance created 
by how much attention and operational experience armies, particularly special 
operations forces, have gained as opposed to their generally ignored navies� 
Consequently, many officers and sailors missed out on the invaluable experience 
of deploying and maintaining ships for long periods on distant multinational 
operations�
This lack of hard operational experience particularly has prevented the de-
velopment of senior naval leaders who have a deeper understanding of Western 
naval concepts� This has been mitigated in part by the deployment of ships to 
NATO standing maritime forces and participation in some operations nearer 
to home (e�g�, Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, the United Nations maritime 
task force off the coast of Lebanon, and support for NATO air operations off 
Libya)� The centralization of resource management within ministries of defense 
has starved these navies of the funding necessary for adequate sea time, thereby 
further limiting habitual contacts with allied navies� This has stunted their in-
stitutional understanding of how they fit into larger allied formations and the 
associated exercise and training planning� This is costly to the Western alliance, 
because these navies’ self-limitation from intensive sea training means Western 
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navies miss the opportunity to profit from their regional knowledge and techni-
cal expertise in fields such as mine countermeasures (MCM)�
The assessment of these navies by region that follows will facilitate a deeper 
understanding of the unique challenges they face�
Baltic Sea
All navies operating in the Baltic Sea face considerable physical challenges� The 
sea is shallow (two hundred feet on average, which has earned it the nickname 
in German of the “flooded meadows”), registers low salinity and visibility, and 
experiences wide temperature variations�20 It is also quite busy, with some 2,500 
ships under way at any one time�21 These factors combine to produce a compli-
cated hydroacoustic environment for antisubmarine warfare (ASW)� The Baltic 
Sea also has the unique distinction of being home to between forty and fifty thou-
sand sea mines still unaccounted for from the two world wars�22 From a Western 
perspective, the Russian-controlled Kaliningrad Oblast located between Poland 
and Lithuania has become highly militarized� It contains the S-400 surface-to-
air missile (SAM) system and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs)� According to 
some sources, from this oblast Russia is capable of carrying out an antiaccess/
area-denial campaign in a conflict with NATO�23 Kacprzyk and Friis recommend 
that, in light of these capabilities, in most scenarios between Russia and NATO 
the Baltic and Nordic regions should be considered a common operational area, 
given the likelihood of conflict escalation beyond either region�24
Poland. NATO’s new navies in the Baltic share a few similarities, but overall are 
quite different� The missions of the Baltic States’ navies are focused primarily on 
MCM, and to a lesser degree patrolling, while the Polish navy is in a class by itself� 
On paper, to support its stated mission of defending territorial waters and the 
country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the Polish navy appears fairly modest 
in terms of hulls compared with old NATO navies� It consists of two former USN 
FFG-7 frigates, three operational (albeit aged) ex-Norwegian Type 207 subma-
rines, one Kilo-class submarine, and many legacy warships and support ships� It 
is in the process of commissioning a newly built offshore patrol vessel (MAKO 
A100 class); it possesses SSMs, Link 11 on some of its vessels, and Link 16 secure 
datalink systems at its maritime operations center (MOC) and maritime com-
ponent command in Gdynia; and it plans to procure Link 16 for new maritime 
platforms and helicopters�25 On closer examination, the Polish navy shares many 
of the same weaknesses that plague all other navies addressed in this article, ex-
cept that it has a larger fleet� Fundamentally, the government in Warsaw largely 
has ignored the Polish navy, a situation the navy has not helped by keeping the 
naval fleet headquarters in Gdynia, as opposed to the capital, where decisions 
(particularly financial ones) are made� Poland’s FFG-7s are almost forty years old, 
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   20 5/2/19   11:35 AM
26
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/1
 YO U N G  2 1
have deployed on only three occasions, and have never been modernized prop-
erly; efforts to build new warships in government-owned shipyards have been 
plagued by long delays and cost overruns�26 A misguided 2013 reorganization of 
the armed forces that closed service headquarters and replaced them with inspec-
torates undermined effective force management of the fleet and made modern-
ization and operational planning even more challenging�27 A recent government 
defense concept aims to reverse this decision and reestablish a fleet headquarters, 
but it remains to be seen whether the redesigned commander of the navy will 
possess an operations and maintenance budget�28
In terms of weapon systems, the Polish navy currently possesses and 
fields a number of types of SSM and SAM systems, such as the Norwegian- 
manufactured Naval Strike Missile, RBS-15 Mk 2, and Harpoon SSMs, as well as 
RIM-67 Standard systems� The navy has two missile unit squadrons armed with 
Naval Strike Missiles supported by Link 11 and Link 16, based in Siemirowice� 
That said, a senior Polish defense official admitted in 2016 that the missiles’ range 
(two hundred kilometers) exceeds that of the current network of coastal radars, 
which raises questions regarding the missiles’ general effectiveness, given that they 
are new and digital�29 This point apropos a recognized maritime picture (RMP) 
speaks to a problem common to all new navies: the lack of effective interministerial 
cooperation—between government ministries� In Poland, the government has 
yet to create an interministerial maritime operations center (IMOC) where one 
national RMP can be produced and effective coordination can be done at the 
expert level� The border guards’ radar picture currently does not feed into the 
navy’s MOC in Gdynia, providing further evidence of the poor state of coordina-
tion� Finally, although they are of questionable use, the navy possesses a legacy 
network of underwater sensors in the Gulf of Gdańsk�30
Poland’s current government has pledged to modernize the navy by spending 
over four billion dollars by 2030�31 Yet without significant changes to the concep-
tual framework by which the navy is commanded and its finances are managed, 
this ambitious modernization plan could fall short of reaching its full operational 
potential�
The Baltic Navies. The Baltic States’ navies, although small and largely centered 
on fulfilling MCM missions, are still sufficiently different to warrant a degree 
of individual treatment� Estonia falls short in relation to other countries in the 
region because it has conflicting jurisdictional authorities between the ministry 
of defense and civilian law-enforcement agencies�32 As a result, development of 
one of the most basic capabilities needed to effect maritime security—an RMP 
to produce maritime situational awareness (MSA)—has been stalled for years 
by bureaucratic disagreements over ministries’ respective institutional roles and 
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   21 5/2/19   11:35 AM
27
Naval War College: Summer 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 2 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
missions� This infighting has inhibited the creation of what should be thought 
of as a national asset� The current, outdated RMP was developed for peacetime 
conditions and is controlled by the Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB)� The 
problem with entrusting such a responsibility to a civilian ministry is identified 
in an insightful study on Estonia’s maritime security requirements chaired by an 
eminent Estonian expert in defense planning: “As a matter of agency policy, the 
PBGB capabilities have been optimized for the lowest level of crisis escalation—
the level of nonkinetic reactions, and therefore there is a systemic gap between its 
expected performance and the capabilities and performance required on higher 
levels of crisis escalation�”33
The current system cannot cover the waters that fall under Estonia’s jurisdic-
tion (both territorial waters and the EEZ) at all times, and the existing data- 
communications link to the 
naval headquarters is unsuit-
able� Moreover, the PBGB’s 
three rotary-wing aircraft 
are insufficient for the size 
of the country and are not 
configured to conduct naval 
operations� Owing to the lack of a wartime-capable RMP to support targeting, 
the report concludes that it is not possible to conduct the maritime defense of the 
country or employ its current fleet of three MCM vessels effectively�34 Finally, that 
such a study had to be commissioned, as opposed to being produced organically 
as routine staff work, speaks to the mistake made in the 2014 reorganization of 
the Estonian Defense Forces that closed the naval headquarters at Miinisadam, 
thereby undermining the navy’s ability to operate in a modern maritime defense 
environment�35
In keeping with many other legacy navies, the Estonian naval commander 
also does not possess a budget� Despite the government’s decision to limit the 
navy to conducting MCM missions and providing support to international op-
erations, there are some discussions about expanding some of its capabilities� 
Expansion efforts (e�g�, procuring Link 11) could improve communications and 
data exchange, or use the army’s existing FGM-148 Javelins in the coastal-defense 
mission, although their modest range (2,500 to 4,700 meters, depending on the 
variant) should be assessed as a limitation�36
The other two Baltic navies, those of Latvia and Lithuania, possess both MCM 
vessels and purpose-built patrol craft�37 They are fortunate in that—as is the case 
with Finland, Denmark, and Norway—their national maritime-surveillance 
infrastructure falls under their respective defense institutions�38 Thus, each 
possesses an RMP in which the navy plays the leading role� Latvia’s coast guard 
[A] clearer appreciation of the conceptual and 
institutional challenges faced by these [new] 
navies, as well as instances where they have 
been able to overcome them, is applicable 
within central and eastern Europe and beyond.
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falls under the navy, but inexplicably it purchased four Skrunda-class patrol 
vessels that carry only light machine guns, although they do have mission-
modular weapons potential� The Lithuanian navy possesses four ex–Danish navy 
Flyvefisken-class patrol vessels, two of which possess variable-depth sonars that 
enable them to conduct some ASW training� These are the most capable warships 
in the Baltic States, as they possess modern combat-management systems and are 
armed with 76 mm guns� Further, consideration is being given to fitting them 
with ASW mortars or depth charges from regional sources to complement their 
sonars�39 In principle, both navies also have dedicated minelaying capabilities 
using ex-Norwegian Vidar-class minelayers, but whether they have mines in suf-
ficient numbers and can execute fast minelaying tasks is unknown� Missing from 
these navies are critical enablers and weapons: missiles, torpedoes, and Link 11 or 
Link 16 (although the Lithuanian navy is investigating procurement of the latter)�
Most disturbing is a seeming inability of these three Baltic States’ governments 
to agree on something as simple and important as developing a common regional 
RMP, and each apparently is on its way to developing its own unique intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities�40 The fact that these countries 
cannot yet exchange real-time radar or sensor data with Allied Maritime Com-
mand (MARCOM), let alone among themselves, needs to be addressed at the 
appropriate political level�
Potential in the Baltic. In light of this brief analysis of the new allied navies in 
the Baltic, one could conclude that in their current configuration they bring few 
useful lethal assets to the alliance; however, they possess well-developed, modern 
ports (e�g�, Gdańsk, Gdynia, Klaipeda, and Liepaja)� The Polish navy has great 
potential for modernization and has the critical mass (and successive govern-
ments’ commitment to spend money on defense) to develop a modest but bal-
anced fleet that could make a significant contribution to NATO’s defense posture 
of the region� Yet notwithstanding Poland’s ambitious modernization plans, it 
is clear that the navy’s intellectual software needs to be thoroughly rebooted to 
retire legacy concepts, assumptions, and institutional logic and replace them with 
the Western approach to modern naval warfare� A justifiable fear is that even if 
new Western kit is procured it will remain underused or, worse, unused, and con-
strained by legacy concepts similar to the embarrassing example of the Polish air 
force F-16s that took almost ten years to be declared full operation capable�41 The 
other navies of the Baltic States face different challenges, and they are confronted 
with the problem of scale and financial penury� That said, given their geographic 
proximity to Russia and maritime exposure, there is an urgent need to improve 
their maritime-defense capabilities� As one Estonian naval officer averred in a 
private discussion, while there is no question that the country’s navy is part of the 
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   23 5/2/19   11:35 AM
29
Naval War College: Summer 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 2 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
NATO integrated command structure, the service does not feel it is a part of the 
alliance’s force structure�42
Black Sea
Russia’s military presence in the Black Sea was already significant before its sei-
zure of Crimea, but its occupation of and movement of key offensive assets to 
Crimean military facilities further complicate NATO naval defense planning�43 
One source argues that the deployment of antiship missile systems in Crimea 
and on the coast of Krasnodar Krai enables the Russian armed forces to strike 
surface targets on approximately one-third of the Black Sea�44 As Horrell argues, 
well before Russia’s invasion of Crimea its 2020 state armaments program envis-
aged significant upgrades to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, to include six upgraded 
Kilo-class submarines and six Admiral Grigorivich–class frigates� Allied naval 
planners also must account for the operational limitations placed on the deploy-
ment of warships from outside the Black Sea, as stipulated by the 1936 Montreux 
Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits�45
The Romanian and Bulgarian navies currently do not possess operational sub-
marines, and both lack sufficient numbers of ASW maritime-patrol aircraft� The 
situation is complicated further by the physical conditions of the Black Sea that 
make conducting ASW challenging�46 Black Sea allies also face the reality that co-
operation among themselves is meager at best� Bugajski and Doran paint a grim 
political-military picture of the region from the perspective of Western interests: 
“Currently, there is little regional integration and infrequent interaction among 
NATO’s Black Sea states, and an absence of well-defined contingency plans in 
case of a Russian military assault� Romania and Bulgaria conduct no bilateral na-
val exercises, possess no common surveillance or early warning capabilities, and 
have no collective defense plan�”47 Finally, allied naval and defense planners must 
factor in the unpredictability of Turkey’s position relative to Russian military ac-
tions under the current Justice and Development Party government�
Romania. Of the two new NATO navies in the Black Sea, the Romanian navy 
has made some progress in redevelopment since the end of the Cold War� As 
in all legacy navies under discussion, Soviet concepts and assumptions framed 
its institutional thinking about how its ships would fight and the essential naval 
engineering of Romania’s sizable fleet of ships� It has taken a number of years 
for leadership to emerge that is not highly influenced by Soviet-imported legacy 
concepts� Under communism, officers and sailors were narrowly trained and spe-
cialized, and the Western style of command was eschewed� There is no question 
that Sanders is right to observe that restructuring and adopting Western concepts 
and thinking were delayed in Romania by some ten years owing to successive 
governments’ indifference (sea blindness) and the limited financial resources 
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dedicated to the navy�48 Over the past two decades, intensive use of Western pro-
fessional military education and the procurement of Western warships (two ex–
Royal Navy Type 22 frigates in 2004) have combined to push the organization 
toward modernization and a growing conformance to Western concepts� How-
ever, the continued existence in the fleet of Soviet and indigenous Cold War– 
designed warships, all of which are of limited use in modern naval warfare (its river- 
monitor flotilla being a case in point), suggests a conceptually confused force� For 
example, logistics remain more tied to legacy than to Western concepts, which 
can only impede the readiness and effectiveness of the fleet�
While the procurement of two Type 22 frigates from Great Britain was seen 
as a significant commitment by the Romanian government to modernizing the 
navy, absent from the sale was 
the procurement of Western 
SSMs and SAMs, active ship-
defense systems, and modern 
electronic-warfare systems�49 
Recent efforts to procure 
these capabilities faltered in 2017 because of insufficient funds�50 Consequently, 
these ostensibly modern Western ships cannot be employed throughout the 
Black Sea� Nevertheless, whereas the ships hardly can be thought of as having 
reached full operational capability, they have had a positive effect on the Western-
ization of the navy� Delegation of command has been implemented, albeit slowly, 
and ship staffs (which enabled collective decision-making) have been disbanded�
Acquisition of these more-modern ships has required an overhaul of the 
professional military education and training system, which includes conducting 
principal warfare officer / tactical action officer training in-country, and, since 
2008, implementing NATO’s Guidance for Operational Planning (subsequently 
replaced by the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive)�51 That said, the 
lack of decentralized decision-making continues to pose a challenge� At the high-
est levels, it is troubling that many organizations of the navy possess their own 
budgets (e�g�, logistics, facilities, reconnaissance, and surveillance), but the fleet 
commander does not� It is almost as if there is a belief that these other activities 
are ongoing and therefore must be funded, but the fighting element of the service 
is expendable� Rather, the Romanian defense institution employs the practice 
common in the region (which is the result of legacy assumptions) of funding 
only a major operation, rather than recognizing the essential need for a naval 
commander to own an operations and maintenance budget if he is to achieve 
any reasonable degree of readiness� Because of this, the Type 22s are chronically 
underfunded and can meet only half of their annual required days at sea�
The small-navy model provides the greatest 
explanatory power for assessing the forces and 
policies of the navies in the Baltic, Black, and 
Adriatic Seas.
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   25 5/2/19   11:35 AM
31
Naval War College: Summer 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 2 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
In 2016, the Romanian government announced an ambitious moderniza-
tion program to modernize the Type 22 frigates. This is commendable—except 
for the fact that the ships are dated and the envisaged modernization budget is 
unlikely to cover all the necessary repairs and upgrades, to include weapons.52 
The existing Tetal corvettes are to be retired and, if funded, four modern, mul-
tirole Sigma-class corvettes will be built in-country.53 The navy has Link 11 and 
is expected to procure Link 16, as well as satellite communications. And while 
the navy lacks modern fixed submarine sensors, it claims to have surface and 
maritime air pictures.
The modernization plans are indeed ambitious, and bringing them to fruition 
is essential for the navy to overcome what one Romanian expert claims is a key 
limitation: the navy currently can undertake only surveillance and constabulary 
missions in the Black Sea, as well as support for international operations.54 De-
claring 2018 to be year of the navy, the minister for national defense announced 
the ambitious plan to procure three submarines and four surface warships for 
delivery to the fleet between 2018 and 2024, which would improve its current 
capabilities greatly.55 As an optimistic observation, the Romanian navy intelli-
gently moved its naval headquarters to Bucharest in 2003 to be close to the locus 
of defense budget and political decision-making. This sage move to the capital 
has yet to be followed by any other European postcommunist navy.
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian navy, like other communist navies, emerged from the 
Cold War oversize and in search of missions. While other countries underwent 
periodic efforts to modernize and embrace Western defense and military con-
cepts, domestic political disagreements in Bulgaria over the future of the military 
left the armed forces, and the navy in particular, bereft of guidance by which to 
reform themselves. A consequence of this strategy deficit was that well into the 
late 1990s the navy found itself too large in relation to its tasks and still dependent 
on legacy concepts; even today the navy possesses a large number of ex-Soviet 
warships and auxiliary vessels.
Modernization began late in 2005 when the navy took delivery of its first 
Wielingen-class ex-Belgian frigate, followed by a second in 2008, while a third 
was procured in 2009 to provide spare parts. This procurement from the Belgian 
Marine Component included a Tripartite mine hunter.56 On paper the frigates 
possess Western missiles (i.e., RIM-7 Sea Sparrow SAMs and MM-38 Exocet 
SSMs)—a rarity in these new navies. However, these weapons cannot be tested 
very often, because the ships spend limited time at sea—despite deploying an-
nually to Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, these ships get less than half the 
amount of time at sea that is considered the norm for ships of their class. More-
over, while the navy possesses Link 11, it does not have Link 16, which limits the 
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utility of its two Eurocopter AS 565 Panther helicopters (with a third to be pro-
cured in 2020)� The navy possesses a MOC in Varna; procured some new coastal-
surveillance radars in 2012; and is upgrading legacy analog systems, with U�S� as-
sistance� Bulgaria still lacks an IMOC, as well as feeds from civil ministries’ radars 
and sensors, thereby inhibiting a more comprehensive MSA� Bulgaria plans to 
procure capabilities for secure communications with MARCOM by 2020�
As is so often the case in postcommunist governments, legacy procurement 
concepts typically focus on platforms and ignore essential items such as training, 
consumables, and a budget process steered by commanders so as to create naval 
force capabilities�57 This has affected directly the ability of the navy to create and 
maintain a semblance of readiness� An example of the perilous state of the navy 
occurred in spring 2011 when the minister of defense directed the deployment of 
the high-readiness frigate to support allied operations off Libya� Because of the 
lack of funding within the navy, it took two weeks to deploy this single vessel�58
The inability of the ministry of defense to define its development plans finan-
cially has stalled planning throughout the armed forces�59 This lack of effective 
planning, combined with the international financial crisis, resulted in 2009 in the 
cancelation of naval modernization plans because the government was forced to 
abandon the procurement of four French Gowind-class corvettes� A plan to resur-
rect this needed procurement so that superannuated Soviet ships could be retired 
was canceled again in 2017�60 Current modernization plans envisage the procure-
ment of two corvettes�61 This assessment of the Bulgarian navy demonstrates that 
the fleet is aging and lacks sufficient funding priorities that would cover essential 
training� As Sanders observes, this situation is unlikely to improve in the medium 
term, given the past performance of the defense institution�62
A Tricky Balance. The existing balance of power in the Black Sea, therefore, is far 
from being in the West’s favor� Efforts to modernize the Romanian and Bulgarian 
fleets have fallen short of creating and maintaining necessary operational capa-
bilities to match the challenges that Russia’s military buildup poses�
In light of this assessment, it is difficult to accept Sanders’s view that following 
the Membership Action Plan leading to NATO accession “led to more focused, 
systematic and effective military reform in both states�”63 The fact that both na-
vies remain conceptually split between legacy and Western naval concepts speaks 
to the continued presence of residual influences� For example, it is problematic 
that the practice of keeping in service aged legacy platforms (e�g�, river flotilla 
vessels) can provide utility in modern naval warfare�
But it is the political dynamics in the region that are most challenging for 
the alliance� These dynamics include a politically unpredictable Turkey, as well 
as a Bulgarian policy that turned down the establishment of a NATO Black Sea 
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fleet—advocated by a former Romanian minister of defense—on the grounds that 
Bulgaria did not want to irritate Russia, to which many Bulgarians are favorably 
disposed�64 Thus, unfavorable geography, owing to Russia’s seizure of Crimea and 
political discord among NATO nations, leaves the Romanian navy exposed and 
in need of strong allied support and modernization� Without doubt, the alliance 
needs to continue the policy initiated after the Russian annexation of Crimea: 
enter the Black Sea more frequently and take advantage of deploying existing ad-
vanced capabilities conveniently not addressed under the terms of the Montreux 
Convention (e�g�, maritime patrol aircraft do not fall under the treaty)�65
Adriatic Sea
In comparison with the Black and Baltic Seas, the Adriatic Sea, strategically 
speaking, is all but a backwater� The littoral states are members of the alliance 
and maritime security priorities are dominated by navies and coast guards whose 
missions are limited to supporting civil authorities in border control, antismug-
gling, and other law-enforcement tasks� Not one of them possesses any variant of 
the Link tactical digital information system, nor do they have the active sonars 
that would enable them to undertake ASW operations� With the exception of Al-
bania, all other littoral navies have the former Yugoslavian navy’s (Jugoslavenska 
Ratna Mornarica, known as JRM from its Yugoslav abbreviation) legacy concepts 
and platforms of varying intensities�
Overall, the Adriatic is a benign maritime environment, but one that sees 
heavy traffic (some forty thousand vessels per year)� The countries on its east-
ern seaboard suffer from entrenched legacy civil institutions with conflicting 
responsibilities and authorities over maritime security� With the exception of the 
Croatian navy, limited defense budgets have produced only modest naval forces� 
Since the navies of Slovenia, Montenegro, and Albania exist primarily to render 
support to civil authorities, the following discussion addresses them together so 
as to provide an understanding of their common challenges, whereas, given the 
Croatian navy’s size and the scope of its government’s maritime ambition, it is 
addressed separately�
Slovenia, Montenegro, and Albania. It would be easy to dismiss the relevance of 
the navies of Slovenia, Montenegro, and Albania, given their small fleets, their 
limited numbers of hulls and limited capabilities, and the priority they give to 
supporting civil tasks� However, although these services are small and their capa-
bilities limited, strong arguments can be made that they can support missions to 
counter negative effects on political and social stability as well as to control illegal 
immigration�66 They have been structured to provide surveillance, patrolling, and 
interdiction missions on their limited budgets�
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The Slovenian armed forces’ ship Triglav 11 likely represents the most mod-
ern and capable vessel of the three navies�67 Montenegro has struggled to find a 
way to put ships to sea that are not too old or expensive to operate (e�g�, ex-JRM 
Kotor-class frigates) and has opted to repair two aged ex-JRM Končar-class mis-
sile boats�68 Largely because of limited resources, Albania placed the coast guard 
within the navy and embraced the concept of one navy with two missions, but 
proceeded to procure four Damen Stan Patrol 4207–class patrol boats, which 
were unarmed�69 The expla-
nation for the anomalous 
procurement is  that they 
were financed partially by 
the Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which meant 
the funds could not be used 
to purchase military items�70 
That being the case, arm-
ing the ships with 20 mm 
automated naval guns on the main decks has been delayed until the warranty 
expiration of the last ship—a period of almost ten years� But despite this limita-
tion, these boats have been deployed (unarmed) in support of Standing NATO 
Maritime Group 2 in the Aegean Sea�
In addition to procuring vessels that meet mission requirements yet are af-
fordable to operate, the other key challenge with which they have struggled is 
the creation of effective interministerial coordination arrangements within their 
respective governments� In this particular context, an effective arrangement is 
defined as one in which those agencies that possess the capabilities needed to 
carry out their respective roles and missions lead in those tasks� The depth of this 
challenge can be found in the difficulties involved in something as basic as creat-
ing and maintaining an RMP that meets the requirements of national defense and 
law enforcement� It was not until 2003 that the Slovenian government recognized 
the need for such a standing, coordinated, interministerial body that addressed 
both national and operation-level issues�71
Albania and Croatia adopted the Norwegian model of creating an IMOC on 
the basis of the functional division of responsibilities among ministries� Alba-
nian legislation, though, had the unintended consequence of placing the cost 
of the coast guard missions on the navy but also removing the service from the 
armed forces’ chain of command� Moreover, IMOCs, by themselves and with a 
standing MOC, cannot maintain secure communications with MARCOM and 
exchange classified data� The Montenegrin navy created a MOC and coordinated 
The continued employment of legacy forces is 
a key impediment to small navies’ adoption of 
Western naval concepts. Their entire approach 
to naval architecture, weapons, training, and 
even crew space is vastly different. . . .  
[C]ommunist and Western military and naval 
concepts are antithetical, and therefore inca-
pable of coexistence in the same institution.
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with civilian agencies through an interministerial working group� When re-
quired, representatives from civilian ministries augment MOC staff in the port 
of Bar� Effective interministerial coordination and the creation of an RMP have 
been essential for these navies to contribute effectively to the Italian-sponsored 
Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center and produce a common virtual mari-
time awareness picture using information provided by member states and then 
shared with Allied Maritime Command in Naples, Italy�72
Croatia. Finally, the Croatian navy is the only postcommunist navy in the region 
with a fleet that is approaching being balanced� This is logical given Croatia’s al-
most two-thousand-kilometer coastline and its possession of over one thousand 
islands, inlets, and reefs� Unique among neighboring navies, the service also pos-
sesses some offensive capabilities (i�e�, missiles) and JRM-era mines�73 The navy is 
considering acquiring Link 11, and the fleet consists of a mixture of ex-JRM mis-
sile craft (of the Končar and Kralj classes), patrol boats (of the Mirna class), and 
two ex–Finnish navy Helsinki-class missile boats, which possess active sonars� 
Significantly, the navy fields the Swedish RBS-15 Mk 1 SSM system at sea and 
ashore, slated for replacement in 2024� The fleet includes one minesweeping ves-
sel and various logistic-support ships, and it has plans to procure MCM vessels� 
Additionally, the navy is defining the requirement for new offshore patrol vessels 
to enter the fleet around 2024� A key operational limitation for the Croatian navy 
is that despite the country’s extensive coastline and territorial seas, the navy lacks 
a dedicated firing range�
As in the other former Yugoslav republics, for Croatia the acquisition of an 
effective RMP has proved to be challenging, owing to overlaps in responsibilities 
among the Croatian navy and civil ministries and agencies� The navy’s MOC re-
ceives radar feeds from civilian ministries and agencies, but they are not integrat-
ed into a common picture; creating a national MOC with one RMP is needed�74 
Independently, it maintains an extensive coastal radar system, with nine radar 
sites, which include four AN/FPS-117 three-dimensional, nine GEM elettronica, 
and four Enhanced Peregrine radars, and other sensors� The AN/FPS-117 radars 
are suboptimal for surface surveillance and are slated to be replaced with two-
dimensional systems�
The Croatian navy’s obvious challenge is its lack of financial means� Note 
that the replacements for the RBS-15 SSMs and the offshore patrol vessel are to 
be acquired in the same period� Resource planning likely will be strained by the 
recent re-creation of the navy’s maritime infantry battalion, the need to replace 
the AN/FPS-117 radars, and the pending acquisition of MCM vessels� Croatia is 
unarguably a maritime nation, yet the navy receives, on average, only 6 percent 
of the defense budget� In light of these realities, it is clear that the government in 
Zagreb suffers from its own form of maritime myopia�
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Challenges Ahead. These navies are modest at best and face considerable inter-
nal, bureaucratic obstacles to creating nationally, let alone collectively, common 
RMPs� Moreover, notwithstanding the offensive capabilities of the Croatian navy, 
key capabilities such as ASW and even the ability to target (i�e�, via Link 11) are 
not currently in their inventories�
However, it would be a mistake to dismiss them� With Montenegro’s accession 
to the alliance in 2017, the Adriatic is now effectively a NATO lake� That being 
the case, modest levels of relevant Western advice and assistance programs, par-
ticularly focused on fixing political barriers to creating RMPs, are long overdue� 
In the end, the alliance should consider its policies a success if these regional 
navies are capable of undertaking peacetime surveillance, reconnaissance, and 
response tasks, thereby allowing the more capable Italian and Hellenic navies to 
carry out blue-water operations in support of Western objectives farther afield, 
augmented with these fleets’ specialized capabilities�
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WESTERN ADVICE  
AND ASSISTANCE POLICIES
A cursory review of NATO’s new navies demonstrates that they are burdened 
with old platforms, sensors, and weapons (or a lack of platforms, sensors, and 
weapons) and that they are bereft of adequate training concepts, funding, and in 
some cases experienced senior leadership that understands the need to be at sea 
rather than only preparing to go to sea� An explanation for the dismal state of 
capability and readiness of these navies can be found in the lack of policy atten-
tion their own national leaderships pay them� Thus, it should not be surprising 
that these navies long have lacked a strong operational focus and their readiness 
suffers accordingly�
A frustrating legacy concept that continues to be practiced among these gov-
ernments is that not all navy commanders are entrusted with operations and 
maintenance budgets� Therefore, readiness often is seen solely as a function of 
a discrete operation and is financed on an ad hoc basis, rather than being seen 
as the lifeblood of any navy� The result is that essential training is funded fully 
only when the navy is supporting an operation, such as participating in one of 
the alliance’s standing NATO maritime groups� Yet new navies have to use these 
deployments as opportunities for gaining needed sea days and developing basic 
skills, as opposed to using them to achieve world-class standards� The evidence 
suggests that few, if any, of these navies are able to put to sea annually for a num-
ber of days adequate to achieve levels of readiness and operational effectiveness 
comparable to those of old NATO navies�
It is past time to retire these legacy concepts in a coherent fashion� Yet blame 
for the state of underdevelopment of these navies needs to be shared�
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Twenty-five years of providing Western advice and assistance and their dismal 
return on investment should demonstrate to officials that shaking off communist 
legacy concepts is difficult� As Keynes presciently observed, “The difficulty lies 
not so much in developing new ideas as in escaping from old ones, which ramify, 
for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds�”75 
The difficulty of changing concepts should prompt Western officials to question 
their policies and assumptions, as they have been ineffectual thus far in generat-
ing needed change in these 
navies� The long-standing 
Western assistance policy 
rests on the assumption that 
the challenges facing these 
navies are largely technical 
and can be addressed using 
focused training at the tactical 
level� Missing has been any official awareness that such approaches will only treat 
symptoms, not address causation in a coherent manner�76
As for the new navies’ governments, they must make the hard choices to cut 
ties to as many legacy concepts as possible� Communist military equipment 
was designed to support legacy-defined military doctrine, and it is problematic 
whether any of these aged legacy platforms and systems could produce lethality 
in the modern maritime battle space� Retiring legacy platforms, their systems, 
and accompanying concepts as soon as possible would free up needed funds for 
modernization and experimentation�
Officials need to recognize that taking the first step on the road to reform 
is inherently a political matter and therefore must be addressed as a political 
problem� This is an important point; acceptance of it leads to the conclusion that 
responsibility for reform cannot be entrusted to armed forces and ministries of 
defense alone, but rather must reside with the heads of government in all NATO 
nations’ capitals�
The need for political solutions can be seen in the struggle of the new Adriatic 
and Estonian navies to resolve jurisdictional disputes over institutional roles and 
missions to create RMPs� The inability of these navies to clarify institutional roles 
and missions with other ministries is not just an internal political issue but rather 
has serious consequences for wider Western interests� Bureaucratic discord has 
led to suboptimal capabilities that cannot produce an RMP that supports MSA, 
which in turn prevents the services in question from being able to respond ef-
fectively and quickly to events at sea�
In short, NATO and Western governments have been suffering from their own 
case of sea blindness when it comes to understanding the real challenges these 
If divesting themselves of communist legacy 
defense and naval concepts were not sufficiently 
difficult for NATO’s new navies, their leader-
ships face an additional challenge: because they 
are all continental states, their governments 
universally suffer from acute sea blindness.
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navies have faced� As a representative example, Hoffman makes the prescient 
observation that, with regard to the U�S� government’s European Reassurance 
Initiative, almost none of the eight hundred million dollars appropriated in fiscal 
year (FY) 2016 nor any part of a budget request in FY17 of $3�42 billion has been 
allocated to the U�S� Navy to support NATO’s new navies�77 This lack of attention 
by the Department of the Navy is surprising, given that one of its key strategy 
documents has cooperative strategy in its title and the Navy’s support of these 
activities is identified throughout the document�78
In light of the challenging security environment in the Baltic and Black Seas 
and given the state of underdevelopment of the alliance’s new navies, immediate 
action at the political level of the alliance and its member nations is long overdue� 
Previous Western assistance policies and programs have been ineffective� Equally, 
governments in central and eastern Europe have not supported consistently the 
need to modernize their navies� A refocus of efforts toward reform should be 
based on the principle, identified by Ullman, of fast-tracking experimentation 
in the Black Sea to develop new and innovative solutions for deterring Russian 
adventurism in either the Baltic or Black Sea�79 The challenges to this initiative 
are numerous, but they can be overcome with strong support and pressure from 
governments�
From the perspective of the new navies, the legacy concept—of focusing on 
maintaining platforms at all costs while deprecating the overwhelming impor-
tance in warfare of creating effects—needs to be fully retired and its Western 
counterpart implemented� As they experiment with new technologies, these 
navies need to focus on innovation, with the full support and cooperation of 
their allies�80 The alliance should focus on countering Russian offensive threats 
in the Baltic and Black Seas and should experiment with drones, new sensors 
and networks, ISR, cyber capabilities, nontraditional platforms, and targeting, 
all of which should take place across air, sea, and land domains� Whatever ca-
pabilities are developed need to be hardened against Russian aggressive use of 
the electromagnetic spectrum, and to the greatest extent possible tasks and costs 
should be rationalized across member states� In the case of the Baltic navies, old 
and relatively inexpensive solutions that could reinforce deterrence include ac-
quiring a reliable fast-mining capability and employing nontraditional delivery 
means�81 The Adriatic navies should not be left out of this effort; the fleets should 
be encouraged to use their technical expertise to support these initiatives, given 
that some of them (e�g�, sensors and cyber capabilities) could be relevant to the 
environment�
Maintaining the delicate balance among all these priorities—including, as 
noted, innovation, joint/combined experimentation, and increasing operations—
will pose a significant challenge to these navies and their allies� However, this is 
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where close political oversight by, if not continuous pressure from, alliance gov-
ernments is essential� Faced with a political mandate to undertake these priori-
ties, all these navies can find efficiencies to free up necessary funding� After all, 
while the proposal to refocus one of NATO’s two standing maritime groups onto 
high-end naval warfare has great merit, unless the alliance’s new navies become 
more operational and more capable of making national contributions they may 
end up as nothing more than missed opportunities�82
This article has marshaled extensive fieldwork and a deep review of the literature 
to argue that national governments and key long-standing NATO members have 
overlooked NATO’s new navies� Indeed, in most cases these navies have been 
more starved of capital redevelopment and operations and maintenance funding 
than their respective armies and air forces, in addition to receiving less and less-
effective Western advice and assistance� The old Viennese saying that “the situ-
ation is desperate but not serious” is not true—the situation is both serious and 
desperate—and this applies directly to the need for all NATO nations and navies 
to pay close attention to this issue�
The governments of the new navies must move in the short term to recon-
ceptualize the use and management of their navies� Perhaps controversially, this 
policy redefinition should precede a commitment of funds to recapitalize their 
navies so as to ensure that money is not wasted unwittingly supporting legacy 
concepts and platforms� With Russian provocations occurring frequently at sea, 
these governments must change their defense policies and priorities to improve 
their ability to contribute to their maritime security as soon as possible� The im-
portance of naval forces must be reassessed and reinforced to ensure that these 
navies can and do contribute to their countries’ maritime defense to the greatest 
degree possible� If for no other reason, failure to do so runs the risk of ending up 
completely outsourcing this key mission to allied navies, thereby opening gov-
ernments to the accusation of undermining continuity of national sovereignty�
In addition to the navies themselves, almost all of their headquarters are 
located on the coasts, and often distant, physically and mentally, from their 
capitals� Organizationally and institutionally, they have been relegated to being 
mere tactical appendages to the rest of their countries’ armed forces, thereby 
denying government officials a full appreciation of the reality of modern naval 
warfare and the imminence of Russian maritime threats� To improve oversight 
and management of these navies, their governments should insist that if naval 
headquarters are not located in capitals already they should move there as soon as 
possible� This would provide these governments with the necessary opportunities 
to reorganize army-dominant general staffs and create integrated defense head-
quarters� This would provide governments with better instruments of military 
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power, as well as enable naval staffs to compete more effectively for funding and 
political attention�
Both old and new NATO members need to respond urgently to the need to 
transform these navies� Whereas this article has argued that a restatement of 
priorities for governments in the region is needed, Western governments also 
need to perform such a review� Fundamentally, Western governments need to 
change their languid approach to their advice and assistance programs to pro-
vide improved aid to the new navies as they modernize and otherwise transform 
themselves� The necessary assessment of the capabilities of the new navies should 
leave no one in doubt that the previous approaches to providing advice and assis-
tance simply have not produced sufficient returns on investment� The comfort-
able approach—of defining reform as a technical challenge that can be addressed 
with training or by the piecemeal transfer or sale of platforms and systems—has 
created instead institutional, and therefore capability, incoherence� 
These navies are no longer legacy services, but neither are they fully Western� 
While the traditional advice and assistance policies and programs have their 
place, by themselves they cannot produce the necessary institutional change� 
New policies—starting from a tabula rasa—should focus primarily on how to 
help these navies retire legacy concepts and replace them with their Western 
counterparts, with the objective of helping them to meet their unique maritime-
security requirements� This review and replacement process requires that a broad 
policy framework be adopted across allied nations and their navies, one that 
drives experimentation within the maritime environment to produce cutting-
edge, even nontraditional, but predictable, lethality at sea� In the end, it is predict-
able lethality and a political willingness to use it to defend vital interests that pro-
duce what the alliance desperately needs in the Baltic and Black Seas: deterrence� 
Allied nations must not tarry; the West essentially has lost twenty-five years, and 
it is imprudent to assume that Russian policy will continue to be so generous as 
to ignore these Western vulnerabilities ad infinitum.
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 To the inquiry, “What simple initial threat do I need to blockade a port with mines?,” various responses present themselves� Simple initial threat is basi-
cally the probability that the first vessel to attempt transiting the minefield will 
become a casualty, so that it no longer can perform its mission� The simple initial 
threat might be very low because the enemy is not very determined to overcome 
the minefield; it might be very high because the enemy is very determined to 
do so� An enemy with a strong mine countermeasure presence or one willing to 
accept a high degree of risk simply might channelize through the minefield and 
accept whatever attrition occurs, making simple initial threat a useless measure 
of effectiveness (MOE) for blockading� The question asked above seeks to deter-
mine what conditions determine the simple initial threat from mines that would 
be needed to accomplish designated objectives, or 
whether another MOE would be more suitable for 
the purpose�
Historically, maritime mine warfare has been 
called on to achieve various effects to support na-
val strategies�1 Land mines have provided a means 
to achieve some similar objectives; while there are 
certainly variations between maritime and land 
mines, the core principles are remarkably similar� 
The methodology for determining how many mar-
itime mines are required to achieve a desired effect 
has never been evaluated fully, because of the com-
plexity of the subject—including important factors 
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rooted in human psychology� MOEs currently in use are informative but do not 
answer the question of the level of risk that mines need to create to achieve a par-
ticular goal, such as closing a port� This article adapts methodologies developed 
for land mines/obstacles to maritime mining, owing to their inherent similarity; 
aligns MOEs to operational objectives; explores developmental mining concepts; 
and presents new MOEs for maritime mines�
Maritime mines generally will not win a war by themselves; however, they 
have the potential to change the outcome of a war by complementing other 
platforms and weapon systems� Incorporating mines to complement submarine, 
surface, air, land, and special forces can increase force effectiveness exponentially� 
In that regard, commanders should understand clearly how maritime mining ef-
fects can be used to increase the capability of the fleet and to dictate operational 
maneuvers and efficiency of movement� History has demonstrated that mines 
are a strategic weapon that can inflict physical and psychological damage that 
impacts the military, economic, and political wellness of an enemy sufficiently to 
change the course of a war�
Physical damage, such as the sinking of a ship or damaging of it to the point 
where it aborts its mission, is often the grading scale associated with the MOE of 
a minefield� However, other grading scales do not depend on physical damage� If 
the intent is to create a barrier and the declared minefield affects enemy move-
ment, the field has merit� The mine is not the primary weapon; it is a subset of the 
primary weapon—the minefield itself� History provides examples of minefields 
being very successful despite augmentation by decoy mines, or even being made 
up entirely of decoy mines, or simply being declared fields without any weapons 
in them at all� The last case, especially, shows us that a minefield’s greatest threat 
is not to enemy shipping but to the enemy psyche� Greer and Bartholomew point 
out that “the real effect of a minefield derives from a subtler influence—an exag-
gerated fear�”2 However, a “brittle” minefield can be pierced easily by countermea-
sures and then might collapse, negating the intended effect� It is important that 
the enemy experience a robust minefield capability that is replicable if we are to 
capitalize on that exaggerated fear—a fear that may be strong enough to allow 
a minefield without mines to be durable over time� This article starts from the 
original question, reviews the concepts currently in doctrine, and offers ideas on 
how to extend beyond them�
A BRIEF HISTORY
The lessons the Russians learned during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War 
about the impact of both defensive and offensive mining were not lost on the 
participants in the two world wars�3 Russian mines were more effective against 
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Japanese battleships than the Russian fleet was� However, as noted, the fear of a 
minefield can have effects beyond the sinking of ships�
During the First World War, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, France, and 
Great Britain lost 240 submarines, with mines or mine-nets causing sixty-eight 
of those losses� Germany lost thirty-eight U-boats to these causes, with the Dover 
Barrage (a minefield aimed at denying German submarines access to the English 
Channel) claiming sixteen of them in the last year of the war� While the loss of 
sixteen submarines is significant, the real power was in the strategic value: the 
barrage forced the U-boats to take a much longer route to begin their operations, 
which had critical effects on the submarine population and the boats’ time in an 
operating area� While the Germans focused on the tactical aspects of mine war-
fare, sinking more than one million tons of Allied merchant shipping, the Allies 
understood the strategic value of mine warfare�4 At Gallipoli the Allied powers, 
despite having a clear advantage in overall military capability, learned how dev-
astating a minefield supported by gunfire can be� The combined threat caused 
the Allies to pause when they should have pressed forward, and this inaction by 
Allied commanders caused their mission to fail�5
Mines also played a major role in the Second World War, for both Allied and 
Axis powers, with mines used to achieve strategic effects�6 For example, while 
some criticize the Northern Mine Barrage (defensive minefields designed to 
restrict German access to the Atlantic Ocean) for a lack of kills (although some 
kills may have gone unnoticed and uncredited), the mine barrage is what caused 
Bismarck to be detected, which eventually led to its sinking in May 1941�7 In the 
Pacific, mining in Palau trapped thirty-two Japanese ships in port, providing a 
target-rich environment; Allied aircraft sank twenty-three ships and damaged the 
remainder with bombs and torpedoes in March 1944� Mining also contributed 
to the sinking of ships by forcing vessels away from mined coastlines, which al-
lowed radar to direct aircraft for attacks in the open ocean� The Japanese navy 
responded to maritime mining by abandoning anchorages at Palau, Penang, and 
Kavieng in the western Pacific area� Ground forces also benefited from naval 
mining because disruptions in supply caused problems for the Japanese army in 
China, Burma, Siam, Malaya, and Indochina�8
Contrary to popular belief, both world wars brought the fight to the shores 
of the United States, and maritime mines played a huge role in submarine shore 
defense, which kept supply ports open and ensured that major military and 
industrial complexes remained operational in support of the war effort� The 
National Park Service notes that in the defense of San Francisco Bay, “[i]f the big 
guns failed to stop an enemy vessel far offshore, the next line of defense was three 
minefields�”9 Later, in Vietnam, the mining of Haiphong Harbor in 1972 did what 
bombers alone had seemed unable to do: impose coercive diplomacy� Maritime 
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mines closed the port, which forced supply lines to go overland, making the 
bombing campaign incredibly effective against trucks and trains� Because of the 
lack of supply routes, the North Vietnamese offense stalled; in fact, the North 
Vietnamese were unable to initiate any major offensive campaigns� This effect 
is credited widely to the maritime mines that prevented the resupply of their 
forces� Thus, maritime mines were the major factor in bringing North Vietnam 
to the negotiating table and in the release of American prisoners of war� One has 
to wonder what the outcome of the war would have been had suggestions from 
Admiral Thomas H� Moorer, USN (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff),  for the 
mining of major ports not been ignored earlier in the war�10
As referred to above, the value of a mine often is in its second-order effects� 
Mines have limited U-boats’ time on station, facilitated the sinking of enemy 
ships by aircraft, caused ports to be abandoned, made land campaigns difficult 
by choking replenishment, and kept harbors safe, and have been the weapon of 
choice for coercive diplomacy� A minefield is completely capable of achieving 
its objective through the attrition of enemy vessels that transit the minefield, or 
through fear of the minefield, which may cause enemy forces to avoid potential 
losses, including by leaving their ships in port� Furthermore, the mere capability 
to mine effectively may be enough to cause enemy forces to choose not to chal-
lenge a declared minefield that may have no actual mines�
Commanders must decide what type of minefields to use to obtain their 
operational objective� Captain Wayne P� Hughes, USN (Ret�), of the Naval Post-
graduate School points out that mines can act both to attack enemy commerce 
and to defend our own commerce, particularly in antisubmarine warfare, in a 
number of ways� 
1� “Ensure safety of goods and services: navies protect the movement of 
shipping and means of war on the oceans and safeguard stationary forces, 
to include nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) and 
coastal patrols�”
2� “Deny safety of enemy goods and services: navies prevent the movement 
of enemy shipping and means of war and threaten enemy forces, such as 
SSBNs�”11
DEFINING THE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES
In many regards, the principles of maritime mining are similar to those govern-
ing the use of obstacles, barriers, and mines in land warfare� Objectives such as 
disrupt, fix, turn, and block are pursued both on land and at sea� However, cur-
rent Navy doctrine chooses to provide specific effects rather than leverage sets of 
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effects for communication� For example, Navy mine policy specifies that mines 
be usable to “deny the enemy the ability to carry out amphibious operations, or 
in support of friendly amphibious operations, or to destroy enemy ships and 
submarines directly�”12
The different policy descriptions can be harmonized, however; by incorporat-
ing specific effects within sets of effect terms (such as block, fix, turn, or disrupt), 
the planner gains a clearer understanding of how to achieve the specific policy� 
Yet while recognizing the numerous technical distinctions between naval and 
land warfare, the Navy might benefit from treating specific effects as subsets 
within sets of effects� This matter of deciding how to join sets and subsets may 
seem like a chicken-and-egg discussion; the key point is to have a method that 
describes the objectives sufficiently for commanders and their staffs to go beyond 
consideration of specific examples of maritime mining to incorporate maritime 
mining within operational art� For example, a minefield established with the 
intent to harass, deter, or send a political message would fall under the disrupt 
objective, while the intent to cause a delay long enough to allow delivery of a 
strike package could fall under the fix objective�
To derive the definitions used here for operational objectives, I extended those 
found in Marine Corps doctrine to focus more on maritime mining�13 Concep-
tual examples follow the definitions, with historical references provided to clarify 
interpretations of those definitions� Concepts also are derived from Barriers, 
Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-15�14 The 
examples discussed below do not cover the full range of intent, but rather provide 
a framework for how to categorize intent�
Disrupt
Definition. When a minefield is used to alter enemy formations and tempo, inter-
rupt enemy timetables, cause the enemy to begin mine countermeasures (MCM) 
operations, or some combination thereof�
Conceptual Examples. (1) A defensive field that causes enemy formations to 
channelize through the field, to where hunters wait for them on the other side� 
(2) An offensive field designed to delay the resupplying of enemy ports�
Historical Example. During World War II, the maritime mining of Siamese (Thai) 
waters by the United States disrupted Japanese supply chains anywhere from a day 
to a month, which degraded the supply line for the Japanese army�15
Fix
Definition. When a minefield is designed to slow or stop targets to create a 
target-rich environment for friendly forces in an engagement area� Ideally, this 
field would inhibit the enemy’s capability to defend itself against friendly forces�
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Conceptual Example. Mining a port to delay the departure of targets of interest, 
with the intention of sending in an air strike�
Historical Example. During World War II, thirty-two Japanese ships were trapped 
in port at Palau, providing a target-rich environment for Allied aircraft attacking 
with bombs and torpedoes�16
Turn
Definition. When a minefield is intended to divert enemy formations from their 
intended transit onto one that is advantageous to friendly units�
Conceptual Examples. (1) Turning enemy forces toward an engagement� (2) 
Turning enemy forces so as to increase the length of their transit routes, thereby 
preventing them from having adequate time in an operational area�
Historical Example. During World War I, the Dover Barrage forced U-boats to 
travel around a minefield, which reduced their time in their operational areas, 
and therefore their ability to interfere with Allied vessels�17
Block
Definition. When a minefield is emplaced to stop maritime traffic along a spe-
cific avenue of approach� Blocking minefields should be able to withstand enemy 
MCM techniques, including clearance through attrition, using creativity, tech-
nology, mine density, or some combination thereof to overcome enemy efforts� 
While all minefields can be integrated with joint/integrated fires, blocking mine-
fields benefit the most�
Conceptual Examples. (1) An offensive minefield whose purpose is to close an 
enemy port for some duration of time� (2) A defensive field that is used to prevent 
an amphibious landing by the enemy�
Historical Example. The mining of Haiphong Harbor during the Vietnam War 
stopped all shipping even before the minefield was actually live� Sea traffic did 
not resume until after the U�S� Navy cleared the minefield�18
The maritime mining terminology currently in use provides the general location 
of a minefield� Offensive minefields are located within twelve nautical miles of the 
enemy’s coastline� Protective minefields are located within twelve nautical miles 
of a friendly coastline� Defensive minefields are located more than twelve nautical 
miles from land�
PREPARING TO MEET REQUIREMENTS  
FOR OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES
What impact on the target must be accomplished to meet the commander’s in-
tent? Three levels of damage frame intent: mobility kill, mission abort, and destroy� 
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Mobility kill constitutes damaging the target so that it loses the ability to control 
speed and heading� Mission abort is defined as damaging the target such that it 
is not capable of exercising some set of predefined capabilities� Destroy means to 
damage a target so that it sinks�
Begin by assuming that the number of mines in a field may vary on the basis 
of the level of damage required� (This is not the rule itself, but a framework for 
conveying the concept�) Hold weapon, target, and conditions constant� In this 
conceptual scenario, a planner would need x number of mines for mission abort, 
but may need x − k mines to achieve mobility kill and x + k mines to destroy� 
Why does this matter? If the commander intends to block a port with an offen-
sive minefield that is not in any of the engagement areas, planners could elect 
to design fields to cause mobility kills that will prevent adversary vessels from 
reaching their patrol or engagement areas� Saving the k mines thus not needed 
(given that k might represent only one mine—or a hundred) may reduce the 
risk to delivery platforms, or reduce the number of weapons required to meet 
the MOE, or both� In another situation, a defensive field might be designed to 
disrupt within an engagement area, with the planner choosing to aim at de-
stroy or mission abort to achieve the commander’s intent� Simply put, planners 
should have the capability to match a desired level of damage to the operational 
objective�
Minefield planning relies on understanding weapon-to-target matching, yet it 
maintains some characteristics of an art, in that it must account for the psycho-
logical perspectives of those subjected to the mining; both aspects will dictate the 
planner’s course of action� Commanders and planners must remember that the 
psychological aspect of mine warfare is often its greatest strength; therefore they 
should exploit the fears of the enemy creatively� However, planners should start 
from some core ideas, on which they can expand as needed� I offer the definitions 
of key terms below as such a starting point� (They assume the capability to plan 
and deliver precision-placed mines�) 
• Mine group: A set of mines placed to provide a layer of threat to a target� The 
mine group need not be linear� The advent of precision-placed mines will 
provide planners the ability to plan randomly, semirandomly, linearly, or 
with optimized precision� Planners can create all types of patterns, although 
for ease of illustration this article uses mine groups with linear patterns�
• Mine segment: A collection of mines that are associated with each other 
according to conditions that impact performance� Mine segments can exist 
within a mine group or can consist of one or more mine groups� Figure 1 
provides an example of multiple mine groups making up a mine segment, 
while figure 2 provides an example of a mine group that is segmented�
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• Minefield: A composition of one or more mine segments that are implement-
ed to achieve a specific operational objective. Minefields and segments are 
planned to meet an appropriate measure of effectiveness. Multiple minefields 








Multiple mine groups within a mine segment
FIGURE 1
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• Layered minefield: The design of a single or multiple minefields where the 
target is expected to pass through more than one mine segment or minefield. 
The purpose is to understand the cumulative threat to the target.
• Minefield set. A group of minefields used to achieve an operational objective 
in a specific area.
• Mine danger zone: An area that is declared—in accordance with the Hague 
Convention of 1907—to alert vessels that the designated area might contain 
maritime mines and that safe passage within the area may not be possible.19
Figure 3 is a graphical depiction of the concept of layered minefields. Ideally, 
the minefield would be planned to meet the desired level of damage and threat 
to a target. The minefields then would be layered to meet the desired operational 
objective.
PLANNING TO ACHIEVE AN OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE
Mine groups should be layered within the mine segment to build an appropriate 
level of threat within an area of the minefield. The two concepts that apply are 
the density of the mine group and the number of mine groups needed within a 
minefield to achieve the disrupt, fix, turn, and block functions. The psychologi-
cal condition of the enemy and its willingness to accept risk will determine the 
number of minefields and the density required to meet the commander’s intent. 







Layered mineelds within a mine danger zone
 
FIGURE 3
LAYERED MINEFIELDS WITHIN A MINE DANGER ZONE
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however, trends, status reports, and military judgment can provide enough infor-
mation to deploy an initial minefield, one that later can be reshaped or reseeded 
to strengthen it� A single sparse minefield might be sufficient to achieve the 
disrupt and fix effects, whereas robust minefields may be needed for successful 
turn or block functions� The number of possible targets in the area will impact the 
number of rows of mine groups or minefields needed to achieve the desired ef-
fect� Figure 4 shows a notional guidance to communicate concepts of application�
Although there are exceptions, disrupt-type fields typically will be constructed 
from mine groups consisting of fewer mines than would other types� Such mine-
fields will have fewer mine rows� A notional example is a minefield made up of 
two rows of mine groups, with each mine group presenting a threat level of x� 
Even though a disrupt field should require fewer mines, since it is not designed 
to blockade a port, an enemy may choose not to challenge the field, effectively 
making the disrupt field a block field�
Fix fields should have mine groups that provide a somewhat higher threat level 
than disrupt fields, to extend the delay time for strike missions by increasing the 
risk of mine-to-target interactions or to complicate enemy MCM efforts further� 
Yet fix fields will have the same, or a similar, number of rows of mine groups 
within a minefield� A notional example is a minefield made up of two rows of 
mine groups, with each mine group providing a threat level of y, where y > x, with 
x being the threat of a disrupt field�
Turn fields should have mine groups providing a significant threat and a large 
number of rows of mine groups� This increase in threat, along with the depth 
of the field, should represent enough risk to the enemy that it would rather run 
the risk of what awaits its ships through the turn than risk a continual transit 
through a field it cannot counter, owing to limitations in time or technology� A 
notional example is a minefield consisting of six rows of mine groups, with each 
mine group having a threat of z, where z > y, with y being the threat of a fix field�
Block fields should have mine groups providing a significant threat and a large 
number of rows, as well as some additional mines seeded to account for enemy 
persistence� The goal is to make transit through the minefield so perilous that an 
enemy refuses to challenge the field� However, complete and long-term blocks 
may be nearly impossible to achieve, depending on what attrition rates the en-
emy will accept� A notional example is a minefield consisting of six rows of mine 
groups, with each mine group having a threat of z + k, where z is the threat of a 
turn field and k represents the additional mines added to the minefield�
Figure 4 is merely illustrative; the mine groups might be consistent or incon-
sistent in their placement on the basis of length� A minefield planner will exer-
cise knowledge and creativity to determine where the individual mines should 
be placed� The figure provides an example useful for introducing concepts for 
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discussion. However, its primary purpose is to clarify terms, not to limit mining 
to ports; the same paradigm can be applied across maritime mining concepts.
PAIRING OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES WITH  
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
It is critical to pair operational objectives with appropriate MOEs. While simple 
initial threat is a good MOE to use for disrupt, and possibly fix, fields, it is a poor 
measure for establishing how many mines are required to block a determined 
adversary, because it does not take into account mine attrition resulting from 
strikes and MCM activity. Instead, penetrator distribution and expected casual-
ties (described below) would be suitable MOEs for the block function. Com-
manders must be able to articulate their intentions via pairing an operational 
objective with an MOE, such that clear communication occurs throughout the 
chain of command.
New MOEs also are needed—MOEs that fit with operational objectives. Oth-
















ONCEPTUAL MINE REQUIREMENTS PER OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE
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merely the best fit from within the current list of MOEs� Condensed definitions 
of MOEs and suggestions for pairing current MOEs with operational objectives 
are given below; however, current MOEs were not designed specifically to meet 
the operational objectives discussed�
It is also necessary to note that casualties are not always the best criterion for 
analyzing minefield success� For example, assume that in areas A and B a plan-
ner needs to achieve a turn, and uses cumulative casualty distribution to plan the 
minefields� In area A, the enemy chooses not to challenge the minefield and turns 
accordingly—thus, the minefield does not cause a single casualty—whereas in 
area B, the enemy chooses to challenge the minefield and loses three ships, but 
does not turn and is able to move forward� Considering the loss of enemy ships, 
one might conclude that area B was more effective; however, area A actually was 
more successful at supporting the strategic objectives for the conflict� This line 
of analysis demonstrates that new MOEs must be developed not only to match 
the intent of the commander’s operational objective correctly but also to broach 
a discussion about new MOEs for future mining capabilities� Table 1 provides 
MOE Descriptor
Time Two measures of time: 
(1)  the effective life of the minefield
(2)  the time required to execute the specified mining mission
Risk The threat level of the minefield to enemy transitors and the risk 
to friendly transitors (active mines that lack remote command and 
control are a risk to both enemy and friendly forces)
Initial threat The probability that the first vessel to attempt transiting through the 
minefield will become a casualty
Casualty density distribution The probability that exactly k casualties will occur in n transit at-
tempts through the minefield
Threat profile The minefield threat to each successive transitor in a sequence of n 
transit attempts through the minefield
Expected casualties The average number of casualties, k, in a given number of transits, 
n, through a minefield that would occur in a large number of repeti-
tions of n transit attempts under statistically equivalent conditions
Cumulative casualty distribution The probability of at least k casualties out of n transits through the 
minefield
Sustained threat The measure of a minefield’s ability to resist the effects of enemy 
mine countermeasures and provide a continued threat following pas-
sage of the first enemy transitors
Penetrator distribution The probability of exactly j penetrators (targets that safely transit the 
minefield) in n transit attempts through the minefield
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTORS OF CURRENT MOEs
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descriptors of current MOEs; table 2 provides recommendations for matching 
them to objectives� 
The methodology used pairs the operational objective with the current MOE 
that best suits the intent of the operational objective� For example, if the intent is 
to disrupt an enemy, the best MOEs to use may be time and initial threat, because 
of the relative amount of investment required to achieve the desired effects� If 
the intent is to cause an enemy to delay the departure of his assets and force him 
to conduct MCM, merely causing him to perceive some threat may delay the 
departure of ships and bring on MCM operations� This may be achieved via an 
initial threat versus a penetrator distribution, which might obviate the need for a 
massive investment, depending on the choices made for the j penetrators out of 
n transitors�
WHY IT MATTERS
The mine warfare community is small; it lacks the exposure and training afforded 
to many other warfare areas� This has decayed the understanding and valuation 
of the U�S� Navy’s mining capability, which then compounds the exposure and 
training deficits� This result further complicates matters through a loss of ap-
preciation for the painstaking process that minefield planners must complete to 
continue to provide sound plans�
Having clear operational objectives and their associated MOEs linked together 
will provide decision makers with the information necessary to match each MOE 
to its desired effect� The question of what simple initial threat is needed to block-
ade a port is a difficult one even in a specific context, especially when even the 
threat of a minefield may blockade a port� However, until we fully understand 
the psychology of our adversary—a daunting proposition—it is clear that we 
must look at more-appropriate MOEs to achieve a blockade� Effective mining is 
Operational Objective Applicable MOEs(time and sustained threat are implied considerations throughout)
Disrupt Initial threat
Fix Initial threat
Low levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution, penetrator 
distribution
Turn High levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution, penetrator 
distribution
Block Highest levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution,  
penetrator distribution
TABLE 2
RECOMMENDED PAIRINGS USING CURRENT MOEs
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achieved through clear operational objectives, MOEs, training, planning tools, 
and effective delivery� Tools and training should be developed to optimize what 
can be delivered, considering the dynamics of conflict�
THE MINES OF TOMORROW
During a November 2015 Mine Warfare Association event, Expeditionary War-
fare (OPNAV N95) discussed several efforts to advance the capabilities of mari-
time mining� The current mine inventory is seeing new algorithms and increased 
capabilities� Some of the mines of tomorrow will be delivered from unmanned 
underwater vehicles equipped with large-diameter tubes� Technological initia-
tives are striving to create precision mining with standoff for air-delivery plat-
forms; other efforts include remote-control capability and wide-area coverage�20 
Open-source literature gives us a glimpse of possibilities, starting with the next 
iteration of air-delivered mines�
Precision air-delivered mines for use at standoff ranges are being created 
from mine components that are already in the U�S� inventory� Efforts to provide 
mines with the same splash-point accuracy of a Joint Direct Attack Munition 
are under way through Quickstrike-J� To expand further the capability of preci-
sion air-delivered mines, efforts to extend ranges also are moving forward with 
Quickstrike-ER� Success will allow a B-52H to lay an entire minefield in one 
pass, without having to fly over the minefield, while achieving mine-placement 
accuracies within six meters of aim points on the seabed�21
Smart mining will provide commanders with wide-area-coverage minefields, 
positive control of the minefield, and the ability to engage multiple targets that use 
the same transit path� Unlike traditional minefields, a single weapon-to-target in-
teraction does not cause a hole in the minefield (assuming that there is more than 
a single weapon); thus, a persistent threat to traffic will remain despite adversary 
efforts to channelize traffic to minimize traditional mine engagements�
McGeehan and Wahl call for the use of underwater gliders to carry guidance 
and trigger systems and explosives—effectively, to convert them into smart 
mines� Their concept calls for using “flash mob” tactics: mobile mines converg-
ing on shipping lanes and choke points, or simply creating a barrier� These mines 
would be able to avoid mine countermeasures while waiting for instructions� Fur-
thermore, such a concept would allow friendly units to pass through safely, with 
the barrier reestablished behind them� New effects also are being introduced to 
detain ships by fouling props and rudders, or disabling them by other nonkinetic 
means� Using nonlethal mines would allow the neutralization rather than the 
sinking of targets—to enforce an embargo, for instance�22
The United States is not the only country interested in using mining to re-
duce the capabilities of potential adversaries� According to GlobalSecurity�org, 
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Iran can produce nonmagnetic, free-floating, and remote-controlled mines�23 
Furthermore, it also may have acquired mines from Russia and negotiated for 
rocket-propelled rising mines from China� In another example, Goldstein pro-
vides evidence that China views maritime mining as an important component 
of naval warfare�24 Its concepts for mine delivery include air, surface, and sub-
surface platforms that can deliver mines so as to provide challenges in both ports 
and open water� Mining is such a key component for China that fishing vessels 
may be called on to “block foreign enemy intervention�” To counter our surveil-
lance, MCM, and antisubmarine warfare capabilities, China also is looking at 
emerging technology to target aircraft, using mines that launch missiles� Truver 
further describes China’s mining capability, mentioning that the country has 
more than thirty types of mines, including remote-controlled, rocket-propelled, 
and mobile varieties�25 Several other countries’ capabilities in maritime mining 
are progressing, and it would be a mistake to think they are looking only at tra-
ditional measures�
MINEFIELD PLANNING CAPABILITIES
Pietrucha points out that advances in mining technology are outpacing the capac-
ity of planners to design minefields properly� As new maritime mining capabili-
ties are added, the tools and concepts of mine warfare should evolve to maximize 
the effectiveness of the new maritime mines�26 This is particularly important with 
regard to the emerging capabilities of the Clandestine Delivered Mine System (in 
which unmanned vehicles deliver mines) and the new Quickstrike-J/ER mine 
(which will be in service shortly), followed by other advanced mining concepts�
Initial threat is determined with regard to the minefield as it exists before an 
enemy attempts to challenge the minefield� After the initial target-to-weapon 
engagement (particularly in cases involving explode-in-place mines) the threat 
level is changed, because the minefield itself is no longer the same� A new analy-
sis would be needed to determine the threat that the remaining mines represent� 
In some cases, planners and operational leaders themselves—especially those 
unfamiliar with mining—may not understand the reduction in the threat that 
the revised field poses, and may assume that the initial threat is sustained for 
each target� Such an interpretation might lead to operational or tactical miscal-
culation, perhaps with catastrophic results� On the other hand, mining concepts 
based on weaponized distributive sensor nodes may mean that the threat will be 
consistent for each target until weapon depletion, assuming the field is planned 
to engage each target�
Minefield planning capabilities and language must be created to enable plan-
ning for and communicating about future minefields, especially those involv-
ing precision placement� For instance, planners should be able to convey plans 
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readily for various traffic patterns� This is particularly important for fields in 
choke points (for cumulative casualty–type measures) and open-water fields (in 
which targets might advance in a spread formation, enabling the minefield to in-
teract with multiple targets at once)� It is possible simply to add terms to current 
and future minefield plans to differentiate the assumptions� Examples include 
channelized cumulative casualty distribution and random cumulative casualty dis-
tribution, where channelized and random are meant to clarify assumptions about 
the targets’ behavior through the minefield (channelized: targets enter the field in 
a line; random: targets enter the field at random locations)� Effective language is 
needed to communicate the specifics of fields that soon may be constructed us-
ing a greatly expanded list of effectors, and this language should be incorporated 
into the planning tool�
MINING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS EXPANSION
While operational objectives are critical to any strategy, it is important for mine 
planners and commanders to have something against which to measure their 
fields� While the MOEs now in place measure current capabilities adequately, 
emerging mining capabilities will require new MOEs to assess their effects� In the 
discussion below I identify concepts for MOE expansion to meet the upgraded 
capabilities of today’s mines, as well as those of tomorrow�
The first is continuous threat�27 The premise is to plan fields for a threat level 
for n number of targets, given k number of effectors� (For now, explosive effec-
tors that engage one target will be the focus, but the Navy also is assessing various 
other effectors, both kinetic and nonkinetic�) Essentially, continuous threat means 
being able to maintain simple initial threat for a determined number of follow-on 
targets� For example, the simple initial threat may be x for the first targets, then 
be lowered to y for the next, while continuous threat maintains the threat of x 
for various targets� Planners would be able to incorporate effectively targeting 
optimization, counters, probability of fire, delay arm, and other capabilities early 
on in the planning process to determine the resources required to create the or-
dered field� Furthermore, with the ability in the near future to practice precision 
placement of mines and to combine that with some degree of positive control of 
the minefield, the command and control authority should be able to check the 
“health” of the field and maintain it by reseeding mines or reshaping the field� 
This should permit the authority to limit the number of sorties required to ensure 
that the field maintains its designed threat level right up until the field can no 
longer achieve the intended threat level or is depleted of effectors� While a num-
ber of factors dictate the threat the field represents, the premise is to maintain 
the threat against multiple targets, regardless of what formation or channeliza-
tion they choose� This MOE is particularly relevant to weaponized distributive 
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sensor–type mining systems. Continuous threat is one of the small number of 
MOEs that should fit under any of the operational objectives.
A natural extension from the continuous threat MOE is the threat over time 
MOE. The concept is that commanders would be able to implement threat to n 
targets per day (or some other time measure—e.g., hours) for a desired duration. 
The idea is to optimize systems so as to vary threat level t for n out of k targets 
per day over some duration of time. This MOE may be used to highlight spe-
cific times of interest, such as high tide; reduce threat during low tide; or simply 
exercise a variable threat throughout the time. Planners can employ this MOE 
with creativity to achieve their objectives. The threat over time MOE lends itself 
to forecasting reseeding requirements, which would assist with asset and supply 
planning, as well as providing considerations for repositioning planning (shoot 
and relocate, shoot and withdraw) for self-relocating effectors and effector/ 
vehicle minefields or applications of remote command and control with explode-
in-place mines. This MOE would fall under the disrupt and fix operational 
objectives.
Extensions of the current time MOE might capture estimated time of opera-
tional effect. Extension becomes necessary when, for instance, a minefield is still 
active even though it no longer can achieve its original intended objective. The 
MOE would be based on mixed-method analysis from known capabilities and 
military judgment, refined as information and intent change throughout the 
conflict. This MOE inherently suffers from numerous sources for error; how-
ever, it also has the potential to provide an answer concerning time. For example, 
consider the commander’s operational objective of blockade, intended to close 
a port. While the ability to execute a mining mission is critical, the importance 
Target















This graphic communicates the idea that a threat level can remain 
the same for targets, until the system is no longer capable of 
maintaining threat, e.g. all weapons are expended
5
This graphic communicates the idea that a threat level can remain the same for targets until the system is 
no longer capable of maintaining threat—e.g., all weapons are expended.
FIGURE 5
CONTINUOUS THREAT
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of the amount of time the field will be operationally relevant should not be lost; 
thus, the commander will want to know the best estimate for the length of time 
the field will be able operationally to support the strategic objectives of the 
fleet. Providing this answer requires combining multiple variables into a “best 
estimate.” Answering the commander’s important question—“How long?”—will 
require a range of subject-matter experts to assist the planner in assigning values 
to these variables. The first variable is the initial threat of the field needed (with 
counter-countermeasures already defined) to cause the enemy to perceive threat 
in the port. The second variable is the enemy’s acceptable attrition rate—that is, 
what level of casualties he is willing to accept to challenge the field (including 
with hardened vessels or those that choose to disregard the risk) before con-
ducting professional MCM. Essentially, this variable captures what attrition the 
enemy considers acceptable in attempting to open a channel via brute-force port 
breakout.
The next variable considers enemy MCM. To calculate its value, intelligence 
officers will determine how important the port is relative to other ports, the en-
emy’s order of battle for clearing fields, where those credible enemy MCM assets 
are located, and how long it will take for them to transit to the port of interest. 
Assigning a value to this variable will require assistance from MCM experts and 
intelligence officers. MCM experts will use software tools (such as the Naval 
Mine Warfare Simulation) to determine how long it will take to clear a channel 
through the field. Intelligence officers will estimate the enemy’s level of accept-
able risk, as well as an MCM skill multiplier that compares the enemy’s abilities 
with our own, based on trends and other sources of information. Once these 
values are determined, the planner can create a minefield calculated to provide 
Target


















The gure abstractly communicates the potential to vary threat to dierent 
targets across some length of time. For instance, Time 1 may be a single day, 
with consistent threat for the rst 6 targets (n), then vary threat levels (t) 
over the k targets with respect to time. Multiple Threat Times are depicted to 
address the exibility of the time scale, weeks, days, hours, etc. Time 2 
demonstrates threat during a specic time, such as high tide. Time 3 shows 




The figure abstractly communicates the potential to vary threat to different targets across some length of time. For instance, Time 1 may be 
a single day, with consistent threat for the first six targets (n), t n varying threat levels ( ) over the k targets with respect to time. Multiple 
threat times are depicted to address the flexibility of the time scale: weeks, days, hours, etc. Time 2 demonstrates threat during a specific time, 
such as high tide. Time 3 shows the potential for variation across targets over time.
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an estimated time of operational effect. Like continuous threat, this MOE will fit 
under any of the operational objectives.
The final MOE offered is scalable traffic. While this MOE can have direct 
military application, it mainly is intended to support political and economic 
impacts. Ideally, this MOE would be associated with a mine that is highly reliable 
and has an efficient discrimination capability. Examples of military applications 
include forcing the enemy to change his replenishment behavior and reducing 
traffic in an area to increase the probability that a given vessel in the minefield is a 
desired target. Achieving a political/economic impact would require knowing, or 
estimating with some appropriate level of confidence, what level of threat would 
be needed to deter noncombatants from entering an area of interest. This MOE 
would require initial research efforts to provide an estimate of likely courses of 
action from military, commercial, and private vessels that commonly operate 
within an area of interest. This MOE would allow commanders to employ the 
minimum number of mines required to change the traffic of vessels in specific 
categories.
However, planners’ capacity to map with this ability in mind requires conduct-
ing research and considering trends amid circumstances that may be in flux. For 
example, assume that the objective is to stop a particular shipping company from 





This graphic showcases how trac density can decrease based upon levels  
of mine threat. This reduction of trac improves the engagement environment, 







This graphic showcases how traffic density can decrease on the basis of levels of mine threat. This reduction of traffic improves the 
engagement environment, reducing the probability of unintended tracking and collateral damage.
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is not highly motivated to risk damage—entering a minefield would cancel its 
insurance policy� This consideration disrupts the delivery timetable� However, 
some companies or state-sponsored ships might be willing to challenge the field, 
owing to a monetary or other kind of inducement promised for undertaking the 
challenge� The research should attempt to determine how much risk or attrition 
would be sufficient to convince all comers that the risk is not worth the reward� 
While one minefield may turn away ships in one group, an increased threat or 
level of attrition might be required to turn away those in another group� Further-
more, knowing how traffic should react provides planners with a starting point 
for selecting mine counter-countermeasures and provides some indication of the 
probability that the vessels within the minefield are targets of interest� Reducing 
the density of nontargets within an area lowers the likelihood that unintended 
targets will be tracked or hit, and provides warfighters with a clearer picture of 
the battle space� The concept even might be applied in the form of announcing 
a fictitious or phony minefield in an effort to reduce traffic so as to provide sub-
marines a clearer area of operation� This concept also can be applied to the goal 
of diverting traffic� Scalable traffic could fit under the operational objectives of 
disrupt and turn�
Current mining paradigms and shape concepts must be improved to prepare for 
the mining of the future� Doing so will require creating categories of operational 
objectives to assist commanders and planners in clarifying intent� The ability to 
plan for various effects on a target (e�g�, mobility kill, particularly when nonlethal 
mines are operational) will allow planners to recommend options that could 
achieve the intent while possibly reducing the number of mines required to com-
plete a mission� Such a reduction in mines likely would reduce costs, in terms 
of both risk and inventory� Linking operational objectives to MOEs will provide 
warfighters with a clear understanding of what type of effort must be carried out 
to realize the commander’s intent� Investing in new minefield planning capabili-
ties and MOEs will enable the fleet to capitalize now on emerging capabilities 
even as they prepare for mid- and long-term capabilities� It is critical that the 
concepts, language, support, and tools for the mines of tomorrow keep pace with 
the development of those mines�
Table 3 shows what tomorrow’s MOE pairings may look like�
Commanders and planners would be able to discuss varying levels of threat 
to the target and would have a clear starting point for discussing objectives and 
measures� Neal Kusumoto has written: “The real success of mining is often 
indirect and usually difficult to measure� The operational artist is faced with 
the choice of either building an MOE with his situation’s strategic and opera-
tional objectives clearly in mind, choosing one of the existing MOEs knowing its 
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limitations, or assuming a certain level of effect�”28 While the MOEs suggested in 
this article certainly do not encompass all those needed, a conversation should 
begin now regarding investment of the time necessary to update doctrine� This 
may relieve the pressure on some future planner attempting to match intent with 
MOEs during a conflict, allowing him or her to focus on the actual plan instead�
N O T E S
Operational Objective
Applicable MOEs
(estimated time of operational effect, time, and sustained threat  
are implied considerations throughout)
Disrupt Initial threat, continuous threat, threat over time, scalable traffic
Fix Initial threat
Low levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution, 
penetrator distribution, continuous threat, threat over time
Turn High levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution, 
penetrator distribution, continuous threat, scalable traffic
Block Highest levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution, 
penetrator distribution, continuous threat
TABLE 3
POSSIBLE PAIRINGS USING FUTURE MOEs
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 The current competitive environment creates new imperatives in the Navy to sharpen our research skills and expand the range of methods we use to inves-
tigate questions about warfare and the Navy enterprise. The call to innovate has 
given rise to a number of very thoughtful critiques and suggestions.1 For example, 
there is renewed interest within the Navy in using wargaming, game theory, and 
experimentation to illuminate war-fighting challenges.2 However, none of these 
critiques or suggestions takes into consideration the nature of the research chal-
lenge or research standards.
Sometimes the use of particular research methods is promoted without under-
standing why analysts choose to use one method versus another or how to use each 
one most effectively to achieve particular objec-
tives.3 As many in the war-fighting research com-
munity are quick to point out, well-intended but 
overzealous analytical enthusiasms often lead to 
inefficient investment and disappointment, which 
inevitably generate critiques and calls for reform. 
In the worst case, a misguided analysis is used to 
support decisions that have tragic outcomes.
Innovating and expanding the range of methods 
we use to understand war fighting are a good idea—
provided they are informed by a clear understand-
ing of our objectives and research-performance 
criteria. However, in its review of joint profes-
sional military education research institutions, 
the Government Accountability Office concludes 
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that the Department of Defense (DoD) does not have criteria to assess research 
performance�4 The results of a 2017 workshop on the Navy’s operations research 
enterprise suggest that the Navy shares this challenge�5
The purpose of this article is to provide a starting point for addressing the 
military research-performance criteria gap by examining the nature of war 
fighting as a research challenge in the context of professional research standards 
and exploring how we could better assess, select, and evaluate methods�6 The 
first section analyzes the nature of war fighting as a research challenge and the 
implications for designing and evaluating research� The second section provides 
an overview of research design and the role of professional research standards in 
selecting methods and evaluating findings� The third and fourth sections analyze 
the strengths and limitations of wargaming, experimentation, and game theory 
against criteria that emerge from the analyses in sections 1 and 2� The final sec-
tion concludes by offering suggestions for improving our research practices�
THE NATURE OF THE RESEARCH CHALLENGE
With regard to analyzing warfare, the Navy (and the military more generally) 
has two challenges, which often are conflated� One challenge is to understand 
the nature of warfare as it evolves and how to fight, which informs the full range 
of the Title 10 concerns of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)� The other is 
to educate current and future warfighters, which primarily informs the CNO’s 
responsibility to organize, man, and train Navy forces�7
The first challenge involves ensuring that we design and conduct high-quality 
investigations that advance knowledge and inform everyday decision-making� 
The second is a pedagogical challenge that involves ensuring that our teaching 
methods achieve our learning objectives� If we wish to select the best methods for 
war-fighting research, we must be clear from the outset about the nature of the 
research challenge, which requires specifying the level of analysis, the nature or 
context of war fighting, and the questions we wish to investigate�
Specification
Joint doctrine provides a starting point for considering a broad range of military 
research questions at multiple levels of analysis� Figure 1 illustrates the levels of 
warfare� Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (JP 1) defines warfare 
as “the mechanism, method, or modality of armed conflict against an enemy� It 
is the ‘how’ of waging war�”8 While most of the Navy’s war-fighting challenges 
have implications at all levels of analysis, to craft a rigorous and coherent research 
design one must focus on a particular level of analysis� For the purpose of discus-
sion, this article narrows its analysis to one of the Navy’s three primary missions: 
how we can be ready to fight (and win) in a specific area of responsibility (AOR)� 
This is a research question at the operational level of warfare�
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One way to specify the operational level of war fighting in an AOR is as a 
series of strategic interactions. In this specification, the term strategic interaction 
does not pertain to the strategic level of warfare but rather to a type of behavior 
in which participants interacting in a system attempt to anticipate each other’s 
preferences, decisions, and actions/reactions; formulate perceptions and beliefs 
about the behavior of other participants, on the basis of available information or 
past experience; and make decisions about their own actions on the basis of their 
perceptions and beliefs about the other participants’ actions/reactions.
War fighting is a strategic interaction because two or more units are engaged 
in some form of rivalry, the scope of which may include a range of strategic 
behavior, from cooperation to competition to full-scale conflict. The focus of a 
research investigation is on some aspect of the behavior and effects of war fight-
ing: the decisions that warfighters make; the signals they produce; the processes 
and capabilities they employ; the effects of inputs to decision-making, such as 
information, beliefs, and incentives to act; the costs, benefits, risks, and effects of 
the choices that warfighters make; and so on.
The next step is to specify the context of operational-level war-fighting deci-
sion behavior. Many war-fighting behaviors emerge from a complex, adaptive 
system of physical and social systems. Complexity has a number of implications 
for designing and conducting research on strategic interaction.9 In operations 
research, decision-making challenges associated with complexity are called 
“wicked challenges.” Wicked challenges cannot be formulated definitively; they 
have neither a well-defined set of right-or-wrong solutions nor a well-described 
set of permissible operations; discrepancies can be explained in many different 
ways; and there is no immediate or ultimate test of a solution. While developing 
Battles











Source: Joint Publication 1.0, g. 1−2
FIGURE 1
LEVELS OF WARFARE
Source: U.S. Defense Dept., Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, fig. 1-2.
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war-fighting capabilities involves bench science, engineering, and social science, 
war fighting involves behavioral challenges that cannot be solved or addressed 
by science or probabilistic mathematics alone� This means that it is inherently 
a fuzzy rather than a formal logic challenge, which requires methods and tools 
that allow us to deal with vagueness and classification issues in a systematic and 
tractable way�10
If we wish to investigate decision-making questions at the operational level of 
warfare, we should employ research methods that are useful for analyzing strate-
gic decision behavior in complex adaptive systems� To do this, we need to specify 
what we mean by complexity, and its implications for research design�
Complex Adaptive Systems
Research questions that involve complicated systems, such as determining the 
range of a missile or a torpedo, may be complicated—but they are not wicked� 
They have knowable parameters and a small number of potential outcomes, and 
with the right set of methods one can generate estimates within a set of confi-
dence intervals� But questions related to decision-making in complex adaptive 
systems, such as deciding whether to launch a missile or a torpedo or where to 
target weapons, have fuzzy parameters and a potentially large number of alterna-
tive courses of action and outcomes� We may be able to observe patterns in the 
behaviors that emerge from complex adaptive systems, but we cannot eliminate 
the possibility that these patterns are transitory or extraneous� Hence, we may not 
be able to generate reliable estimates�
Similarly, we may find correlations in the behavior of components of complex 
adaptive systems, but it may not be possible to accumulate evidence that demon-
strates causal relations� For example, warfighters can and do change the nature 
of a rivalry by manipulating factors related to time, space, and force� Variables 
include the types of participants; functions and enablers, such as command 
and control, intelligence, fires, logistics, maneuver, position, cyber, and other 
assets or capabilities in their AOR; the scope of permissible action and rules of 
engagement; the enforcement of rules; and the imposition of costs and benefits� 
Warfighters make decisions or take actions on the basis of an estimate of who or 
what their adversaries and allies are at any given point in time and what actions 
those adversaries and allies have taken or will take� Hence, to understand the 
behavior of one warfighter, one must understand the behavior of others within 
the relevant war-fighting environment, which may extend beyond the immedi-
ate AOR�
Behavior that emerges from complex adaptive systems can be differentiated 
from behavior in complicated systems in a number of ways� First, behavior is self-
organizing and exhibits both deliberate and spontaneous order� Self-organizing 
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behavior occurs without explicit command or control and depends on locally 
operating social and technical processes, which may be quite difficult to observe.
Second, the structure of complex adaptive behavior is distributed—or, more 
specifically, is polycentric—and it is multiscale. We can expect to find more than 
one center of decision-making and control, which means that a single, hierarchi-
cal form of command and control does not govern the system, even though some 
subsystems may be centralized or decentralized hierarchies. Multiscale behavior 
cannot be described by a single rule or analyzed at a single level; the structure of 
behavior exists on multiple scales and multiple levels.
Finally, while complex adaptive systems are sensitive to initial conditions, 
they often exhibit contradictory behavior. We may find path dependencies and 
stable equilibrium; however, these systems are ultimately dynamic, and we also 
can expect to find punctuated equilibrium, “black swans,” interdependencies, 
and nonlinearity.
It is extremely challenging to comprehend complex adaptive systems. If we 
wish to understand the behavior that emerges from these systems, we must be 
very careful in how we design and evaluate research.
RESEARCH DESIGN
As figure 2 shows, research design begins by specifying a purpose and objective(s) 
for the work. Objectives drive research design, which includes reviewing prior re-
search, then selecting approaches, methods, and tools to conduct research. The 
ultimate test of research findings is the extent to which they meet research objec-
tives, contribute to producing knowledge that is supported by facts and logical 




The Foundations of War-Fighting Research Design
FIGURE 2
THE FOUNDATIONS OF WAR-FIGHTING RESEARCH DESIGN
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The objective of operational-level war-fighting research may be to create or 
contribute to a body of basic research or applied research� For example, a basic-
research project on operational-level war fighting could involve trying to develop 
or test theories about enduring questions, such as why adversaries fight, how 
certain types of conflict end, or which signaling behaviors are associated with 
particular types of operations� Findings could contribute to advancing general 
knowledge about war fighting by providing evidence that either supports or does 
not support theories about the challenge�
By contrast, an applied-research project could involve identifying the func-
tions and enablers that are required to support an operational concept in a partic-
ular AOR under a specific set of conditions� It may or may not test theories about 
an operational challenge, but it could inform operational planning� The findings 
could help senior leaders and planners better understand the implications of 
using the operational concept that is being investigated in a specific context at a 
particular moment in time�
Once the objectives of research are determined, the principles that guide re-
search design and execution are quite similar� The overarching goal of research is 
to produce findings that have inferential value for other researchers, educators, 
and practitioners� However, this can pose a challenge for research design� Pro-
fessional research communities have expertise in research design� They impose 
stringent requirements for inferential value because society entrusts them to both 
build the stock of knowledge and guard the integrity of this stock� In contrast, 
practitioners might not have expertise in research design and they might accept 
less-stringent requirements for inferential value because they are not charged 
with building or guarding the stock of knowledge� Researchers must take these 
differences into consideration when they design research and share it with others�
War-fighting challenges cross disciplines, and research-design practices can 
vary across disciplines and research groups� For example, understanding the 
effects of hitting a target with a missile involves a grasp of knowledge that re-
searchers accumulate in physics, chemistry, material sciences, engineering, social 
sciences such as psychology and political economy, and so on� However, profes-
sional researchers, regardless of their disciplines, are trained to think about their 
work in the context of normal science and to use some version of the scientific 
method in the way they design and conduct their research�11 Table 1 lists the 
generally accepted steps in research design�
The aim of research design is to produce findings that will contribute to a 
stock of accumulated knowledge� This may involve testing an existing theory 
about a research challenge or developing a new theory� A peer-review process 
determines whether research findings will be added to the official stock� While 
peer reviews are notoriously idiosyncratic, the research communities do have 
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standard operating practices, which aim to assess and enforce rigor� Measures of 
rigor relate to validity, or the extent to which the way research is designed and 
carried out generates findings that actually measure what the researcher intended 
to measure; reliability, which refers to whether the researcher’s measuring proce-
dure, used in the same way, will produce the same measure; and replicability, or 
the extent to which another equally capable researcher could duplicate an analy-
sis using the same data and reach the same conclusions�12
Other professional research standards include taking steps to minimize bias 
and error in research procedures and ensuring, to the extent possible, that re-
search procedures are parsimonious (explaining as simply as possible, with as 
little extraneous detail as possible)� Finally, researchers are expected to be humble 
and to share their knowledge� All knowledge and all inference have limits; the 
best researchers are collegial skeptics who are able and willing to ask about the 
relevance of data, the appropriateness of research and analytical procedures, and 
the possibility of alternative explanations for inferences� They disseminate their 
research findings widely, in accessible ways, to stimulate and accelerate knowl-
edge production�
TABLE 1
STEPS IN PROFESSIONAL RESEARCH DESIGN
Notes:
a. Data may be quantitative (amounts or quantities, in the form of numbers or proportions) or qualitative (in the form of characteristics or qualities).
b. Mathematical, statistical, and machine-learning methods, which typically are called quantitative methods, require quantitative data. By contrast, qualita-
tive methods, such as histories, case studies, and interviews, rely on qualitative data.
Step Activity Issues/Questions
1 Specify an interesting purpose 
and objectives
What do we need to address to advance the stock of knowledge, such that 
it has broader impact?
2 Survey the scholarly and empiri-
cal research literature
What do we know about the issues associated with our purpose and 
objectives, and how strong is the evidence? That is, what are existing 
theories (i�e�, reasoned and logically consistent speculations about the 
answers to research questions) about our research challenge? What is the 
evidence that supports these theories? How extensive is the empirical 
support? How rigorous is the support? 
3 Formulate research questions 
as hypotheses and develop a 
detailed plan to investigate or 
test the degree of support for the 
hypotheses
Which data can we realistically collect to test theory?a How will we 
collect, structure, record, and archive the data we collect? How will we 
analyze data? Analytical questions focus on evaluating alternative testing 
methods to identify the one that best fits our research objectives and the 
type of data we are able to collect�b
4 Conduct the research How can we use data and conduct analyses to generate inferences that are 
unbiased by error? How can we increase leverage while minimizing the 
information used for description or inference?
5 Disseminate research results Research conducted to advance the stock of public knowledge is submit-
ted for peer review and published as widely as possible in scholarly and 
other public media� Research conducted to advance a private stock of 
knowledge also should be peer-reviewed and disseminated as widely as 
possible within the constraints of the research tasking�
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METHODS
Research design includes surveying research methods and selecting the one best 
suited to achieving research objectives� Recently the Navy research community 
has been reconsidering three methods to investigate questions about decisions 
and interactions in war fighting: wargaming, experimentation, and game theory� 
This section provides an overview of these methods, and the following section 
evaluates them against the criteria discussed in the preceding sections�
Wargaming
The Navy has employed wargaming as a method for investigating war fighting 
since at least 1887�13 The Navy’s use of wargaming has been shaped indelibly by 
the work of Captain William McCarty Little, Captain Wilbur R� Van Auken, and 
Francis McHugh� These early researchers developed wargaming at the Naval War 
College over a period that spanned the founding of the College, the interwar pe-
riod, and the Cold War era� McCarty Little is credited with introducing wargam-
ing into the Naval War College in 1887, and he wrote a number of papers on the 
subject�14 Van Auken was hired to stand up a research department at the College 
in 1932 to document and analyze wargame findings�15 However, it is McHugh 
who is associated most closely with developing the disciplined and systematic 
methodological approach to using wargames to analyze war fighting that the 
College’s War Gaming Department (NWC WGD) uses today�16
McHugh, incorporating McCarty Little’s work, defined wargaming as follows: 
“A war game is a simulation, in accordance with pre-determined rules, data, and 
procedures, of selected aspects of a conflict situation� It is an artificial—or more 
strictly, a theoretical—conflict � � � to afford a practice field for the acquirement of 
skill and experience in the conduct or direction of war, and an experimental and 
trial ground for the testing of strategic and tactical plans�”17
Today, the NWC WGD conducts wargames for the senior leadership of the 
Navy, primarily at the operational level of war in the context of great-power 
competition� Wargaming is a systematic method for experiencing the effects of 
war-fighting decisions and analyzing decision behavior� A wargame is a represen-
tation of a war-fighting decision-making dilemma—a representation that may or 
may not conform to what we can or will observe in the naturally occurring world� 
It is a representation of a real war fight, in the sense that players are actually play-
ing the game, and hence engaging in decision-making related to war fighting� 
Disciplined wargamers begin with a decision challenge, specify their research 
objective(s), and then design an experience that will illuminate the decision in 
such a way that they will achieve these objectives�18
In a typical wargame, players (individuals or groups with experience or re-
sponsibilities that are relevant to the decision challenge) are recruited to play the 
game in teams� Individuals who are not involved directly in playing the game act 
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as facilitators, adjudicators, data collectors, and analysts� Individuals are selected 
to participate on the basis of their expertise and understanding of the decision 
context� For example, if a researcher or research sponsor wishes to investigate 
the strengths and limitations of a concept of operations (CONOPS), the validity 
and reliability of the findings from game play depend to a great extent on how 
knowledgeable the participants are about the operating environment and the 
capabilities that the CONOPS requires them to employ� In other words, expe-
rienced warfighters should be asked to fight using the CONOPS and all their 
acquired knowledge and skill� Typically, none of the participants in a game is 
selected or assigned randomly�
Players and other participants are provided with scene setters, an environment 
in an operating area, and scenarios, which create a decision-making context and 
provide them with rules of engagement, resources, capabilities, and limitations� 
Games may be designed to represent conflict between two opposing units (two-
sided) or among multiple teams, which may be allied or opposed (multisided)�19 
The main point is that the game pits players against a rival or adversary� Partici-
pants may use computers in their play; manually manipulate assets and forces 
on a board; or deliberate, record, and convey their decisions in a seminar or 
workshop-style format�
Another group of participants controls the play of the game and adjudicates 
the effects of the decisions that players make� At the end of the game, players 
discuss the game experience, including the logic they used in playing the game, 
the challenges they encountered, and so on� Game play—including facilitation 
and after-action discussion—is observed and recorded by a data collection and 
analysis team� Following the conclusion of the game, the team organizes game-
play data; conducts analysis against a predetermined set of research questions, 
using qualitative and quantitative methods; reports on findings; and archives all 
game material�
The NWC WGD has a professional wargame research-design process that 
includes the steps that are typical in professional research design, which are 
modified to accommodate the Navy’s requirements for wargaming�20 The WGD’s 
current wargame-research process, which is depicted in figure 3, includes speci-
fying the challenge, purpose, and objectives of wargame research; conducting 
a literature review and articulating research questions; developing a research 
design that includes a data-collection and -analysis plan; designing and testing a 
game to achieve research objectives and address research questions; developing 
and testing the game; executing the game; conducting analysis; writing a report, 
which is peer-reviewed and disseminated to an approved audience; and archiving 
game artifacts� This disciplined process makes it possible to replicate the game, 
repeat the game, or iterate on some aspect of the game�21
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The fact that the NWC WGD has a professional wargame research-design 
process does not guarantee the quality or inferential value of its research prod-
ucts. As in any research enterprise, the research process may not be implemented 
perfectly at all times, researchers in the department may not always have the skills 
or tools they need at the time they need them to conduct rigorous research for 
particular challenges, and those who direct research tasking may wish to sacrifice 
analytical rigor to achieve other objectives.
NWC WGD wargaming research is conducted at classified levels and added 
to stocks of knowledge that the Navy and DoD maintain. The department’s 
wargames are peer-reviewed by other wargamers and decision analysts who are 
engaged in developing and evaluating war-fighting concepts and plans. Wargam-
ing is used in civilian research and learning and reported in publicly accessible 
scholarly research on conflict and decision behavior. There are many trade press 
publications on wargaming; however, few address it in the context of professional 
research criteria.
Experimentation
Most of us intuitively search for associations and causal relationships to explain 
and improve on our experience, and often we engage in a process of trial and er-
ror to arrive at a useful solution to a challenge. However, trial and error is a costly 
approach. The Navy has employed experimentation to identify a range of useful 
solutions to war-fighting challenges at the operational level of warfare.22 Formal 
experiments test the influence of one or a small number of causes of observed 
effects.23 Researchers articulate a specific theory of cause and effect, take an ac-
tion consistent with their theory (a treatment), attempt to control for extraneous 
influences that could limit or bias the hypothetical causal relationship, and sys-
tematically observe and record the effects of the manipulation.
Some analysts associate experimentation with the physical sciences and a 
tightly controlled laboratory environment. However, the experimental method 









Naval War College Wargame Research-Design Process
Source: Burns, ed., War Gamers’ Handbook
FIGURE 3
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE WARGAME RESEARCH-DESIGN PROCESS
Source: Burns, War Gamers’ Handbook.
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been developed over time to address variation in research challenges and ana-
lytical settings.24 Experiments and experimental frameworks are a well-described 
component of military operations research. Richard A. Kass, the Technical Coop-
eration Program (TTCP), and the Navy Warfare Development Center (NWDC) 
have published detailed, practical guides on war-fighting experimentation.25 All 
three of these guides categorize analytical wargaming as a type of experimental 
method. Experiments also are used in the social and computational sciences, 
which are the scholarly disciplines that address basic and applied decision- 
making challenges. Moreover, both wargaming and game-theoretic approaches 
can be used in combination with experimentation.26
All experiments consist of four elements: (1) units or persons, (2) treatments, 
(3) observations or outcomes, and (4) settings. Experiments are designed to 
understand a theory or hypothesis about a causal relationship among these ele-
ments. They answer the question: If we do x to y in a particular setting s, will z 
occur? Experimental design involves specifying and operationalizing proxies for 
x, y, s, and z and developing a set of protocols for organizing and running the 
experiment that will reduce bias and minimize threats to validity. Experimental 
protocols address the assignment of units or persons to experimental conditions, 
measurement of observations or outcomes, comparison groups, and treatment.
Kass, TTCP, and NWDC identify four requirements for a war-fighting experi-
ment to have inferential value.27 First, the experiment must provide the ability 
to use the hypothetical concept or capability. Second, the experimental environ-
ment must be structured in such a way that the experimentalist can observe an 
effect from using the hypothetical element. Third, the experimental environment 
and procedures must permit the experimentalist to isolate the reason for the 
observed effect. And finally, the experimental findings must relate to a real war-
fighting challenge.
Experimentation is an appealing approach to investigating war-fighting chal-
lenges because it has the potential to provide evidence about causal variables, 
which can be used to build knowledge about how to fight. The weakness of the 
approach is the extent to which causal inferences can be generalized beyond the 
experimental conditions to explain a broader class of similar war-fighting chal-
lenges. Generalization challenges in war-fighting experimentation are related to 
validity and they are intrinsic to the practical limits on designing and implement-
ing war-fighting experiments.
For example, most war-fighting challenges are necessarily local and particular. 
They occur in a restricted range of settings, which may or may not be replicable or 
repeatable, and with a particular version of one type of war-fighting “treatment” 
rather than all possible versions. Usually they have several different effective-
ness measures—each with theoretical assumptions that are different from those 
7308_Polski.indd   72 5/3/19   9:39 AM
78
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/1
 P O L S K I  7 3
associated with other measures—but not a complete set of all possible measures� 
Moreover, warfare often is conducted with a convenient sample of warfighters 
rather than one that reflects a well-described population, and it is conducted at 
a particular moment in time that soon becomes history� Each of these aspects of 
war fighting poses a challenge for using the findings from experimentation to 
answer general classes of war-fighting questions or challenges�
All research methods in the decision sciences and operations research have 
generalization issues� Yet we are not likely to abandon our quest to understand 
how things work in complex field settings or how we can improve the inferential 
value of our research findings� The mitigation strategies we use to address threats 
to validity depend on the type of validity challenge we confront� Kass, TTCP, and 
NWDC enumerate twenty-one threats to validity in war-fighting experiments 
and provide a catalog of techniques and procedures for improving validity�
Game Theory
Game theory is a mathematical approach to developing and testing theories of 
decision challenges that involve conflicts of interest� While it has been used to 
analyze strategic interactions that may occur in a war-fighting context, it is not 
per se a method for investigating war fighting or any other strategic interaction 
at an operational level� Martin J� Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein provide the fol-
lowing definition of game theory, games, and game-theoretic solutions� “Game 
theory is a bag of analytical tools designed to help us understand the phenomena 
that we observe when decision-makers interact� � � � A game is a description of 
strategic interaction that includes the constraints on the actions that the players 
can take and the players’ interests, but does not specify the actions that the players 
do take� A solution is a systematic description of the outcomes that may emerge 
in a family of games�”28
One way to think about a game-theoretic analysis is as a systematic thought 
experiment that follows formal mathematical rules� It is an abstract representa-
tion of a particular interaction or class of interactions, which may or may not 
conform to real life� Decision makers do not play a game-theoretic analysis; a 
game theorist designs, “plays,” analyzes, and reports on the game� The game en-
vironment is an idealized choice context, “players” are mathematical operations, 
and the game does not provide the opportunity to engage in or experience the 
effects of decision-making�
The research-design process for a game theorist is focused principally on 
specifying an interesting decision challenge and assumptions about decision-
making, finding or developing an appropriate solution concept, and constructing 
a mathematical proof of the concept� The esoteric nature of the method dictates 
the research objective; it is an analytical exercise that is abstracted from a physical 
and social operating environment� While game theorists often motivate or impel 
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their models with a stylized description of a specific operational challenge, they 
aim deliberately for a sparse context so they can identify strategies that math-
ematically dominate other strategies for the interaction of interest� However, the 
product of the research—namely, the game-theoretic model—may be, and often 
is, tested empirically in richer environments using other research methods, such 
as experimentation and agent-based simulations� Empirical testing can offer the 
opportunity for greater specificity, as well as provide experience with the decision 
challenge�29
Game-theoretic assumptions about decision-making address the following 
aspects of the incentives and motivations of hypothetical decision makers: deci-
sions and the outcomes of decisions (e�g�, the payoffs or the costs/benefits as-
sociated with decisions); decision makers’ knowledge about alternative choices; 
their preferences for one decision over another, and the consistency of these 
preferences; their knowledge about the decisions that other decision makers will 
make, both preemptively and in response to their own choices; their beliefs or ex-
pectations about the likelihood of obtaining the payoffs associated with choices; 
the rules they use to make a decision; and the bases on which they update their 
knowledge about the state of play�
Game-theoretic analyses are based on a “rational” model of decision-making, 
in the sense that the analysis of decision makers’ incentives and motivations is 
based on the fundamental assumption that they are aware of their alternatives, 
form expectations about unknowns, have clear preferences, and make choices 
using some type of optimization process� Games can be designed to make the 
decision challenge more interesting by introducing uncertainty and incomplete 
or imperfect information� For example, a model may assume that players are un-
certain about the objective parameters of the environment, imperfectly informed 
about the events that unfold in a game, uncertain about the actions of other play-
ers, or uncertain about the reasoning of other players� However, rationality as-
sumptions are maintained in the face of uncertainty and are resolved by assuming 
that players determine the value of a choice on the basis of an estimated value of 
a utility function with respect to a probability measure�
COMPARING METHODS
Wargaming, experimentation, and game-theoretic modeling—all are used to 
analyze strategic decisions and interactions� However, they are very different 
methods and have different strengths and weaknesses for analyzing war-fighting 
decision challenges� Analysts using these methods to investigate war-fighting 
decisions approach research design in ways that have profoundly different impli-
cations for achieving the Navy’s research and education objectives� Table 2, which 
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provides a side-by-side comparison of wargaming, experimentation, and game 
theory against the standard measures of rigor discussed previously, shows that 
no method provides perfect rigor, and it highlights the trade-offs associated with 
using one method versus another�30 Game-theoretic modeling and experimenta-
tion have high internal validity, reliability, and replicability, but low external va-
lidity� This makes these methods good candidates for conducting rigorous basic 
research on the effects of war-fighting decisions under tightly constrained con-
ditions, but comparatively poor candidates for addressing research questions as-
sociated with less-constrained conditions, such as those associated with complex 
adaptive systems or the intensity and fog of war� In contrast, wargaming has high 
internal validity, reliability, and replicability, and its findings are more likely to be 
useful for addressing relatively unconstrained war-fighting decision questions�
The estimates of rigor associated with each method listed in table 2 are based 
on the potential of the method to generate findings in a rigorous way if research 
is designed and executed properly� However, the potential of a method to gener-
ate rigorous findings does not guarantee the quality or usefulness of the research; 
even the best researchers are not always able to meet standards for rigor, because 
they may not have the data, tools, facilities, or funds they need at the time they 
need them, or they may choose to sacrifice some analytical rigor to achieve other 
objectives�
Another way to look at methodological selection is through the lens of the 
purpose and objectives of research� Research purposes and objectives may in-
clude any of the following: 
• Advancing general knowledge about decision-making in war fighting
• Recognizing decision points in war fighting, so as to fight more effectively
• Providing warfighters with the opportunity to rehearse decision-making in a 
fight (e�g�, to prepare themselves to fight, without actually fighting)
• Educating current and future warfighters by providing experience in the art 
and science of decision-making in war fighting
Method Internal  Validity
External 
Validity Reliability Replicability
Wargaming High Medium High High
Experimentation High Low High High
Game theory High Low High High
TABLE 2
COMPARISON BASED ON MEASURES OF RIGOR 
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When we consider the nature of many war-fighting research questions and 
potential purposes and objectives, it suggests that we need a method that will 
accommodate both fuzzy and formal logic� As with any requirements analysis, if 
we are going to select a method properly to fit the nature of the war-fighting chal-
lenge and meet our purposes and objectives, we need a commonly understood 
criterion� In research requirements analysis, this criterion is inferential value, or 
the extent to which one can infer implications from research� However, inferen-
tial value is really a shorthand way of referring to two standard methodological 
selection criteria: the extent to which the selected method will generate analyti-
cally rigorous findings (i�e�, findings that are valid, reliable, and replicable) and 
the feasibility of operationalizing and executing the method�
Table 3, which compares our selected decision-analytical methods on the 
basis of four distinct purposes and objectives, shows that, once again, none of 
the methods meets all our potential requirements, although wargaming and 
experimentation meet most of them� Wargaming provides warfighters with an 
opportunity to think deeply about the use of an operating concept, an operat-
ing plan, or a course of action, or to experience decision-making and the effects 
of interaction with a determined adversary, whereas experimentation provides 
researchers a means to analyze alternative concepts and capabilities empiri-
cally� However, wargaming and experimentation are not the best candidates for 
research that aims to advance general knowledge of warfare� Yet while game- 
theoretic modeling is a strong method for obtaining rigorous insights into gen-
eral classes of tightly constrained decision questions, it has limited use for ad-
dressing the kinds of decisions and decision environments that are typical in joint 
warfare and combined arms� As Thomas C� Schelling observed when the military 
reinvigorated mathematical modeling and simulation to address war-fighting 
decisions in the Cold War era, when humans are in the loop it is impossible to 
sustain rigid parameters; we can and do change the rules of the game as we play 
and, more importantly, as we fight�31
Objectives Wargaming Experimentation Game Theory
Advance general knowledge of warfare Weak Weak Strong
Recognize decision points Strong Strong Weak
Rehearse decisions Strong Strong Weak
Experience decisions Strong Strong Weak
TABLE 3
COMPARISON BASED ON PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   76 5/2/19   11:35 AM
82
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/1
 P O L S K I  7 7
Researchers understand that no method ever will allow them to achieve 
perfect inference or analytical rigor—these are ideal standards, not minimum 
thresholds� They also understand that their most interesting challenges, such as 
fighting peer and near-peer adversaries in a global political and economic system 
with four physical domains, are messy and difficult to investigate� This implies 
that we must reconcile ourselves to trading some degree of inferential value and 
rigor to make progress� For example, it may be difficult to find data that will 
measure what we would like to measure, data may be difficult to clean for analy-
sis because it is incomplete or corrupted, it may be difficult to mitigate bias in 
data collection and analysis, we may not understand or be able to agree on how 
to measure or interpret data, and we may not have the analytical capabilities or 
tools we would like to have�
Wargaming, experimentation, and game theory have different but potentially 
complementary strengths for investigating questions about war fighting at the 
operational level� Wargaming is a research process that provides the opportunity 
to experience and think through the implications of operational decisions and 
to identify gaps and shortfalls in potential war-fighting operations� Similarly, ex-
perimentation is a disciplined and systematic investigatory process for isolating 
and identifying associations and causal relationships among a range of variables� 
When used to investigate war fighting, it may produce a range of useful find-
ings with a relatively high degree of inferential value� Game theory can serve 
both wargaming and experimentation by providing a framework for specifying 
the structure of decision makers’ incentives and motivations in a potential war-
fighting operation, which is useful in designing, implementing, and interpreting 
research findings�
However, when used on a stand-alone basis, wargaming, experimentation, 
and game theory all have serious limitations as research methods for improving 
the useful stock of knowledge about war fighting at the operational level� Each 
method may produce biased results that can affect the validity and reliability of 
findings� The technique most often recommended to strengthen the validity of a 
research design is to use formal probability sampling of instances of units, treat-
ments, observations, or settings� However, implementing this approach requires 
both the existence of clearly delineated populations of each of these variables and 
the ability to sample with known probability from within each of these popula-
tions� Even if this were possible in critical war-fighting research areas, formal 
sampling methods usually offer only a limited solution to generalization issues�
TTCP suggests an alternative approach to improving the inferential value of 
war-fighting research� It recommends using multiple research methods, inte-
grating methods into a coherent and concerted research program, and using an 
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iterative process of analysis.32 The Navy has an ongoing experiment that applies 
this approach to exploring critical war-fighting decision issues.33 Beginning in 
late 2014, the Navy began experimenting with integrating a number of different 
research methods to explore the challenges associated with potential war-fighting 
scenarios in the Pacific Fleet AOR. Figure 4 illustrates the Navy’s perspective on 
integrated research. The aim of the project (still ongoing, on a classified basis) is 
to develop concrete recommendations that can inform decisions about strategy, 
concepts of operations, mission analyses, operation planning, campaign analy-
ses, and resource allocation. The sponsor for the project is the fleet commander. 
The analytical team includes the CNO’s strategy and planning staff (N3/N5), his 
campaign analysis staff (N81), the fleet’s war-fighting assessments and readiness 
staff (N9), and the NWC WGD.
Naval analysts are using the insights they have obtained from this research 
program to inform ongoing modeling, simulation, development of CONOPSs, 
mission analyses, and strategic thinking; to refine analytical agendas; and to 
conduct further research. The team that originally organized and directed this 
program of research characterized it as an innovation in decision analysis that has 






An Integrated Program for Operational War-Fighting Research
Source: Rear Adm. Patrick Piercey [USN] and David Yoshihara
FIGURE 4
AN INTEGRATED PROGRAM FOR OPERATIONAL WAR-FIGHTING RESEARCH
Source: Rear Adm. Patrick Piercey, USN, and David Yoshihara.
7308_Polski.indd   78 5/8/19   10:19 AM
84
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/1
 P O L S K I  7 9
value of linking and more tightly integrating operations analysis and research and 
of basing operational and command decisions on findings that rely on multiple 
research methods�
The team has offered the following recommendations, which have implica-
tions for designing and conducting research, education, and training�34
1� Begin with the end(s) in mind. Use a structured, systems approach to 
identify opportunities to achieve actionable results, specify the context 
for decision-making, generate objectives, and outline requirements� If 
integrative analysis is something new in an organization, create a Skunk 
Works, provide top cover, and communicate strategically�
2� Keep it simple. Research is time-consuming and costly; resist the tendency 
to overspecify requirements, to focus on tools and technologies rather 
than decisions and insights, and to include too many people� Do not be 
afraid to slow things down to avoid “rushing off to failure�”
3� Facilitate collaboration� Build the infrastructure for collaboration into the 
research design and integration process, and ensure that there is openness 
and transparency among all associated staff members�
4� Understand what is required and delivered. The commander and analytical 
staff need to have a good understanding of research methodologies and of 
what is reasonably achievable� Manage expectations about the inferential 
value of the research and how component projects will align within the 
larger research program�
Professional research communities are rife with—and often thrive on— 
controversy and professional jealousies� However, if senior Navy leaders wish to 
optimize returns on investment in operations research, it would behoove them 
to focus on the inferential value of research findings, be wary of provoking un-
productive turf wars, and eschew searches for silver bullets and all-encompassing 
methods� Researching complex system-of-system challenges such as war fighting 
requires multiple methods, integrated research programs, and strict account-
ability to research criteria related to inference, intellectual merit, and broader 
impacts�
There is no single operations research method that is demonstrably better 
than any other method for advancing knowledge of operational-level warfare� 
Every method has strengths and limitations in producing findings that can help 
the Navy make decisions that will protect and successfully prosecute U�S� inter-
ests over the short, medium, and long terms�
To grapple more effectively with complexity and rapidly changing threat 
environments, we need wargames and we need more, not less, senior leader 
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engagement in these games� But these games must be designed and conducted 
with an experimental mindset, integrated within a broader research program, 
and informed by professional research practice, and researchers must be willing 
to take on board advances in science, mathematics, and technologies� We can use 
game theory to inform and refine operations research practices, but we cannot 
use it to analyze contemporary or future policy, strategy, operational design, or 
tactical challenges�
The history of the U�S� Navy is replete with examples of innovation in warfare 
at the operational level� If senior leaders wish to innovate, they must focus their 
attention and efforts on ensuring that decision-making in the Navy enterprise 
is based on professionally vetted research, then hold the research enterprise to 
these standards�
N O T E S
 1� The call to innovate in the Department of 
Defense began with Deputy Secretary Robert 
O� Work’s memorandum dated February 
9, 2015, available at news�usni�org/� In the 
Navy, Secretary Ray Mabus issued a call to 
innovate with his memorandum dated May 5, 
2015, available at www�doncio�navy�mil/� For 
reflections on the implications for research at 
the Naval War College, see Thomas J� Culora, 
“A War-Gaming Renaissance,” U�S� Naval 
Institute Proceedings 142/5/1,359 (May 2016)� 
Similarly, see John Hanley’s call for change 
in analysis and research in John T� Hanley Jr�, 
“Changing DoD’s Analysis Paradigm: The 
Science of War Gaming and Combat/Cam-
paign Simulation,” Naval War College Review 
70, no� 1 (Winter 2017), pp� 64–103� Chief 
of Naval Operations Admiral John Richard-
son has emphasized the role of analysis and 
research� John Richardson [Adm� USN], “A 
Design for Maintaining Maritime Superior-
ity Version 2�0,” December 2018, available at 
www�navy�mil/�
 2� Hanley proposes that we use game theory 
to enhance operational wargaming prac-
tice� John T� Hanley Jr�, “Planning for the 
Kamikazes: Toward a Theory and Practice 
of Repeated Operational Games,” Naval War 
College Review 70, no� 2 (Spring 2017), pp� 
29–48�
 3� With respect to wargaming, see, for example, 
Hank J� Brightman and Melissa K� Dewey, 
“Trends in Modern War Gaming: The Art of 
Conversation,” Naval War College Review 67, 
no� 1 (Winter 2014), pp� 17–30, and Culora, 
“A War-Gaming Renaissance�” With respect 
to game theory, see Thomas C� Schelling, The 
Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Univ� Press, 1960)� For a more recent critique, 
see, for example, Ariel Rubinstein, “Com-
ments on Economic Models, Economics and 
Economists: Remarks on Economics Rules by 
Dani Rodrik,” Journal of Economic Literature 
55, no� 1 (March 2017), pp� 162–72�
 4� Government Accountability Office, Joint 
Professional Military Education: Opportunities 
Exist for Greater Oversight and Coordination 
of Associated Research Institutions, GAO-14-
216 (Washington, DC: March 2014)�
 5� See Jon Scott Logel and Margaret M� Polski, 
2017 Navy Operations Analysis and Research 
Workshop Final Report (Newport, RI: U�S� 
Naval War College, December 29, 2017)�
 6� Substantial portions of this article are based 
on Margaret M� Polski, “A Warfighter’s Guide 
to Analysis” (working paper WGD20181, War 
Gaming Department, U�S� Naval War College, 
Newport, RI, April 2018), and Margaret M� 
Polski and Jon Scott Logel, “Doing Analysis” 
(working paper WGD20191, War Gaming 
Department, U�S� Naval War College, New-
port, RI, January 2019)�
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 7� The Chief of Naval Operations and the other 
service chiefs are charged under Title 10 of 
the U�S� Code with providing policy advice; 
organizing, manning, training, and equipping 
the force; providing guidance for the develop-
ment of doctrine, concepts, courses of action, 
and standard operating policies and proce-
dures; budgeting, research and development, 
and capital investment; and building strategic 
partnerships�
 8� U�S� Defense Dept�, Doctrine for the Armed 
Forces of the United States, JP 1 (Washington, 
DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013, 
incorporating change 1 of July 12, 2017), p� 
I�A(3)�
 9� The following sections are drawn from 
Margaret M� Polski, “Extending the Institu-
tional Analysis and Development Framework 
to Policy Analysis and Design,” chap� 2 in 
Institutional Diversity in Self-governing Socie-
ties, ed� Filippo Sabetti and Dario Castiglione 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017), pp� 
25–47�
 10� Fuzzy logic is a means of classifying objects 
or concepts that are inherently vague or dif-
ficult to categorize as either true or false� The 
modern fuzzy logic concept and fuzzy logic 
set theory are attributed to Lotfi A� Zahdeh� 
For an accessible account of fuzzy logic, see 
Daniel McNeill and Paul Freiberger, Fuzzy 
Logic: The Revolutionary Computer Technol-
ogy That Is Changing Our World (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1993)�
 11� Classic texts on the philosophy of science 
include Karl R� Popper, The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery, Routledge Classics (Abingdon, 
U�K�: Routledge, 2002), and Thomas S� Kuhn, 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chi-
cago: Univ� of Chicago Press, 1962)� For an 
interesting analysis from a sociological per-
spective, see Randall Collins, The Sociology of 
Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual 
Change (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ� 
Press, 1998)�
 12� These definitions of validity, reliability, and 
replicability are drawn from Gary King, Rob-
ert O� Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing 
Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualita-
tive Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ� 
Press, 1994)� Donald Campbell and Julian 
Stanley, who are concerned with experimen-
tal design, distinguish internal validity from 
external validity� Findings have internal valid-
ity if we can state that the experimental treat-
ment made a difference in a specific experi-
mental instance� External validity refers to the 
extent to which findings can be generalized 
across other populations, settings, treatment 
variables, and measurement variables� Donald 
T� Campbell and Julian C� Stanley, Experi-
mental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for 
Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963)� 
For a general primer on research design and 
planning, see Paul D� Leedy and Jeanne Ellis 
Ormrod, Practical Research: Planning and 
Design, 9th ed� (Harlow, Essex, U�K�: Pearson, 
2010)�
 13� The proper spelling of wargaming is contro-
versial� In McCarty Little’s and McHugh’s 
published writings, the term was rendered as 
war gaming (i�e�, open)� Today, however, other 
than in the name of the War Gaming Depart-
ment, the College uses the wargame/-er/-ing 
spelling (i�e�, closed up)�
 14� McCarty Little was appointed in 1887 as a 
member of the faculty and developed two-
sided wargaming at the College� Brightman 
and Dewey, “Trends in Modern War Gam-
ing�” McHugh also credits McCarty Little 
with introducing wargaming at the College� 
See Francis J� McHugh, Fundamentals of War 
Gaming, 3rd ed� (Newport, RI: U�S� Naval 
War College, 1966)� McCarty Little’s publica-
tions on wargaming include Rules for the 
Conduct of War Games (Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, 1901, 1905), “The Strategic 
Naval War Game or Chart Maneuver,” U�S� 
Naval Institute Proceedings 38/4/144 (1912), 
and The Chart Maneuver (Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, 1920)�
 15� Jon Scott Logel reports on Van Auken’s 
appointment as director of the Research De-
partment at the College and his team’s work 
analyzing wargames in the interwar period� 
See Jon Scott Logel, “Captain Van Auken 
and the Research Department of the Naval 
War College: Considerations of Analytical 
War Gaming in the Decade before Midway” 
(paper prepared for the 2017 McMullen  
Naval History Symposium, U�S� Naval 
Academy, Annapolis, MD, September 14–15, 
2017)� Also see John M� Lillard, Playing War: 
Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for 
World War II (Lincoln: Univ� of Nebraska 
Press, 2016), p� 100�
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 16� McHugh’s influence is reflected in the current 
edition of the College’s reference work on 
the subject� Shawn Burns, ed�, War Gam-
ers’ Handbook: A Guide for Professional 
War Gamers (Newport, RI: U�S� Naval War 
College, [2015]), available at usnwc�edu/� 
For a professional wargamer’s perspective on 
McHugh’s influence, see David DellaVolpe’s 
foreword�
 17� McHugh, Fundamentals of War Gaming�
 18� For detailed descriptions of wargaming meth-
odology, see ibid�, and Burns, War Gamers’ 
Handbook�
 19� Wargamers have different ways of categoriz-
ing the structure of their wargames� Common 
categories are one-sided, one-and-one-half-
sided, two-sided, multisided, and red  
teaming�
 20� See Burns, War Gamers’ Handbook, for a 
description of the process�
 21� By replicate I mean that another equally 
capable research team could analyze the data 
from game play and obtain the same findings� 
By repeat I mean that the same game design 
could be played again by another research 
team or the same research team with the same 
players or another group of players� By iterate 
I mean that a new game could be designed 
and played that builds on previous findings to 
extend the investigation of the war-fighting 
challenge�
 22� The Navy Warfare Development Command 
(NWDC) manages and executes the Fleet 
Experimentation program on behalf of Com-
mander, U�S� Fleet Forces Command and 
Commander, U�S� Pacific Fleet� For informa-
tion, see “Navy Warfare Development Com-
mand,” America’s Navy, www�navy�mil/�
 23� The following section draws on M� M� Polski, 
“Technical Brief on Quasi-Experimental 
Design” (paper prepared for the WG 30 Special 
Session, “Are War Games Quasi-Experiments?,” 
of the Military Operations Research Society’s 
83rd Symposium, Alexandria, VA, June 23, 
2015)�
 24� William Shadish, Thomas Cook, and Donald 
Campbell identify five different types of 
experiments: an experiment, a randomized 
experiment, a quasi experiment, a natural 
experiment, and a correlational study� They 
also provide examples of the use of the 
experimental method across disciplines� 
See William R� Shadish, Thomas D� Cook, 
and Donald T� Campbell, Experimental and 
Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized 
Causal Inference (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
2001)�
 25� See Richard A� Kass, The Logic of Warfight-
ing Experiments, Command and Control 
Research Program Publication Series (Wash-
ington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense, 2006); the Technical Coopera-
tion Program [hereafter TTCP], Guide for 
Understanding and Implementing Defense 
Experimentation [hereafter GUIDEx], ver� 1�1 
(Ottowa: Canadian Forces Experimentation 
Centre, February 2006); and NWDC, Experi-
ment Planning Guide [hereafter EPG], 2017 
ed�
 26� See, for example, Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gard-
ner, and James Walker, Rules, Games, and 
Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: Univ� 
of Michigan Press, 1994); John H� Kagel and 
Alvin E� Roth, eds�, The Handbook of Experi-
mental Economics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
Univ� Press, 1995); Nigel Gilbert and Klaus G� 
Troitzsch, Simulation for the Social Scien-
tist, 2nd ed� (New York: Open Univ� Press, 
2010); John T� Cacioppo, Penny S� Visser, and 
Cynthia L� Pickett, eds�, Social Neuroscience: 
People Thinking about Thinking People (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT, 2006); and Dietrich Dörner, 
The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding 
Error in Complex Situations (New York: Basic 
Books, 1997)� Many empirical social scientists 
conceptualize decision challenges using game 
theory, then test these game-theoretic models 
using experimental methods�
 27� Kass, The Logic of Warfighting Experiments; 
TTCP, GUIDEx; NWDC, EPG.
 28� Martin J� Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A 
Course in Game Theory (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1994); John von Neumann, “Zur 
Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele,” Mathe-
matische Annalen 100 (1928), pp� 295–320; 
John von Neumann, “Über ein ökonomisches 
Gleichungssystem und eine Verallgemeine-
rung des Brouwerschen Fixpunktsatzes,” 
Ergebnisse eines mathematischen Kolloquiums 
8 (1937), pp� 73–83; John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton Univ� Press, 1944)� In addition to von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, classic texts 
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include R� Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, 
Games and Decisions: Introduction and 
Critical Survey (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1957); 
Martin Shubik, Game Theory in the Social 
Sciences: Concepts and Solutions (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1982); Hervé Moulin, Game 
Theory for the Social Sciences (New York: New 
York Univ� Press, 1986); Drew Fudenberg and 
Jean Tirole, Game Theory (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1991); Roger B� Myerson, Game 
Theory: Analysis of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Univ� Press, 1991); and Kenneth G� 
Binmore, Fun and Games: A Text on Game 
Theory (Lexington, MA: D� C� Heath, 1992)�
 29� Game-theoretic analyses are used extensively 
in institutional political economy, experi-
mental economics, and computational social 
science� See, for example, Ostrom, Gardner, 
and Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool 
Resources; Kagel and Roth, The Handbook 
of Experimental Economics; Robert H� Bates 
et al�, Analytic Narratives (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Univ� Press, 1998); and Gilbert and 
Troitzsch, Simulation for the Social Scientist�
 30� For an alternative but complementary ap-
proach to analyzing and comparing methods, 
see Paul K� Davis, Analysis to Inform Defense 
Planning despite Austerity (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2014), and Paul K� Davis and 
Amy Henninger, Analysis, Analysis Practices, 
and Implications for Modeling and Simulation 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007)�
 31� For an early critique of game-theoretic analy-
ses, see Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 
chap� 4� Also see Thomas C� Schelling, 
“The Role of War Games and Exercises,” in 
Managing Nuclear Operations, ed� Ashton B� 
Carter, John D� Steinbruner, and Charles A� 
Zraket (Washington, DC: Brookings Institu-
tion, 1987), and Thomas C� Schelling, “Red 
vs� Blue” (paper presented at a wargaming 
conference organized by the National Defense 
Univ� at U�S� Marine Headquarters, Quantico, 
VA, August 2015)� Schelling is often—and 
wrongly—described as a game theorist� In a 
conversation with him in September 2014, I 
asked about this identification� He told me 
that he had never worked with game theory, 
but that he thought some of its organizing 
ideas were useful for thinking systematically 
about strategic interaction�
 32� TTCP, GUIDEx contains fourteen principles 
for designing defense research; five of them 
(nos� 4–7 and 10) are related to integrating 
and leveraging multiple operations research 
methods�
 33� This section is based on Margaret M� Polski, 
“The Navy’s Experience with Integrative 
Decision Analysis” (unclassified case 
study prepared for the Military Operations 
Research Society wargaming community of 
practice) and classified cross-game studies 
the author conducted in July 2017, December 
2017, August 2018, and November 2018 for 
the CNO�
 34� Polski, “The Navy’s Experience wth Integra-
tive Decision Analysis�”
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STORM CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON
Challenges and Recommendations for Military Recruiting  
and Retention
Christopher J. McMahon and Colin J. Bernard
 The current administration has placed great emphasis on “rebuilding the mili-tary�” The proposed buildup, which includes initiatives such as increasing the 
number of USN ships from the present number of 272 to 355, will require more 
soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen� Because of today’s insufficient state of 
recruiting and retention in the military, the Pentagon is presented with a consid-
erable challenge to increase the size of its forces� For the Department of Defense 
(DoD) to meet the human resource requirements and attract and retain appropri-
ate numbers of personnel, the Pentagon needs to consider making significant and 
likely controversial changes to its policies on career 
flexibility, permanent change of station (PCS) 
moves, and required recruiting standards� A failure 
to modify these policies will lead mathematically 
to serious personnel issues owing to the dearth of 
young people who are willing to join the military, 
meet the present requirements and qualifications, 
and plan to remain in the military for a long-term 
career�
THE PROBLEM
The fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act (FY18 NDAA) that President Donald J� 
Trump signed authorized nearly seven hundred 
billion dollars for DoD�1 The FY18 NDAA is 
predicated on increasing the size of the military 
Christopher J. McMahon holds the Maritime Ad-
ministration Emory S. Land Chair of Merchant Ma-
rine Affairs at the Naval War College. He is a gradu-
ate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings 
Point, New York, and completed master’s degrees at 
American University, Long Island University, and 
Starr King School. He is an unlimited master mari-
ner and a commissioned rear admiral, U.S. Mari-
time Service. He has held several Senior Executive 
Service positions with the Department of Transpor-
tation and the Maritime Administration.
Commander Colin J. Bernard, USN, is a leadership 
instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, 
Maryland. He is a graduate of the academy and of 
the Naval War College, and is a naval f light officer 
who has served four tours as a weapons systems of-
ficer in the F/A-18/F Super Hornet.
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STORM CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON
Challenges and Recommendations for Military Recruiting 
and Retention
Christopher J. McMahon and Colin J. Bernard
by 25,900 people by October 2019 and by a total of 56,600 by 2023�2 The major-
ity of the increase would consist of active-duty personnel� The numbers were 
calculated specifically to achieve the intent of the 2018 National Defense Strategy 
(NDS), which in the publicly released Summary calls for moving forward from 
“a period of strategic atrophy�” The Summary NDS expresses concern “that our 
competitive military advantage has been eroding” and it highlights the need to 
“build a more lethal force” through a “competitive approach to force development 
and a consistent, multiyear investment to restore warfighting readiness and field 
a lethal force� The size of our force matters�”3
To meet these recruiting goals, each branch of DoD has been required to 
implement aggressive policies to reverse a culture of downsizing caused by ten 
years of fiscal restraint� Despite these changes, DoD has struggled to meet its re-
cruiting metrics and is faced with short- and long-term problematic challenges� 
In 2018, after realizing that the service could not attain its stated recruiting goal 
of eighty thousand troops (a 16 percent increase from 2017), the Army lowered 
its goal for that year to 76,500�4 Similarly, that same year, the Navy increased its 
accession goals by 14 percent, but, according to Vice Admiral Robert P� Burke, 
USN, Chief of Naval Personnel, there are “difficult times ahead” in attracting 
and recruiting the numbers of qualified sailors required for a future fleet expan-
sion to 355 ships� Specifically, Vice Admiral Burke identified personnel short-
ages in areas such as nuclear power, advanced electronics, aviation, and cyber 
occupations—all specialties essential to the operational success of a technologi-
cally advanced naval force�5
While some analysts attribute the recruiting shortfall to the improving econo-
my (the United States is experiencing its lowest unemployment rate in a decade), 
the paucity of recruits is symptomatic of a much larger societal problem� Accord-
ing to the Pentagon, of the thirty-four million seventeen-to-twenty-four-year-
olds in the United States, 71 percent do not qualify for military service because 
of a lack of education, poor health, or criminal records, or some combination of 
these factors� Furthermore, only 1 percent of young people are both “eligible and 
inclined to have a conversation” with the military about possible service�6 These 
statistics clearly illustrate a harsh reality for the Pentagon’s recruitment plan and 
have compelled leaders within each service to search for solutions to improve 
recruitment rates�
In addition to the requirements associated with recruitment, the military is 
tasked with retaining the quality members it has indoctrinated, trained, and 
educated already� Current personnel shortages in technology-centric billets have 
resulted in major staffing gaps that are exacerbated by the excessive “time to 
train” required for each specialty� The current shortfall of Air Force pilots is esti-
mated to be more than two thousand, for example�7 These manning deficits have 
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placed a greater strain on active-duty personnel as operational commitments 
have increased over the past seventeen years� The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
which represent the longest period of continuous war in American history, have 
required an operational tempo that is unsustainable� This environment has made 
the civilian sector much more appealing to many young people both within and 
outside the military�
THE MILLENNIALS (GENERATION Y) AND GENERATION Z
The Pew Research Center defines six generations or age groups on the basis of 
birth dates� In order, these are the “greatest generation,” the “silent generation,” 
“baby boomers,” “Generation X,” the “millennial generation,” and “Generation 
Z�”8 The millennial generation (also known as Generation Y) and Generation Z 
together are growing demographic groups that are projected to represent 75 per-
cent of the global workforce by 2025�9 While some have characterized members 
of these generations as entitled narcissists who lack a traditional work ethic, they 
are instead the most educated, most informed, and most interconnected genera-
tions in history�10 The parameters of sociological generations vary by study, but 
for the purposes of this article the authors define millennials (Generation Y) as 
anyone born between 1981 and 1996 and Generation Z as anyone born from 
1997 onward, although the authors’ focus on Generation Z includes only those 
persons approaching adulthood�11 Since 2014, Generations Y and Z have become 
the largest living generations in the United States—including seventy-three mil-
lion adult persons aged eighteen to thirty-four�12 Members of Generation Y (as 
well as the older members of Generation Z) are climbing the leadership ranks of 
the American workforce already and logically will increase their influence on the 
civilian, military, and political ranks in the relatively near future�
For American millennials and older members of Generation Z, the world al-
ways has been volatile and complex� Many in these generations have no memory 
of the United States before the attacks of September 11, 2001, nor do they recall 
a day when the nation was not at war� Whereas members of previous generations 
viewed schools as safe havens, Generations Y and Z received their education in 
an environment impacted by tragic massacres at such places as Columbine High 
School in 1999, Virginia Tech in 2007, Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012, 
Stoneman Douglas High School in 2018, and dozens of others�13 Major global 
financial crises have influenced their views on financial security, while the con-
cept of climate change has molded their outlook on the sustainability of the envi-
ronment� For Generations Y and Z, these events have provoked a sense that the 
government is unable to provide for their personal security and have compelled 
them to value the present more than any other previous generation�14
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Those persons born after 1981 have been raised in an information environ-
ment with continuous access to news, data, and social interaction� Over the past 
fifteen years, the American evolution of the Internet and smartphone technol-
ogy has provided a bottomless source of information and completely altered the 
manner in which members of Generations Y and Z interact socially, compared 
with previous generations at the same stage in life�15 According to a study com-
missioned by the car-sharing company Zipcar, 40 percent of millennials believe 
that losing a smartphone would be a greater hardship than losing an automobile, 
computer, or television (compared with 16 percent of older generations who 
believe the same)� Forty percent of those in Generations Y and Z prefer to text, 
e-mail, or video chat rather than interact in person�16 In a survey conducted 
by the World Economic Forum, 51 percent of Generations Y and Z gave their 
primary news sources as news websites and social media, while only 18 percent 
relied on television�17 Although they are aware that the accuracy of the content 
provided on these fora is questionable, the youngest generations prefer the con-
venience and speed associated with these avenues over the reliability of more-
traditional news sources�
This combination of unfettered access to information and a sense that the gov-
ernment cannot provide for their security created the flash point for Generation 
Y’s historic political involvement in 2008� (Generation Z was not yet of voting 
age�) That year, following decades of limited voter participation by the younger 
demographic, millennials turned out in record numbers for the presidential 
election� It was the largest voter turnout of young people since eighteen-to-
twenty-year-olds were given the right to vote in 1972� During the 2008 election, 
50 percent of adults in Generation X and older generations voted for Barack H� 
Obama� Generation Y overwhelmingly supported Obama and his message of 
change by more than a two-to-one ratio (66 percent to 32 percent)�18 Following 
two years of his presidency, however, millennials’ enthusiasm for politics began 
to wane� In 2015, for example, near the end of President Obama’s second term, 
only 26 percent of millennials named government and politics as one of their top 
three topics of interest�19
Generations Y and Z’s political involvement has evolved concurrently with 
their views on national security� In 2010, these generations were less supportive 
than their elders of an assertive national security policy and more supportive of a 
progressive social agenda�20 In contrast, six years later, following the proliferation 
of the radical Islamist group ISIS, 60 percent of Generations Y and Z supported 
the increase in American involvement in Iraq and Syria, including the use of 
ground troops� When asked whether they would be willing to serve in the armed 
forces, however, only 15 percent of those surveyed conveyed any willingness to 
do so�21
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Socially, Generations Y and Z are far more tolerant of differences in race, 
sexual orientation, and gender than previous generations� Two decades of Pew 
Research surveys confirm that those born after 1981 are the most open to change 
of any generational demographic, followed by Generation X, baby boomers, and 
the silent generation� In response to views on immigration, 58 percent of Genera-
tions Y and Z believe immigrants strengthen the country, while only 43 percent 
of older generations agree with that view� This same pattern is found in issues 
concerning nontraditional family arrangements (working mothers, unmarried 
cohabitation, and interracial marriage, as examples)� Members of Generations Y 
and Z are far more accepting than previous generations of each of these modern 
family developments�22
Professionally, the motivations, work habits, and expectations of Generations 
Y and Z are significantly different when compared with previous generations� 
Unlike the baby boomers and Generation X, who aspire for career and financial 
success, the most recent generations are motivated largely by a desire to make 
a positive contribution to the greater good� While previous generations valued 
long-term predictability and changed jobs less frequently, members of Genera-
tions Y and Z “seek non-linear career trajectories that will compel them to change 
jobs more frequently�”23 Their decision to change jobs often is inspired by the fail-
ure of an organization to commit to its employees’ development� In a 2016 Gallup 
poll, 87 percent of those born after 1981 cited professional development or career 
growth opportunities as “very important” to them in a job� Finally, members of 
Generations Y and Z want to enjoy their time in the workplace and thrive in a 
work environment that is social, spontaneous, and less structured� More than any 
other generation, Generations Y and Z seek a “work-life” balance that enables 
them to enjoy their life experience�24
When it comes to matters of personal life, the youngest generations place 
marriage and parenthood far above everything else� When polled by the Pew 
Research Center, Generations Y and Z listed their top three priorities as “being 
a good parent” (52 percent), “having a successful marriage” (30 percent), and 
“helping others in need” (21 percent)�25 While only six out of ten were raised by 
two parents, members of Generations Y and Z have a strong commitment to their 
families� Compared with previous generations, they are more educated, especially 
the women� In 2017, a woman aged twenty-one to thirty-six was 7 percent more 
likely than a man of the same age to have at least a bachelor’s degree and 8 percent 
more likely than a woman of Generation X� In a 2017 survey, males and females 
aged twenty-one to thirty-six were 6�5 percent more likely than members of Gen-
eration X to have at least a bachelor’s degree�26
In summary, Generations Y and Z have matured in an age of insecurity that 
has compelled them to value flexibility and tolerance in society� They have 
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   88 5/2/19   11:35 AM
94
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/1
 M C M A H O N  &  B E R NA R D  8 9
experienced a technological revolution that has provided unlimited and im-
mediate access to information� As a result of these factors, they have developed 
into generations that lack confidence in their government� Data show very few 
have an interest in joining the military� They place significant importance on 
their personal and professional development as well as that of their children, and 
they are more inclined to be tolerant of societal differences� Significant numbers 
of persons in these generations are motivated by the betterment of society and 
professional flexibility, and they prefer to operate in a relaxed atmosphere that 
enables freedom of thought and creativity�
THE PROBLEM AND GENERATIONS Y AND Z
In 1973 the United States eliminated military conscription and transitioned to 
an all-volunteer force (AVF)� Since its establishment, the AVF has been a major 
success, as it has increased the quality of new recruits, the number of personnel 
who pursue a full military career, and the professionalism and proficiency of the 
force�27 This success, however, has been contingent on the availability of sufficient 
individuals qualified for military service and willing to serve� Following a decade 
of downsizing since 2008, the military has been reduced to the smallest it has 
been since before World War II� However, as noted earlier, the Pentagon now has 
been tasked with expanding its forces while at the same time facing a shrinking 
pool of young Americans who both meet the eligibility requirements and are 
inclined to serve� To maintain its AVF, DoD is challenged to enhance the appeal 
of military service and overcome the obstacles of a generation that does not meet 
the recruiting standards as they currently exist�
In an effort to enhance the appeal of military service, the Pentagon, and, for 
example, the Navy, has instituted a series of programs designed to increase the 
recruitment and retention of Generations Y and Z� DoD has implemented initia-
tives such as Force of the Future, the blended retirement system, and Sailor 2025 
in an attempt to increase career flexibility and provide incentives for retention 
and advancement to attract more members of Generations Y and Z to military 
service� More recently, the FY18 NDAA has allocated $148 billion to account for 
a 2�6 percent military pay raise in 2019, the largest since fiscal year 2010� Not 
included in this raise are 2�9 percent and 3�4 percent increases in the housing 
and food allowances, respectively� While these programs represent steps toward 
progress, they do not address adequately the primary reasons for Generations Y 
and Z’s reluctance to consider military service�28
Unlike for previous generations (baby boomers and Generation X), monetary 
gain has limited appeal for Generations Y and Z� Therefore, financial incentives 
alone are not effective tools to recruit and retain them� In fact, in a study con-
ducted prior to the passage of the FY18 NDAA, researchers from the Center for a 
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New American Security concluded that military members are compensated bet-
ter than their civilian counterparts�29 Rather than enhancing an already positive 
aspect of military service (i�e�, compensation), DoD should implement policies 
designed to enhance job satisfaction, provide professional flexibility, and pro-
mote better family stability—all employment characteristics that Generations Y 
and Z desire� Such policies would include, for example, limiting the frequency of 
PCS moves and enhancing the ability of honorably separated servicemembers to 
reenter the force following successful tenures in the civilian sector�
While the enactment of policies targeting the evolution of generational priori-
ties might address Generations Y and Z’s willingness to serve and improve re-
cruiting efforts, the Pentagon still is challenged by the lack of eligible candidates� 
In 2009, a group consisting of ninety-nine retired flag officers and senior enlisted 
leaders formed the nonprofit organization Mission: Readiness� This group deter-
mined that the principal reasons that nearly three-quarters of Americans aged 
seventeen to twenty-four were not eligible for military service were criminality, 
inadequate education, and poor physical fitness�30 More recently, the former 
commander of Marine Corps Recruiting Command Major General Mark Brila-
kis, USMC, stated, “There are thirty some million seventeen to twenty-four-year-
olds out there, but by the time you get all the way down to those that are qualified 
[for military service], you’re down to less than a million young Americans�”31
Across all branches of service, the military requires an individual to have a 
high school diploma or a general equivalency diploma (GED) to ensure that 
a recruit possesses the minimum level of education to complete an organized 
training program and perform his or her duties successfully� According to the 
National Center for Education Statistics report on 2014–15 public high school 
graduation rates, “the adjusted cohort graduation rate (ACGR) for public high 
school students rose to eighty-three percent�”32 Although this statistic is positive, 
the results are skewed by a substantial caveat� The rate was derived from the num-
ber of students enrolled in comprehensive high schools, but it omitted students 
from alternative programs, which typically comprise those most at risk of drop-
ping out� The statistic also fails to consider the reality that the public school sys-
tem has lowered its graduation standards�33 According to the Mission: Readiness 
report, the lowered graduation standards contribute to the fact that only 70 per-
cent of potential recruits who possess a high school diploma are able to pass the 
Armed Forces Qualification Test, eliminating 30 percent of the potential pool�34
With regard to criminality, the armed forces jointly adhere to a “common 
standard of moral behavior as a means of evaluating a recruit’s ability to succeed 
in military service�”35 Although the requirements differ among branches, each 
branch disqualifies candidates for a conviction of a crime and determines wheth-
er a potential recruit with a criminal record poses too great a liability� According 
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to the Mission: Readiness report, “one in ten young adults cannot join the service 
because they have at least one conviction for a felony or serious misdemeanor�”36 
This statistic, when applied to the population of thirty-four million seventeen-
to-twenty-four-year-olds, indicates that 3�4 million young people are not eligible 
for recruitment because of a criminal background�
By far, the most significant disqualifier that impacts recruiting stems from the 
health crisis plaguing American youth� According to the former commander of 
U�S� Army Recruiting Command Major General Allen Batschelet, USA (Ret�), 
“the biggest culprit keeping young adults from qualifying to serve in the United 
States military is health concerns, mostly obesity�”37 The Mission: Readiness re-
port states that “twenty-seven percent of young Americans are too overweight to 
join the military� Many are simply turned away by recruiters and others never try 
to join� Of those who attempt to join the services roughly 15,000 young potential 
recruits fail their entrance physicals every year because they are overweight�”38
Culturally, little has been done to address this health crisis, so these numbers 
are expected to climb� According to data from the 2013–14 National Health 
and Nutrition Examination Survey, 17�2 percent of American youth ages two to 
nineteen were likely to be considered obese, while 6 percent were considered to 
be morbidly obese� Furthermore, when the current pool of seventeen-to-twenty-
four-year-olds was polled in 2013–14, 20�6 percent of them were considered 
obese and 9�1 percent were considered extremely obese�39 When applied to the 
group of potential military recruits, the data indicate that over ten million young 
adults do not meet the current physical standards to join the military, and in 
future years this problem will become worse—creating a major dilemma for the 
future military force�
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
In the current period of desired military growth, the Pentagon is challenged by 
the youngest generations’ lacking both the willingness and, in large measure, 
the ability to serve� To solve this problem, military leaders will need to consider 
modifying—modernizing—DoD recruiting policies to make them more relevant 
to Generations Y and Z, and future generations as well� Military leaders have 
taken steps to address some of the issues raised in this article, but much more 
needs to be done, as noted in the recommendations that follow� As the first course 
of action, so as to enhance the appeal of military service, incentives tailored to the 
values of Generations Y and Z must be put in place� A monetary incentive alone 
is not an adequate tool to entice generations that value professional freedom, 
personal growth, and family stability� Second, the military cannot control the so-
cietal and cultural trends that are leading to an ever-diminishing pool of eligible 
candidates� The services therefore must assess eligibility standards internally and 
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   91 5/2/19   11:35 AM
97
Naval War College: Summer 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 9 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
consider making the necessary or appropriate changes so as to recruit effectively 
the number of servicemembers needed for the force� Although these solutions 
may appear to be relatively simple, the reality of these modifications will require 
fundamental changes to the manner in which the armed forces conduct them-
selves� The following are suggested courses of action to consider�
Career Flexibility
The Naval Postgraduate School sponsored a 2013 study in which 481 community 
college students (the overwhelming majority of whom were born after 1981) were 
polled to assess generational attitudes toward military service� When asked, “What 
would make the military a more attractive career option?” the largest group of 
those polled, 39 percent, indicated that “more flexibility / more personal freedom” 
was needed�40 Although these results were derived from a relatively small sample, 
the outcome is consistent with a 2016 survey conducted by LinkedIn� This survey 
was posed to members of the professional networking site and intended to as-
sess the rate of “job-hopping” by different generations five years after graduation 
from college� According to the data, those who graduated between 2006 and 2010 
switched jobs nearly twice as frequently as those who graduated between 1986 
and 1990� This indicated a desire for job flexibility and the freedom to change 
professions�41
In light of these results, many civilian organizations have changed their per-
sonnel strategies to remain competitive� The health-care industry, which has 
been quick to realize the benefits of catering to evolving generational values, has 
been extremely successful in establishing long-term relationships with former 
employees, so that it might be possible to intercept them on the rebound from 
their next jobs� Scripps Health in San Diego, which counts 67 percent of its recent 
hires as members of Generations Y and Z, instituted an alumni program to court 
former staff� Since the program’s inception, Scripps reports that about 20 percent 
of employees return to the company within a year of leaving�42
While the civilian sector attempts to ease the return of members of Genera-
tions Y and Z to previous employers, the military has neglected to adopt this type 
of strategy� Although each service has programs dedicated to the recruitment of 
prior-service personnel, they are inconsistent in their definition of prior service, 
are highly restrictive, and often require extensive waiting periods� Specifically, 
each branch of DoD considers a prior-service enlistment billet as a reenlistment 
slot� As a result, the service must be below their goal of reenlistments for a prior-
service recruit to have the opportunity to return�43
Over the past several years, each service has met its reenlistment goals and 
therefore has had limited prior-service quotas� Although by itself this fact indi-
cates that prior-service reentry is unnecessary to maintain a military force, it fails 
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to consider the fiscal environment in which it occurred� During these years, DoD 
was in the midst of downsizing to the smallest force in nearly seventy years; now 
the Pentagon is tasked with reversing these trends and increasing the size of the 
force� When this fact is combined with the limited pool of eligible candidates, 
officials should consider modifying current policy to prioritize attracting prior 
members to return to the service in an expedited manner�
A specific area requiring review is the rank of reenlisting personnel� Currently, 
the rank (and therefore the pay and responsibility level) of a prior-service recruit 
is determined by the needs of the respective services� As a result, a person could 
be readmitted to the service at a level that is subordinate to what he or she already 
achieved during his or her previous enlistment period� Perhaps more impor-
tantly, no consideration is given to the education and professional accomplish-
ments a person may have achieved in the civilian sector� In contrast, the civilian 
sector rewards returning employees with opportunities that are commensurate 
with their accomplishments in other organizations� To compete with the civilian 
job market, the military needs to adopt a comparable policy and reward prior-
service candidates with exceptional performance and accomplishments outside 
the services by reenlisting them at a higher rank� The military does this already 
in special instances, mostly among staff officers� For example, medical doctors or 
lawyers may enter the service at a higher rank than a typical entry-level officer, 
because their accomplishments and credentials are considered� This approach 
should be examined for all reenlistments�
Permanent Change of Station
DoD spends more than four billion dollars (nearly 4 percent of the annual mili-
tary personnel budget) to relocate active-duty personnel� Statistically, PCS moves 
affect nearly one-third of the armed forces annually, and each move requires 
an average military family to find new schools for children and new careers for 
spouses (if that is even possible) every two to three years� The PCS system was de-
veloped during a period when 10 percent of servicemembers had families; today 
70 percent have at least one dependent� The system increases government costs 
and imposes difficult circumstances on servicemembers and their families�44
The current PCS system has substantial financial impact on families� Accord-
ing to analysis provided by the RAND National Defense Research Institute, PCS 
moves hinder the career progress of military spouses, thereby weakening the fi-
nancial security of military families� Through its analysis, RAND concluded that 
military spouses who are active in the labor force report a 28 percent reduction 
in earnings owing to PCS moves�45 The reduction is even more significant in light 
of the findings of a separate study conducted by Capella University� According to 
the Capella study, 22 percent of spouses stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 
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and Fort Hood, Texas, reported that they were working “beneath their education 
and experience level�”46 When we apply these findings to the RAND analysis, it 
is logical to deduce that the reduction in earnings for military families is actually 
even more substantial than the 28 percent noted above�
As Generations Y and Z continue to mature, the impact of the current PCS 
system on recruitment and retention only will increase� When the current system 
was formulated, only 40 percent of all women were participating in the workforce; 
today 71 percent of working-age women born after 1981 are employed, and 36 
percent have earned at least a bachelor’s degree� Members of Generations Y and Z 
(both men and women) are the most educated demographic in the nation’s history 
and are more career focused than any of their predecessors�47 PCS moves limit 
career opportunities, a fact that makes these generations less willing to enter or re-
main in military service� If recruiting and retention are to be improved, the Penta-
gon must modernize its PCS policies and better align them with the civilian sector�
It appears the Pentagon is aware of this reality� In a recent interview with the 
Fayetteville Observer, Robert Wilkie, former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness, acknowledged that the military’s current way of do-
ing business is outdated and in need of review� Specifically, he was critical of the 
traditional PCS system, the detriment this system causes families, and the effect 
it has on retention� According to Wilkie, “We have an industrial age system, but 
we are living in a new age�” To meet the demands of the modern military family, 
Wilkie suggested the concept of extended tours at major installations that would 
decrease the frequency of PCS moves while still providing the needed career op-
portunities for servicemembers� He further contends that installations such as 
Fort Bragg, Camp Lejeune, and Naval Station Norfolk are large enough to provide 
the career opportunities for servicemembers without placing the burden of mov-
ing on their families�48 This is a step in the right direction, but alone it will not 
address the problem adequately�
A better solution is to limit PCS moves for junior personnel within the officer 
corps and enlisted ranks (O-3 and below and E-6 and below)� This approach 
would create a more solid foundation for military families, spouses, and children 
while increasing the incentive to enter or remain in military service� This type of 
policy would enhance the stability of families, and the increased rate of retention 
would enable the military to earn a better return on investment on training costs� 
As the battlefield becomes more technologically advanced, the cost to train future 
forces will increase, often radically� Additionally, owing to technology advance-
ments, it can be argued that in many instances PCS moves no longer are neces-
sary� These advancements, including advanced communications, autonomous 
weapons systems, and cyber warfare, have diminished the differences associated 
with each respective installation, thereby alleviating the operational necessity 
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to move personnel� As a result, by decreasing the frequency of PCS moves, the 
Pentagon would enable military families to enjoy greater stability and working 
spouses to pursue a career�
Standards beyond the Control of the Pentagon
The Pentagon’s ability to recruit future servicemembers is predicated on society’s 
ability to educate, nurture, and care for its youth� In regard to each of these tasks, 
Generations Y and Z have been neglected� According to the Mission: Readiness 
report, of Americans aged seventeen to twenty-four, one in four lacks a high 
school diploma, one in ten has at least one prior conviction for a felony or serious 
misdemeanor, and nearly one in three is considered obese�49 These three findings 
represent the Pentagon’s greatest impediments to attaining current and future 
recruitment goals� Because of its inability to control the societal trends that are 
leading to the dwindling number of eligible candidates, DoD needs to assess its 
eligibility standards internally and make the necessary changes to recruit and 
retain the force effectively�
The inability of young people to earn a high school diploma or GED, for ex-
ample, eliminates nearly 25 percent of potential recruits� While it is obvious that 
underlying issues in the educational system need to be addressed, the military 
does not have the luxury of waiting for those benefits to be realized� One im-
mediate solution is the development of a DoD GED preparatory program that 
requires military enlistment on completion; it could be made available through 
local recruiting offices� Such a program not only would provide individuals with 
the opportunity to earn a high school education but would use guaranteed em-
ployment in the armed forces to incentivize completing the curriculum� Once the 
curriculum is established, the program likely would require minimal funding and 
oversight� Such a program certainly would enhance military recruiting, especially 
considering the benefits� If only 1 percent of seventeen-to-twenty-four-year-olds 
who currently lack a high school degree participated in such a program, the 
armed services would expand the recruitment pool by 85,000 candidates�
With regard to criminality, recent history suggests that lowering the present 
standards can result in a higher rate of misconduct within the force� According 
to Lieutenant General Tom Spoehr, USA (Ret�), “The Army learned a painful 
lesson in 2009� We lowered the standards, we signed more waivers for people 
who had acts of criminality than we usually did� We paid the price� These people 
we let in eventually caused misconduct, were separated for dishonorable reasons 
more than normal soldiers� The last place that we would go is to mess with the 
standards�”50 While the lowered standards may have been the root source of the 
disciplinary issues, it also is possible that the method of granting the waivers 
was ineffective� Each recruit seeking a criminality waiver should be investigated 
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thoroughly and evaluated on an individual basis� If this was not the manner in 
which the waivers were issued in 2009, officials should give further consideration 
to incorporating a thorough, individualized process now� Although a meticulous 
review of each candidate would be arduous, the gained value of eligible personnel 
would be significant� Currently, 3�4 million seventeen-to-twenty-four-year-olds 
are ineligible owing to criminal records�51 If only 1 percent of these individu-
als were worthy of a waiver, the number of potential recruits would increase by 
34,000�
The largest discriminator of potential recruits involves the physical fitness 
standards that currently disqualify 27 percent of applicants�52 This statistic, com-
bined with the fact that obesity has more than doubled over the past four decades, 
suggests that the number of eligible candidates will continue to decrease in the 
future if the current physical standards are not modified�53 Despite this austere 
prospect, military leadership has been steadfast in maintaining the physical re-
quirements associated with military service� According to Major General Jeffrey 
Snow, USA, commanding general of U�S� Army Recruiting Command, “We don’t 
want to sacrifice quality� If we lower the quality, yes we might be able to meet our 
mission [achieving recruiting goals], but that’s not good for the organization� 
The American public has come to expect a qualified Army that can defend the 
nation� I don’t think the American public would like us to lower the quality of 
those joining the Army if they knew it’s going to impact our ability to perform 
the very functions our nation expects us to do�”54 While Snow’s sentiment has 
some validity, the Army’s failure to meet its 2018 recruiting goals indicates that a 
reassessment of recruiting standards is very much needed�
To justify changing the military’s current physical standards, it is necessary to 
consider the future nature of warfare and the types of actual jobs and responsi-
bilities that eventually would be assigned to prospective recruits� According to 
Dr� Jacquelyn Schneider, a professor at the Naval War College, the “victors of 
future war will be those states that are best able to harness autonomy and human- 
machine integration�” As cyber warfare and autonomous weapon systems contin-
ue to advance, warfare is expanding in dramatic ways into high-technology the-
aters requiring technical skills such as computer programming, big-data analysis, 
and advanced weapon systems’ operation� The need for intellectual capacity to 
“adapt to high-tech threats to high-tech machines in real time” is becoming more 
prevalent throughout many facets of warfare�55
In the future of high-tech warfare, the ability of a servicemember to do push-
ups is irrelevant� As a result, the military should consider tailoring its physical 
specifications to the specialty that each prospective recruit is pursuing� To be 
sure, current physical standards need to be upheld for servicemembers assuming 
roles in traditional combat specialties that are physically demanding� However, 
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for recruits who will contribute to the fight from their keyboards, away from a 
battlefront, a reduction of required physical standards needs to be considered. 
While it is difficult to calculate the exact impact these changes will have on po-
tential recruits, it is logical to assume that they will expand the eligibility pool 
of recruits significantly and enable DoD to enhance recruitment goals greatly, 
particularly with technologically savvy individuals who might not meet current 
physical standards. Altering the physical standards could have a significant effect 
on the culture of the armed services and possibly the operating capacity of the 
future force. Despite the potential repercussions, altering recruiting standards is 
a viable option to ensure recruitment goals are met.
The armed services of the United States are at a crossroads. At a time when 
there is a call for reinvigorating the military and expanding the number of ser-
vicemembers, the youngest generations have insufficient interest in pursuing 
a military career, and the services are having problems retaining the men and 
women who have taken the oath already. The costs associated with these reali-
ties are expensive in terms of recruiting and continually training new members 
to develop the skills needed to replace those servicemembers who decide not to 
pursue long-term military careers. This, of course, impacts the readiness of the 
military and the ability of the services to fulfill their ever-expanding missions. 
The challenge facing the Pentagon is to increase the pool of prospective recruits 
substantially and develop incentives to retain members already in the services 
who are considering leaving.
Perhaps the key factor to improve recruiting and retention is to understand 
Generations Y and Z and make the requisite efforts to identify their motivations 
and determine what can be done to entice them to pursue military careers. This 
is not a simple matter; it requires considering and modifying existing standards 
and adopting many new policies, some of which may be considered controversial. 
Maintaining the status quo is not an option, since it is clear that such an approach 
will lead to a failure to recruit future personnel and to retain those already in the 
service in sufficient numbers. The younger generations differ from those previ-
ous in terms of what attracts them to careers. They are inclined to job-hop, often 
returning to employment with organizations for which they previously worked. 
Financial incentives, while important, are not their only motivation. These gen-
erations have a need to be part of organizations that value their service. They 
place a high priority on families and on a work-life balance. As members of the 
most educated generations in history, Generations Y and Z spouses desire profes-
sional pursuits commensurate with their education and experience. Compound-
ing these issues is the fact that a majority of those born after 1981 do not meet 
the current standards of eligibility for military service.
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If the military hopes to improve the recruitment and retention of current 
and future generations, policies must be modified and adopted. The Pentagon 
should consider taking steps to portray the military as a profession conducive to 
generational motives and viewpoints. Other options for improving recruitment 
and retention include improving family and professional lifestyles by changing 
existing PCS policies and revising physical standards to match them with mili-
tary occupations. Furthermore, DoD could consider developing a military GED 
program with military career placement following completion and developing a 
program to review, on a case-by-case basis, young people with criminal records to 
determine whether they are ready to leave their pasts behind and pursue honor-
able military futures.
Discussion already has begun in many of these areas, but it is time to double 
down on those discussions and potentially to take radical steps to enhance the 
ability of the military to attract and retain young people. Failure to do so threat-
ens the future security of the United States.
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ORIGINS OF A “RAGGED EDGE”
U.S. Ambiguity on the Senkakus’ Sovereignty
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 On May 15, 1972, the United States returned Okinawa and the other islands in the Ryukyu chain to Japan, culminating years of negotiations that some have 
hailed as “an example of diplomacy at its very best�”1 As a result, Japan regained 
territories it had lost at the end of World War II, while the United States both 
retained access to bases on Okinawa and reaffirmed strategic ties with Japan� 
One detail, however, complicates this win-win assessment� At the same time, 
Japan also regained administrative control over the Senkaku, or Diaoyu, Islands, 
a group of uninhabited—and uninhabitable—rocky outcroppings in the East 
China Sea�2 By 1972, both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic 
of China (ROC) on Taiwan also had claimed these islands�3 Despite passing con-
trol of the Senkakus to Japan, the United States expressed no position on any of 
the competing claims to the islands, including Japan’s� This choice—not to weigh 
in on the Senkakus’ sovereignty—perpetuated 
the underlying dispute and fostered tensions that 
recently have found new expression�
To this day, Japan administers the Senkakus, 
China and Taiwan claim them, and the United 
States ostensibly maintains its neutral position 
with regard to their sovereignty�4 U�S� leaders 
across recent administrations have stated publicly, 
however, that treaty obligations to defend Japan 
include the Senkakus�5 So, although the United 
States takes no explicit position on the Senkakus’ 
sovereignty, it has committed to defending them� 
Washington’s seemingly contradictory stance on 
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the Senkakus contributes to the risk of misunderstanding and conflict over these 
islands, which some analysts describe as the “most likely flash point” in Sino-
Japanese relations�6
Beijing’s military, political, and economic efforts to uphold its claim and 
challenge Tokyo’s are of particular concern� Militarily, China operates naval and 
paramilitary forces near the Senkakus to challenge and erode Japan’s control over 
the islands�7 Politically, in November 2013 China attempted to regulate air traffic 
in the East China Sea by declaring an air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) that 
encompassed the Senkakus�8 Economically, China reprimands companies that do 
not acknowledge Beijing’s claim; in one recent example, the Chinese government 
ordered Muji, a Japanese housewares company, to “seal and scrap” catalogs that 
featured “faulty maps” of China that did not include the Senkakus�9 China’s ap-
parent desire to challenge the status quo in the East China Sea may increase the 
risk of a conflict that likely would involve the United States�
This risk could increase if Beijing and Tokyo doubt Washington’s commitment 
to defend the islands on Japan’s behalf� Political scientist Thomas C� Schelling 
once described the Taiwanese island of Quemoy, just off the coast of China, as 
“a ragged edge about which [U�S�] intentions were ambiguous�” Schelling argued 
that because the United States appeared unwilling to defend Quemoy on behalf of 
its ally Taiwan, China may have felt emboldened to attack it�10 During the 1950s, 
Beijing and Taipei fought over the island in two wars, both of which involved 
the United States� Despite public assurances of U�S� resolve, the Senkakus could 
become a similar, modern “ragged edge” if Beijing doubts the credibility of Wash-
ington’s commitment to these isolated islands� This risk may increase further if, 
as Eric Heginbotham and Richard J� Samuels suggest, “some Japanese question 
the extent of the U�S� commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands�”11
Why did the United States sidestep questions raised during the Okinawa re-
version negotiations about the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands? Washington’s 
preference for successfully reverting Okinawa, including the Senkakus, while 
walking a fine line regarding the sovereignty question—neither placating nor ag-
gravating other claimants—most likely shaped U�S� policy choices� To understand 
the factors that influenced the transactional U�S� approach to returning admin-
istrative control over the Senkakus to Japan, this article first will review existing 
theories about U�S� decision-making� These explanations discount the context 
of the decision and the complex interactions within the U�S� government and 
among Washington and the three claimants� Second, the article will review the 
historical roots of each claim to the Senkakus and describe how the United States 
gained control of the islands at the end of World War II� Third, the article will 
analyze post–World War II U�S� decision-making toward Okinawa, culminating 
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in the decision to return it to Japan, and the choices subsequently made—or 
avoided—about the Senkakus� On the basis of this analysis, the article finds that 
U�S� decision-making on the Senkakus’ sovereignty may have emerged from 
a complex policy-making process focused on achieving the proximate policy 
objectives of returning Okinawa and reaffirming the U�S�-Japan alliance, while 
accepting future strategic risk� Fourth, the article will conclude with a review of 
the contemporary policy implications of this understanding of the origins of U�S� 
policy toward the Senkakus�
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS: STRATEGIC GAMBIT OR  
BUREAUCRATS RUN AMOK?
Analysts have proposed several different explanations for why the United States 
returned the Senkaku Islands to Japan in the way it did� Some argue that the 
United States saw the ambiguous status of the islands as a means to a strategic end 
in East Asia, while others argue that bureaucratic behavior or existing precedent 
constrained U�S� options� These explanations take a too-narrow perspective on 
this complicated issue and provide an incomplete analysis, which could have 
misleading policy implications�
Several scholars argue that the United States made decisions about the Sen-
kakus with a strategic eye toward shaping the future western Pacific security en-
vironment� Kimie Hara, a historian at the University of Waterloo, Canada, argues 
that Washington deliberately left this territorial dispute unresolved to sustain 
Sino-Japanese tensions and act as a mechanism to ensure that Tokyo would con-
tinue to permit U�S� access to military bases in Japan�12 Jean-Marc F� Blanchard, a 
political scientist at East China Normal University, makes a nearly opposite argu-
ment� Writing before many U�S� archival sources were available, he speculates that 
the United States “betrayed” Japan by not endorsing its sovereignty claim, in an 
effort to “curry favor with the Chinese whom [the United States] was seeking as 
allies against the Soviet Union�”13 Hara and Blanchard make realpolitik cases and 
suggest that giving Japan administrative control, rather than full sovereignty, over 
the Senkakus was a ploy either to maintain Sino-Japanese tensions or to promote 
Sino-U�S� rapprochement�
China similarly ascribes strategic motives to U�S� policy� A December 1971 
statement by the Chinese foreign ministry argues that “U�S� and Japanese reac-
tionaries � � � barter[ed] China’s Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands and use[d] Chinese 
territory to sow dissension between the Chinese and Japanese people�”14 A 2012 
white paper uses less-inflammatory language to assert that the U�S� government 
both administered the Senkakus and transferred them to Japan in an “illegal 
and invalid” fashion, constituting “acts of grave violation of China’s territorial 
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sovereignty�” Chief among these acts were “arbitrarily” including the Senkakus 
in U�S� postwar jurisdiction, and conducting “backroom deals” with Japan to 
include the Senkakus in the reversion of Okinawa�15
Some U�S� government leaders and analysts who participated in the decision-
making pertaining to the Senkakus contemporaneously emphasized the impact 
of bureaucratic actors and precedent� In June 1971, Henry A� Kissinger, the as-
sistant to the president for national security affairs (i�e�, national security advisor) 
for President Richard M� Nixon, expressed to Nixon his frustration with the U�S� 
State Department and how its actions during the Okinawa reversion negotiations 
constrained the president’s options� He said, “Mr� President, this is one of those 
examples where the bureaucracy, ’til they got into trouble, no one even told us 
there was an issue�” He then lamented that by the time he looked into the issue “it 
was already down the drain,” implying that negotiations were too far along—it 
was an issue to which U�S� and Japanese diplomats already had agreed�16
A State Department briefing paper on the Senkakus written in 1972 took a 
fatalistic approach, stating that “we had little choice other than to return these 
islands to Japan along with the rest of the Ryukyus” because of how the United 
States had gained control of them�17 The memo describes how the United States 
took over administration of the Senkakus—and the rest of the Ryukyus—from 
Japan at the end of the war, and suggests that this circumstance limited the United 
States to returning them to Japan as a collective whole� Both Kissinger and the 
anonymous State Department analyst provide compelling descriptions of what 
they experienced or observed, but they neglect to examine fully how and why 
U�S� participants developed this policy�
To provide a more thorough understanding of U�S� decision-making, this 
article will broaden the inquiry’s scope beyond just the Senkakus to consider 
other interests that influenced U�S� government policy makers� This analysis in-
corporates declassified U�S� government correspondence, Nixon and Kissinger’s 
recorded conversations, and (where English-language sources permit) the three 
claimants’ perspectives and their impact on U�S� policy� Other analysts have 
evaluated much of this documentary evidence, but the Nixon tapes provide new 
and valuable insight into decision-making at the highest level�18 There are inher-
ent limits to the conclusions that one can draw from reading primary sources 
and evaluating their impact on decisions; nonetheless, this analytical approach 
usefully tests existing theories and advances a plausible alternative hypothesis�19 
Opening the analytical aperture beyond just the question of sovereignty over the 
Senkakus makes it appear more likely that questions of whether, when, and how 
to return Okinawa to Japan played an outsize and underappreciated role in deci-
sions that U�S� policy makers made or deferred on the Senkakus�
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In the years leading up to the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, the United 
States had a significant foreign policy goal: to strengthen relations with Japan� 
Across several administrations, U�S� leaders evaluated and debated the trade-off 
between holding on to Okinawa for its strategic value and returning it to Japan� 
By the time of Nixon’s presidency, U�S� policy makers considered reversion to be 
an opportunity to reinforce the U�S�-Japan alliance and encourage Tokyo to take 
on more leadership in Asia� Once President Nixon decided to revert Okinawa to 
Japan, the U�S� government, led by the State Department, worked within existing 
processes to resolve many pertinent issues, including the sovereign status of the 
Senkakus� Defining the Senkakus’ status became increasingly complicated, how-
ever, as other U�S� political objectives came into play and interacted with Taiwan’s 
and China’s competing claims� As reversion negotiations drew to a close, several 
conflicting political goals came to a head in key decisions by President Nixon, 
because these negotiations occurred simultaneously with domestically significant 
textile trade discussions with Japan and Taiwan and in parallel with President 
Nixon’s secret diplomacy with China�
Rather than a calculated international gambit, the result of diplomats keeping 
political leaders in the dark, or just an inevitable outcome, U�S� decision-making 
toward the Senkakus may be understood better as an outcome of complex U�S� 
foreign policy processes in which policy makers encountered the thorny ques-
tion of the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but deferred a lasting settlement 
to achieve the immediate and transactional goal of returning Okinawa to Japan�
CLAIMS ON THE SENKAKUS AND U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE  
CONTROL
Japan, China, and Taiwan all claim the Senkaku Islands� The historical context 
is that Japan first claimed islands in the East China Sea in 1879 when it annexed 
the Ryukyus, including Okinawa� Previously the islands had been relatively au-
tonomous, but they paid tribute to both Japan and China� China opposed Japan’s 
annexation� Even then, the United States played a role in addressing competing 
claims in the East China Sea; during an 1879 visit to Asia, former president 
Ulysses S� Grant encouraged the two parties to negotiate about the Ryukyus, but 
the talks quickly broke down�20
Japan asserts that it then (in 1884) determined the Senkakus to be terra nullius, 
meaning they were unclaimed and uninhabited, and therefore international law 
allowed any state to acquire them by exercising effective and continuing control�21 
Japan claimed them in January 1895, in the midst of the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese 
War�22 Proponents of Japan’s claim note that it preceded and is separate from the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the war several months later, in April 1895�23 
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In that treaty China ceded Taiwan to Japan, ended its political dominance in Ko-
rea, and opened up new ports to Japanese trade� The pact has been described as 
the most “galling” of China’s nineteenth-century humiliations�24
China, on the other hand, asserts that the islands were not terra nullius because 
China discovered them in 1403 and that “Chinese fishermen have exploited the 
islands and their adjacent waters for generations�” Furthermore, Beijing argues 
that, despite the several months’ difference between Tokyo’s claim to the Senkakus 
and the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the claim still should be considered part of Japan’s 
pattern of territorial aggrandizement and aggressive behavior toward China in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries�25 China also asserts that the 
United States should not have held the Senkaku Islands at the end of the war, 
that instead China should have recovered them “in accordance with the Cairo 
Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration” as one of the “territories invaded and 
occupied by Japan�”26 Taiwan highlights similar historical evidence in its claim�27
The Cairo Declaration, a joint communiqué that followed a U�S�-U�K�-ROC 
summit in November 1943, declared in part: “Japan shall be stripped of all the 
islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of 
the First World War in 1914, and that all territories stolen from the Chinese � � � 
shall be restored to the Republic of China� Japan will also be expelled from all 
other territories which she has taken by violence and greed�”28 The United States, 
Great Britain, and China reaffirmed this approach in the July 1945 Potsdam 
Declaration, which stated in part that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall 
be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, 
Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine�”29 Modern 
Chinese sources (both in Beijing and in Taipei) consider the Senkakus to be part 
of Taiwan Province (of the PRC and the ROC, respectively) and argue that the 
Senkakus were among the territories “taken by violence and greed” during the 
period of the Sino-Japanese War and should have been returned to China at the 
end of World War II�30
The United States occupied Japan at the end of World War II� It desired to 
retain strategically located Okinawa even after ending the occupation of Japan’s 
home islands�31 U�S� and Japanese commanders on Okinawa signed a surren-
der document on September 7, 1945, that “formally [rendered] unconditional 
surrender of the islands in the Ryukyus” and geographically defined them� As 
shown on the map, this area included the Senkakus�32 The United States changed 
its definition of the Ryukyus twice over the next eight years as it returned some 
islands to Japan, but each time the Senkakus remained within the boundaries of 
U�S� administration�
The United States planned to maintain control over the Ryukyus indefinitely� 
A 1948 U�S� National Security Council (NSC) report about U�S� goals for a peace 
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treaty with Japan noted that “the United States intends to retain on a long-term 
basis the facilities at Okinawa and such other facilities as are deemed by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to be necessary in the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° N,” which is 
roughly the northern end of the Ryukyu Islands� The report also indicated that 
Washington would seek international support for “United States long-term 
strategic control” of those islands�33 The United States pursued this goal in part 
through the peace settlement�
The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty ended the war in the Pacific, but also 
granted control of the Ryukyus to the United States� Article III named the United 
States as the “sole administering authority” over “Nansei Shoto south of 29 de-
grees north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands)�”34 The 
term Nansei Shoto refers to southwestern (nansei) islands and included all islands 
not explicitly returned to the Republic of China between 29 degrees north lati-
tude and Formosa�35 Before the San Francisco Peace Treaty took effect in April 
1952, the U�S� Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) issued Ordinance 
Number 68 on February 29, 1952, to outline the structure of the government of 
the Ryukyu Islands� The ordinance began by defining “the area of political and 
geographical jurisdiction of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands�”36 This area 
roughly matched the 1945 definition of the Ryukyus, but the northern boundary 











Ryukyu Islands: Area Administered by the United States
Japanese Surrender: Sep. 7, 1945
USCAR Ordinance 68: Feb. 29, 1952
USCAR Proclamation 27: Dec. 25, 1953
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The terminology in the San Francisco treaty was ambiguous about both Ja-
pan’s sovereign rights over the Ryukyu Islands and the inclusion of the Senkakus� 
The treaty neither prohibited Japan from repossessing the Ryukyus in the future 
nor closed off alternative territorial settlements with other countries� At the San 
Francisco conference and again during Senate ratification of the treaty, however, 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said that Japan would hold “residual sover-
eignty” of these territories, which suggested that U�S� administrative control was 
granted by Japan and only would be returned to Japan, not transferred to another 
country�37 The San Francisco treaty did not name the Senkakus explicitly as being 
among the islands over which control was ceded to the United States, but they lay 
within the bounds of the treaty’s vague territorial delineation�
USCAR Proclamation 27 of December 25, 1953, again updated the geographic 
definition of the islands under U�S� control�38 USCAR delineated new boundaries 
because the United States returned the Amami Islands to Japan on that day� The 
map shows how this change again diminished the area under U�S� control but did 
not affect the boundaries encompassing the Senkaku Islands� USCAR Proclama-
tion 27 is a particularly significant document because it provided the definition 
of the Ryukyus that would be current during the Okinawa reversion negotia-
tions� The Chinese government argues that in 1953 the United States arbitrarily 
expanded its definition of the Ryukyus to include the Senkakus�39 The historical 
record indicates, however, that the Senkakus had been within the U�S� definition 
of the Ryukyus since 1945�
After this examination of the details of how Japan and then the United States 
gained control of the Senkakus, it is important next to consider the broader con-
text of U�S� policy toward Okinawa and U�S�-Japan relations�
OKINAWA AND EVOLVING U.S. STRATEGIC PRIORITIES  
IN EAST ASIA
To place the reversion of Okinawa and the disposition of the Senkaku Islands 
within the appropriate historical framework, it is useful first to understand how 
U�S� policy makers perceived the relative significance to the United States of pos-
sessing Okinawa versus strengthening the alliance relationship with Japan, and 
how this perception changed over time�
The relationship between the conflicting U�S� policy objectives of controlling 
Okinawa and deepening ties with Japan evolved over three distinct periods� First, 
during Dwight D� Eisenhower’s and John F� Kennedy’s presidencies, U�S� leader-
ship prioritized control of bases on Okinawa over the relationship with Japan� 
Second, during Lyndon B� Johnson’s administration, U�S� policy makers began 
to accept the idea of eventually returning Okinawa to Japan but would not com-
mit to a time frame� Third, Richard M� Nixon valued more highly the broader 
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U�S�-Japan strategic alliance and sought to return Okinawa while still maintain-
ing access to its bases� This shift in U�S� policy priorities can be observed in the 
evolving positions taken by these presidents and their key advisers, along with 
U�S� perceptions of Japanese domestic political demands for reversion and com-
mitment to the alliance�
Eisenhower and Kennedy: Reluctant to Revert
Presidents Dwight D� Eisenhower and John F� Kennedy both believed that it was 
strategically and militarily important to retain control of Okinawa indefinitely� As 
early as 1953, however, it was evident to senior U�S� policy makers that the U�S� 
occupation of Okinawa and the other Ryukyus could impede the improvement 
of relations with Japan� During a December 23, 1953, NSC meeting, Secretary 
of State Dulles warned Eisenhower that the United States should “expect a very 
unpleasant reaction” from Japan to the U�S� intention to control the Ryukyus 
indefinitely� Furthermore, he warned that “the effect of such bad relations might 
go far to offset the military advantages we would gain from the military rights 
we retained in Okinawa�” Vice President Nixon, who had just returned from 
a trip to Asia, agreed with Secretary Dulles, believing that the continued U�S� 
hold on Okinawa could expose Washington to accusations of colonialism� These 
arguments did not sway President Eisenhower, however; he dismissed them by 
pointing out that “the Russians are in the Kuriles and lots of other places where 
they don’t belong�”40 A 1954 NSC report on U�S�-Japan relations acknowledged 
that Japan desired the return of the Ryukyus, but “because of the critical strategic 
importance of these islands, the United States must continue to impress upon 
the Japanese its intention to retain control over them pending the establishment 
of enduring conditions of peace and stability in the Far East,” implying an open-
ended time frame�41
President Kennedy continued Eisenhower’s policy toward Okinawa� He blunt-
ly told the U�S� Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1963 that he “had no intention of 
giving up the island�”42 Okinawa was critically important to U�S� security policy 
in East Asia� Unlike at other bases in Japan, nuclear weapons were stationed 
there officially� Conventional forces operating from the island were critical com-
ponents in contingency planning for defending South Korea and Taiwan, and 
became important to executing the Vietnam War� Equally significant, because 
of U�S� administrative control, the United States could operate these forces as it 
wished, unfettered by any other nation�43 During a conversation with Japanese 
prime minister Hayato Ikeda on June 21, 1961, President Kennedy described 
the importance of Okinawa to U�S� security, stating that the “only interest of the 
U�S� in the Ryukyus is to support our security position in Southeast Asia and 
Korea” and that without base access “we might have to deploy all the way back 
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to Hawaii�” He then noted that “our interest in the area is not colonial, but flows 
purely from security considerations�” Kennedy concluded that the United States 
and Japan shared an interest in “avoiding pressures for reversion�”44
During the Kennedy administration, Japanese leaders did not apply meaning-
ful pressure on the U�S� government to revert Okinawa� Prime Minister Ikeda 
focused on developing the Japanese economy and strengthening ties with the 
United States, which would reduce the need for and expense of rearmament�45 
He did not seek Okinawa’s return and instead advised President Kennedy to take 
steps that would lessen the emerging domestic political pressure to reincorporate 
Okinawa into Japan, such as by helping to improve the local economy�46 Kennedy 
took this advice to heart and commissioned a Ryukyus Task Force to understand 
better how to reduce local dissatisfaction�47 The task force’s report noted that 
“[w]hile the [Japanese] government continues to speak formally in favor of the 
return to Japanese administration, it recognizes that we in fact have no intention 
of making any such transfer for the indefinite future, and that its position on 
this matter is for the public record only�”48 The U�S� State Department shared this 
impression that the Japanese government spoke about reversion only to satisfy its 
domestic audience�49 It was not until the Johnson administration that Japan more 
forcefully sought Okinawa’s return�
Johnson: Okinawa Bases or U.S.-Japan Alliance?
U�S� interests in Okinawa and the American relationship with Japan began to 
change during the Johnson administration� Lyndon B� Johnson at first continued 
Kennedy’s policies� When Deputy Under Secretary of State U� Alexis Johnson 
briefed the newly appointed U�S� high commissioner of the Ryukyus in June 1964, 
he explained that the United States intended to “stay in the Ryukyus for as long 
as there is a military requirement for our bases there�”50 By that August, however, 
some government officials recognized that “Okinawa remains a simmering and 
potentially dangerous issue in terms of U�S� relations with Japan” and that the 
United States faced a “hard choice between our military bases on Okinawa and 
our strategic alliance with Japan�”51
President Johnson publicly expressed his Okinawa policy in a joint commu-
niqué with Japanese prime minister Eisaku Satō in January 1965� The statement 
describes Japan’s interest in eventual reversion but concludes that such a change 
would happen at an indefinite time in the future when the United States no longer 
needed Okinawan bases� The communiqué notes that Japan sought reversion “as 
soon as feasible,” while the United States “look[ed] forward to the day when the 
security interests of the free world in the Far East [would] permit the realization 
of this desire�”52 However, with bases on Okinawa supporting military operations 
in Vietnam, it was impossible to predict when security interests would permit 
reversion under this formula�
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Over the next several years, Japan’s leaders focused their political and diplo-
matic efforts on the Okinawa issue� In August 1965, Satō visited Okinawa and 
declared that World War II would not be over until the United States returned 
the Ryukyus to Japan�53 By 1967, Japanese officials increasingly expressed their 
desire for Okinawa’s reversion and their frustration with the U�S� pledge to re-
turn the islands only after tensions relaxed in East Asia� During one week in July 
1967, Japanese officials in both Washington and Tokyo approached their U�S� 
counterparts in a seemingly coordinated effort to discuss Okinawa’s status ahead 
of the next Satō-Johnson meeting that November� In Washington, the Japanese 
ambassador warned Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
William P� Bundy that “the present trend of developments appears to be leading 
toward the creation of new problems which might damage fundamental U�S�-
Japan relations�” The ambassador also expressed frustration that the “military im-
portance” of Okinawa “will never decrease,” postponing reversion indefinitely�54 
In Tokyo, Foreign Minister Takeo Miki met clandestinely with U�S� ambassador 
U� Alexis Johnson and discussed “how to reconcile Japanese desire for reversion 
with military requirements�”55 The pressure Japan applied in these meetings may 
have spurred the U�S� government to reexamine reversion�
Several weeks later, State Department officials argued that there would not 
be a better opportunity to resolve “the only major problem between Japan and 
the United States�” In a memo to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, William Bundy 
explained that “we are prepared to negotiate on reversion provided they give us 
advance commitments to assure broad freedom of action for the use of U�S� bases, 
particularly to support the Vietnam War, and to enlarge [Japan’s] political and 
economic role in Asia�” He then pointed out that “our prospects for reaching an 
agreement with Japan on this basis will never be better than at the present time” 
and that “the longer we delay negotiations the greater the danger that an explosive 
situation could develop�” If a deal was not reached, domestic political pressure 
on Japan’s leaders eventually could force the United States out of Okinawa on 
less favorable terms, perhaps as soon as 1970, when “the Security Treaty debate 
could bring irresistible pressures for reversion�”56 The Treaty of Mutual Coopera-
tion and Security between the United States and Japan (known as the Security 
Treaty), which established the U�S�-Japan alliance, was up for renewal in 1970� 
The original treaty, signed in 1954 and amended in 1960, had sparked political 
controversy in Japan, and State Department officials expected the renewal to roil 
Japanese domestic politics if Okinawa remained unresolved�57 Despite dissent 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense Robert S� McNamara agreed 
that smoothly renewing the Security Treaty was more important than retaining 
Okinawa�58
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In several memos to the president ahead of a November 1967 meeting between 
President Johnson and Prime Minister Satō, Secretary of State Rusk and the na-
tional security advisor, Walt W� Rostow, outlined U�S� interests regarding Okinawa 
reversion� Secretary Rusk argued that Japan should play a more active and equi-
table role in the U�S�-Japan alliance� He wrote, “[W]e want Japan as a partner— 
not as a rival—in Asia, but as [a] partner sharing the political and economic bur-
dens of regional responsibility�”59 Rostow outlined the U�S� government’s position 
on reversion and its relationship to U�S�-Japan relations, writing, “The fact is that 
the old, immediately pre-war relationship is changing and must change� Our ob-
jective can only now be a gradual and judicious transition into a new relationship 
in which the Japanese take increased responsibility as a partner as we alter the 
essentially occupation status on the islands�”60 Thus U�S� policy began to prioritize 
the alliance with Japan over the unrestricted use of Okinawan bases�
Diplomatic and intelligence reports prior to the November summit also 
emphasized the importance of Okinawa to Japanese domestic politics� The U�S� 
ambassador in Tokyo reported that Satō would seek “a commitment on Okinawa 
which would represent a step forward beyond [the] 1965 communiqué�”61 The 
State Department’s director of intelligence and research described Okinawa re-
version as “the leading political issue in Japan today” and noted that, “wittingly or 
unwittingly, Prime Minister Sato has staked a large amount of his political pres-
tige on his handling of the reversion issue�” The analysis concluded that “popular 
sentiment demands something more concrete than a U�S� promise to return Oki-
nawa when security conditions permit�”62 A Central Intelligence Agency report 
noted that Satō faced increasing domestic political pressures to recover Okinawa 
and that “he reportedly considers it vital that his [November 1967] Washington 
trip result in some positive progress toward meeting Japanese desires�”63
Thus, it was in both U�S� and Japanese interests to make progress toward 
reversion� During their November 1967 summit, President Johnson and Prime 
Minister Satō acted on this shared interest and moved closer to reversion� Their 
joint communiqué provided more-tangible conditions for Okinawa’s return to 
Japan� Satō urged that “within a few years” the two governments should agree on 
a “date satisfactory to them for reversion of these Islands�”64
During Johnson’s presidency, U�S� policy shifted from prioritizing base access 
toward a willingness to discuss reversion, owing to the greater importance of 
maintaining and strengthening the U�S�-Japan alliance� Japan’s increased asser-
tiveness about recovering Okinawa occurred simultaneously with, and may have 
spurred, this policy shift�
Nixon: Ready to Revert
Returning Okinawa to Japan while retaining U�S� military freedom of action was 
one of Richard Nixon’s foreign policy goals� From his service as Eisenhower’s 
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vice president, Nixon was familiar with the debate within the U�S� government 
about Okinawa� As early as 1968, then–presidential candidate Nixon privately 
expressed a willingness to return Okinawa to Japan, provided that Tokyo would 
play more of a leadership role in Asia�65 As president, he publicly agreed with 
Prime Minister Satō in a 1969 joint communiqué to revert Okinawa, leading to 
the June 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement and Okinawa’s return to Japan in 
May 1972� The Senkakus played little apparent role in the negotiations ahead of 
the 1969 communiqué but were among many factors affecting the more detailed 
negotiations leading to the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement�
For Nixon, reverting Okinawa to Japan was not just a goal but a priority� He 
viewed Okinawa as a “constant irritant” in U�S�-Japan relations and believed that 
resolving the issue could encourage Japan to take a larger role in ensuring Asian 
security�66 Upon entering office, Nixon told his NSC that he wanted to return 
control of the Ryukyus to Japan, so long as basing rights could be retained�67 After 
only a few months in office, his administration issued National Security Decision 
Memorandum (NSDM) 13, articulating its Japan policy� The classified document 
described Japan as “our major partner in Asia,” argued that the mutual-defense 
treaty should remain in effect after 1970, and recommended that the United 
States encourage Japan to “seek an increasingly larger � � � role in Asia�”68
NSDM 13 also set three objectives for reverting Okinawa to Japan� First, an 
initial agreement should be reached in 1969, allowing time to negotiate the details 
and complete reversion by 1972� While unstated, this timeline would allow Nixon 
to return Okinawa before his term ended� Second, the United States desired 
“maximum free conventional use of the military bases, particularly with respect 
to Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam�” Third, although the United States desired to 
keep nuclear weapons on Okinawa, it would agree to withdraw them if it could 
retain “emergency storage and transit rights�”69 Achieving these goals would en-
able the United States to retain most of the military benefits it already enjoyed on 
Okinawa while ending a major irritant in bilateral relations and shoring up the 
U�S� alliance with Japan� Negotiations with the Japanese began in earnest in June 
1969 and continued through the Nixon-Satō summit that November�70
Prime Minister Satō remained a staunch advocate of Okinawa reversion, yet 
proved willing to negotiate� Recovering Okinawa—with no U�S� nuclear weap-
ons remaining—was his political priority� Furthermore, he wanted Okinawa 
to be treated on a “homeland basis,” meaning that the United States would be 
prohibited from deploying nuclear weapons there in the future, just as it was 
with regard to mainland Japan�71 Yet despite this public antinuclear stance, Satō 
was more interested in regaining Okinawa than in restricting nuclear weapons 
fully� Through high-level back-channel negotiations, Satō agreed to a more flex-
ible, secret arrangement: if the United States removed all nuclear weapons from 
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Okinawa before reversion, the United States could return nuclear weapons to the 
island in an emergency� This met Nixon’s policy goal�72
These negotiations culminated in a joint communiqué issued on November 
21, 1969� In it, President Nixon and Prime Minister Satō announced their inten-
tion to transfer control of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands from the United 
States to Japan by 1972� The United States agreed to remove nuclear weapons 
from Okinawa but retained access to “such military facilities and areas in Okina-
wa as required in the mutual security of both countries�” The communiqué noted 
that by settling “the last of the major issues between the two countries arising 
from the Second World War” the agreement “would further strengthen United 
States–Japan relations � � � and would make a major contribution to the peace and 
security of the Far East�”73
By agreeing to revert Okinawa to Japan while achieving all the goals set out in 
NSDM 13, the communiqué was a diplomatic achievement for the Nixon admin-
istration� There is no evidence that the status of the uninhabited Senkaku Islands 
played any role in these initial negotiations�
OKINAWA REVERSION AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
After this public declaration of a high-level consensus between the United States 
and Japan that Okinawa and other islands under U�S� control should revert to 
Japan, the hard work of negotiating the details began� The status of the Senkaku 
Islands was among those details�
The State Department led the U�S� government effort to negotiate the Oki-
nawa Reversion Agreement� U�S� negotiators operated within the bounds of their 
established procedures to address the Senkakus’ status, and they believed that 
adjudicating this issue was within their remit� Contrary to Kissinger’s depiction 
of them as rogue bureaucrats boxing in the president, they appear to have negoti-
ated within their perceived limits�
Delegated Responsibility and Negotiating Instructions
The U�S� State Department delegated the negotiations to the U�S� embassy in 
Tokyo, and provided explicit instructions to establish goals, constraints, and pro-
cedures� The instructions granted the embassy “overall responsibility for conduct 
of the negotiations,” while laying out five “general objectives”: 
1� “To retain maximum military flexibility for our Okinawa bases”
2� “To arrange an orderly transfer of administrative rights over Okinawa”
3� “To assure maximum economic and financial benefit to [the] U�S�”
4� “To assure best arrangements for the future of U�S� business and other 
private U�S� interests on Okinawa”
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5� “To assure public support of [the] continued U�S� military presence”
A number of additional political, military, and economic aims supplemented the 
general objectives� The instructions also directed negotiators to “refer new or 
unresolved issues not adequately covered by instructions to Washington together 
with your recommendations as appropriate�”74 The Senkaku Islands later fell into 
this category�
The reversion negotiations were inherently complex but were within the 
capacity of the participating U�S� organizations� A State Department negotiator, 
Charles A� Schmitz, later recalling the negotiations, said that “there were thou-
sands of details that needed to be addressed and somehow resolved before rever-
sion could take place, and several hundred of them had to be negotiated and put 
into the treaty itself�”75 For example, a status report in September 1970—nine 
months into the process—listed over thirty significant issues still being worked 
out, including currency conversion, disposition of U�S�-owned assets, civil avia-
tion agreements, defense responsibilities, trade arrangements, radio frequencies, 
telecommunications, and postal procedures�76 Notably, the status of the Senkakus 
did not appear on this list� Many of these issues were technical in nature, but 
some had meaningful policy implications and received attention at higher levels 
of government, including from the president�
The State Department oversaw the U�S� negotiators for this high-visibility 
process� The U�S� embassy in Tokyo provided routine updates on progress to 
Foggy Bottom and, per instructions, referred a number of issues to higher head-
quarters in Washington for resolution�77 For example, an October 1970 summit 
between Nixon and Prime Minister Satō provided an opportunity for the State 
Department to brief the president about the negotiations� Several days before 
the summit, U� Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and 
prior ambassador to Japan, informed the president that “reversion negotiations 
are progressing reasonably well, but potentially serious problems are emerging�” 
These problems included “the future of American business on Okinawa, includ-
ing civil aviation, and the continuation of a VOA [Voice of America] relay broad-
casting from Okinawa�”78 He did not include the status of the Senkaku Islands in 
this list of problems�
Remarks by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger at the October 24, 1970, 
summit suggest that both were comfortable with the progress made in the ongo-
ing negotiations and the latitude given to the negotiators� According to notes 
summarizing the discussions, Nixon told Satō that “he [Nixon] had told our 
people to cooperate in working out little problems in the same way that he and 
the Prime Minister had cooperated in solving the big problem,” meaning the na-
tional commitment to return Okinawa� Kissinger followed up on the president’s 
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comments by noting the specific disagreements on civil aviation and VOA 
broadcasting but “explained to the President that VOA and civil aviation had not 
been raised to his level because it was hoped that a solution would be worked out 
at lower levels�”79 The president understood that organizational processes were 
necessary to achieve reversion and were functioning as intended� The negotiators 
elevated some issues to him, even if they did not require his action� It appears, 
however, that they did not raise the question of the Senkaku Islands until near 
the end of the negotiations�
Status of the Senkakus: Decision Deferred
As part of the Okinawa reversion negotiations, the United States and Japan 
needed to determine which territories were included in the reversion, and their 
sovereignty� The State Department already had wrestled with questions about the 
Senkakus’ sovereignty before the November 1969 Nixon-Satō communiqué and 
so may have been predisposed to handle it without seeking a presidential-level 
decision, but instead in a manner consistent with precedent and conforming with 
the negotiating instructions�
Initial questions about the Senkakus’ sovereignty came not from Japan but 
from U�S� oil companies seeking to explore surrounding waters� The prospect of 
oil reserves near the islands appears to have provided the first prompt to the U�S� 
State Department to consider its position on the islands’ sovereignty� In May 1969, 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) 
reported that oil and gas could be found under the seabed near the Senkakus, 
and in fact the area “might contain one of the most prolific oil and gas reservoirs 
in the world”—which attracted the attention of the international oil industry�80
Within a month of the ECAFE report, a U�S� oil company, Gulf Pittsburgh, 
asked the State Department about maritime boundary lines near the Senkakus 
to determine which country—perhaps even the United States—could grant 
permission to survey the adjacent seabed� Robert W� Barnett, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, replied that “international 
law is murky�” He then described the dilemma facing the United States� “Settle-
ment of the Ryukyu-Taiwan boundary question would require that the U�S� act 
for Japan in negotiations with the Republic of China, since the U�S� administers 
the Ryukyus but recognizes that residual sovereignty rests with Japan�” Further-
more, “the U�S� is reluctant to get involved on this matter at this time with return 
of the Ryukyus under active discussion with the Japanese�” The lines of sovereign 
authority were just as murky as international law, and U�S� officials were not will-
ing to upset reversion negotiations, which were still at an early stage, to assist 
Gulf Pittsburgh�81
Beyond the Senkakus, broader U�S� policy toward competing maritime claims 
across East Asian sought to reduce the risk of conflict and maintain positive U�S� 
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relations with all claimants� Specifically, a January 1971 memorandum within the 
State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs outlined policy goals 
in this and other regional territorial disputes� These goals included avoiding U�S�-
PRC conflict and avoiding “exacerbation of U�S�-PRC and U�S�–[government of 
the Republic of China] relations in general over this matter,” which might mean 
“avoiding taking a position either way�” It further advocated avoiding damage to 
U�S� relations with other countries in East Asia, peacefully resolving the conflict-
ing claims, and avoiding fostering “permanent animosities that would preclude 
a peaceful general settlement of existing differences in the East Asia area�” The 
memo’s author lamented that these goals “seem mutually exclusive, but this 
merely reflects the complexity of the situation�”82 In support of this policy of not 
taking a position, the U�S� government asked U�S� oil companies “to stay out of 
disputed areas until claims are settled” and warned companies “operating Ameri-
can vessels anywhere in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea and the Taiwan Strait 
that [the United States] will not provide military protection in the event their 
operations are challenged�”83
During reversion negotiations, U�S� officials believed that the territorial de-
scriptions in the Okinawa Reversion Agreement should be consistent with the 
ambiguous phrasing used in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty� Their Japanese 
counterparts, however, argued that the agreement should state explicitly the 
boundaries of the territories transferred to Japan, and that those boundaries 
should encompass the Senkakus� On October 8, 1970, Japanese negotiators sub-
mitted a proposed draft agreement that included the coordinates USCAR had 
used to define its boundaries in 1953, to “add precision” but also to address the 
“Senkakus issue�” Officials from the U�S� embassy countered this proposal, telling 
their Japanese counterparts that “(1) the [U�S� government] prefers to stay out 
of the middle of the Senkakus issue, [and] (2) that [the] reversion agreement is 
probably not [the] proper place to refer even indirectly to [the] Senkakus dis-
pute�” U�S� officials further emphasized that the reversion agreement’s description 
of the boundaries should match the San Francisco treaty’s wording�84
The State Department’s strong organizational preference not to intervene in 
territorial disputes may have influenced its position on the Senkakus’ status� 
Furthermore, decision makers within the State Department may have considered 
their stance on the Senkakus to be consistent with specific precedent regarding 
the Ryukyus, such as Secretary of State Dulles’s “residual sovereignty” interpre-
tation of the 1951 San Francisco treaty and existing policy toward territorial 
disputes more generally� It therefore would be unsurprising that, unlike other 
issues such as civil aviation and the VOA, the State Department did not bring this 
issue to President Nixon’s attention during the negotiations� Instead, negotiators 
in Tokyo and State Department officials in Washington appear to have believed 
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that their solution to this issue was within their instructions and consistent with 
U�S� policy�
How to address the Senkaku Islands in the reversion agreement remained 
unresolved through at least the final months of U�S�-Japanese negotiations� A 
cable that the U�S� embassy in Tokyo sent in March 1971, three months before the 
treaty was signed, identified the status of the Senkakus as one of nearly twenty 
“outstanding problems which must be resolved before final arrangements can be 
worked out for signing reversion agreement�” The cable indicates that negotiators 
still were “awaiting Washington guidance for appropriate method of referring to 
Senkakus�”85 It is unclear from whom in Washington the negotiators were await-
ing a response, but there is no indication the issue was raised outside State De-
partment headquarters� President Nixon and Kissinger both later said that they 
were not aware of this issue until April 1971, when Taiwan’s ambassador brought 
it up with them�86 By that point, however, U�S� and Japanese negotiators already 
had agreed on how to handle these islands�
Ultimately, by May 1971, U�S� and Japanese negotiators referenced the broad 
language of the 1951 peace treaty in the draft reversion agreement, and added 
an “agreed minute” that explicitly delineated the boundaries of the administered 
area� Providing instructions to U�S� negotiators in May 1971, Under Secretary of 
State John N� Irwin II wrote that it was “essential to limit metes and bounds to 
context of area U�S� now administering�” Anything more expansive could result in 
the U�S� government’s “involvement in sovereignty issue,” which the United States 
was trying to avoid�87 As a result, the treaty defined “the Ryukyu Islands and the 
Daito Islands” as “all the territories and their territorial waters with respect to 
which the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and 
jurisdiction was accorded to the United States of America under Article III of 
the Treaty of Peace with Japan�” The agreed minute provided points of latitude 
and longitude that matched those used in USCAR’s Proclamation 27 of 1953 (see 
map) to describe “the territories under the administration of the United States 
of America�”88 Thus did U�S� negotiators dodge a definitive decision on the status 
of the Senkakus�
The U�S� position of not recognizing any claims to the Senkakus was unsat-
isfying to some in Japan, but did not halt reversion� During the negotiations, 
Japan’s foreign minister expressed his unhappiness with the “uncertain attitude” 
of the United States toward the Senkakus and the Japanese ambassador to Wash-
ington similarly criticized the U�S� “public position of neutrality�”89 Days before 
the Okinawa Reversion Agreement was signed, two members of Prime Minister 
Satō’s cabinet—the director of Japan’s Defense Agency and the minister for ad-
ministrative affairs—informed Satō that they did not concur with the agreement, 
because the United States would not address the Senkakus’ sovereignty� Their 
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nonconcurrence could have blocked Japan’s execution of the agreement� Re-
sponding to Minister for Administrative Affairs Sadanori Yamanaka’s objection, 
Satō said, “[Yamanaka] is passionate about Okinawa, and I see that he cannot be 
budged from his position� However, if this is the case, there is no telling when 
Okinawa will get returned�”90 Although the U�S� position may not have been ideal 
for Japan, Prime Minister Satō placed such a high priority on recovering Okinawa 
that he accepted the ambiguous U�S� Senkaku position so as to complete the Oki-
nawa Reversion Agreement�
U�S� negotiators received clear objectives and constraints, then operated 
within them to execute the policy of reverting Okinawa, and ultimately felt that 
they had performed successfully� In a cable sent several weeks before the agree-
ment was signed, the U�S� embassy in Tokyo summarized the negotiations and 
highlighted officials’ belief that “we have substantially carried out negotiating 
instructions with changes made only with Washington concurrence to accom-
modate firm GOJ [government of Japan] positions�” The embassy listed over a 
dozen approved deviations from their instructions, including the status of the 
Senkaku Islands� The cable indicated that the agreement avoids “making specific 
reference to [the] disputed Senkaku Islands (although covered in agreed minute) 
and clearly relates territories to be relinquished to those now administered by 
USG [U�S� government]�” The negotiators did not consider this to be a controver-
sial outcome� They concluded this summary of their work on the reversion agree-
ment with the perhaps self-serving commentary that “while there has been a hard 
and protracted negotiation with give and take from both sides, the fundamental 
objective of preserving an effective military base structure in Okinawa has been 
achieved�”91 In other words, mission accomplished�
BARGAINING GAMES AND COMPETING CLAIMS
This article next evaluates whether and how the interests of other domestic enti-
ties, foreign countries, and Nixon’s own policy initiatives may have affected U�S� 
policy toward the Senkakus during the Okinawa reversion negotiations� Relevant 
actors included governments of the other claimants (Taiwan and China); U�S� 
textile manufacturers; and Nixon, with regard to his own secret effort to improve 
relations with Beijing� This section will describe how these external factors in-
teracted with the reversion negotiations and affected U�S� decisions on the Sen-
kakus� In each case, Nixon decided to favor returning control over the Senkakus 
to Japan, rather than accommodating other claimants or interests�
As rival claimants for the Senkakus emerged in late 1970 and early 1971, 
these competing interests complicated U�S� efforts to avoid making a decision 
on the Senkakus’ sovereignty� Taiwan and China did not challenge Japan’s claim 
and assert their own until Okinawa reversion negotiations were well under way� 
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Japanese and Taiwan diplomats discussed the sovereign status of the Senkakus in 
the summer of 1970, and by September the Japanese formally asserted that the 
Senkakus belonged to their country�92 Taipei quickly contested this claim, and 
later announced its own on February 23, 1971�93 China staked its claim in a De-
cember 4, 1970, radio broadcast, and reiterated it over a year later in a December 
30, 1971, statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs�94
Different actors within the U�S� government also had a range of interests re-
lated to these competing territorial claims� Trade negotiators saw the Senkakus 
as a carrot to spur Taiwan’s cooperation in textile trade negotiations� Nixon in-
tervened, however, to affirm the U�S� position on the Senkakus and preserve the 
Okinawa Reversion Agreement� Ongoing but secretive efforts to open relations 
with China could have influenced policy toward the Senkaku Islands if more 
participants had been aware of Nixon’s overtures to Beijing� This secrecy likely 
inhibited some of the normal bureaucratic conflict and compromise across the 
U�S� government that might have brought more scrutiny to U�S� policy toward the 
Senkakus and how it would affect future relations with China� Under the pressure 
of the deadline for signing the reversion agreement, U�S� policy makers, including 
President Nixon, weighed these issues against the goal of reverting Okinawa� In 
both cases, U�S� leaders concluded that this territorial dispute should not obstruct 
reverting Okinawa�
Taiwan and Textiles: “High Politics at Home and Abroad”
Taiwan sought U�S� support for its claim on the Senkakus and linked this issue 
with a textiles trade dispute, forcing President Nixon to decide whether the Unit-
ed States should weigh in on the Senkakus’ sovereignty question more explicitly� 
Following its February 1971 claim, Taipei elicited U�S� support, both by detailing 
its sovereignty claim in a diplomatic note verbale and by dispatching its ambas-
sador to lobby the White House� The March 15, 1971, diplomatic note provided 
historical, geological, and economic justifications for Taiwan’s claim, but also 
explained why Taipei had not asserted its sovereignty any earlier� “For regional 
security considerations the government of the ROC has hitherto not challenged 
the U�S� military occupation of the Senkakus under Article 3 of the San Francisco 
Treaty�” Taiwan essentially argued that it had not voiced its claim previously to 
avoid antagonizing the United States, the guarantor of its security� The note went 
on to ask Washington to restore Taipei’s sovereignty over the Senkakus rather 
than revert the islands to Tokyo along with Okinawa�95
Taiwan’s ambassador, Chow Shu-kai, raised the question of the Senkakus’ 
sovereignty with President Nixon and Henry Kissinger on April 12, 1971� He 
emphasized the political importance of these islands to Taiwan, stating that “the 
issue of nationalism was deeply involved�” Henry Kissinger was not familiar 
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with the issue and told the ambassador that he was “looking into the Senkakus 
matter�”96 The next day, an NSC staffer sent a memo to Kissinger that detailed 
Taiwan’s claim, noted that Japan “has a comparable list of apparently offsetting 
arguments,” and explained that “State’s position is that in occupying the Ryukyus 
and the Senkakus in 1945, and in proposing to return them to Japan in 1972, the 
U�S� passes no judgement as to conflicting claims over any portion of them, which 
should be settled directly by the parties concerned�” In a handwritten marginal 
note, Kissinger remarked, “But that is nonsense since it gives islands to Japan� 
How can we get a more neutral position?”97 Despite Kissinger’s frustration with 
this apparent contradiction, U�S� policy did not change�
Taiwan’s claim and U�S� policy dramatically came to a head in June 1971, only 
weeks before the United States and Japan planned to sign the Okinawa Rever-
sion Agreement� In parallel with the Okinawa negotiations, President Nixon also 
discussed textile trade issues with Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea� Responding 
to political pressure from southern states affected by competition with Asian 
textile manufacturers, Nixon sought voluntary export restrictions from those 
countries�98 He designated former Treasury Secretary David M� Kennedy to lead 
these negotiations�
Kennedy reported from Taipei that the Taiwan government proposed linking 
the Senkakus’ sovereignty with textile trade concessions� Nixon’s international 
economic adviser, Peter G� Peterson, informed the president on June 7 that “Am-
bassador Kennedy is convinced that the ‘only’ way to resolve the [textile] issue is 
to withhold turning the Senkaku Islands over to Japanese control�”99 That same 
day, Henry Kissinger and Peterson urgently requested to meet with Nixon about 
“the issue of the Senkaku Islands,” which Kissinger described as “a delicate issue 
of the greatest importance to the Republic of China�”100 The meeting was sched-
uled for the same afternoon�
Hours before the meeting, Kissinger spoke with Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs U� Alexis Johnson in two telephone calls to understand how 
changing the status of the Senkakus in response to Taipei’s demands could affect 
the Okinawa negotiation� Johnson had unique experience on this issue because 
he had served as U�S� ambassador to Tokyo from 1966 to 1969 and had been 
involved with the Okinawa reversion negotiations from the beginning�101 In the 
first call, Kissinger started in by asking, “About those God damn islands, where 
do we stand?” Johnson explained that “[i]t’s frozen in the text of the agreement 
with Japan” and had been since before Taiwan’s ambassador Chow first brought 
up the issue at the White House that April�102 In the second call, Johnson ex-
plained that if the United States changed its position on the Senkakus to favor 
Taiwan, “there is not the slightest question about this blowing up the Okinawa 
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negotiations with the Japanese�” He also explained that “it [the Senkakus] is not 
our territory� We have no sovereignty� It is a territorial dispute under our pres-
ent administration of Okinawa� We just administer it—it is a Japanese-Chinese 
[meaning Japanese-ROC] question�”103 Johnson did not elaborate on why he felt 
the deal would collapse if the United States reneged on the existing draft agree-
ment about the islands� Perhaps his extensive professional experience in Japan 
and personal involvement with the Okinawa negotiations caused him to present a 
worst-case assessment of Japan’s reaction� Alternatively, he was acutely aware that 
the Senate needed time to review and ratify the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, 
so he also may have been wary of reopening the negotiations because doing so 
might weaken support on Capitol Hill and delay or derail ratification�104
A short time before meeting with Kissinger and Peterson, Nixon called Kis-
singer to prepare for the discussion ahead� According to the transcript of that 
brief conversation, Kissinger, echoing Johnson, said that changing the U�S� posi-
tion on the Senkakus would “blow up negotiations with Japan�” Nixon reiterated 
the importance of reaching a deal on textiles, to which Kissinger countered, “This 
would be a hell of a price to pay with the Japanese� The treaty is to be signed 
in about a week�” Appearing to agree with his national security advisor, Nixon 
wrapped up the call by asking whether Kissinger had “gotten him [Peterson] 
around” to agreeing with his view, to which Kissinger replied, “He’s all right�”105 
The president seemed to have made up his mind about the Senkakus prior to 
meeting with his two senior national security and economic advisers�
Kissinger and Peterson met with the president on the afternoon of June 7, 
1971; Nixon’s taping system recorded their conversation�106 Nixon began by 
indicating the importance of the decision before him, remarking that “what’s 
involved here is some high politics at home and abroad�” He told them both 
that “a lot of the things here have to be done in the context of our relations with 
Japan� � � � You understand that?” Kissinger then described his understanding of 
the history behind the decision: “In 1951 when the peace treaty was signed the 
Senkaku Islands were made part of the Okinawa administrative arrangement in 
which we handled the administration and the Japanese received sovereignty� � � � 
As a result of that we treated the islands as part of the Okinawa complex, since we 
had already granted the Japanese residual sovereignty in ’51 and it’s never been 
really disputed during the negotiations�” He concluded that “if we now suddenly, 
in the last week of the negotiations, surface this � � � it would blow up the Okinawa 
negotiations�” Kissinger later added, “[M]y major concern is that this would be 
seen in Japan now as deliberate sabotage of the treaty and would profoundly 
jeopardize our relations there�”
Nixon abruptly shifted the conversation to Taiwan, but rather than discussing 
Taipei’s arguments in detail he instead asked, “Is there something else we can do 
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with Taiwan?” In other words, what could we offer Taiwan other than changing 
our position on the Senkakus? Options included selling weapons to Taiwan or 
sending the Secretary of Defense to visit Taipei� Nixon, frustrated with the poor 
choices in front of him, then acknowledged, “I don’t think we can go back on 
Okinawa, I think our long range relationship is symbolic�” He wanted to find an-
other opportunity to “screw them [Japan] on trade,” but it was not worth risking 
Okinawa reversion to trade the Senkaku Islands for a textiles deal with Taiwan� 
He added, “I hope to God that we can think of some other things where we can 
stand up and kick the Japanese in the butt,” but he was unwilling to sacrifice Oki-
nawa reversion to that end�
Following Nixon’s decision, Kissinger criticized how the Okinawa reversion 
negotiators appeared to have put Nixon in a bind, and analyzed the impact of 
the U�S� position on the Senkakus� He asserted that “this is one of those examples 
where the bureaucracy, ’til they got into trouble, no one even told us there was 
an issue, and I frankly had never even heard of these islands until—” Nixon 
interrupted, “I never heard of ’em�” Kissinger resumed by saying, “[U]ntil Chow 
[Taiwan’s ambassador] came in here to see you [in April]�” To which Nixon 
added, “[O]h yeah, he hit those items�” After recounting the post–World War II 
history of the Senkakus, Kissinger lamented that by the time he first learned of 
the islands “they had already been given away because they had automatically 
been included by the Japanese in the reversion of Okinawa�” Peterson then asked, 
“[H]ow crucial are these islands to the Japanese?” and “[A]re you sure they are 
urgently important?” Kissinger responded, “I think it’s the sort of issue which, if 
it had been raised six months ago, we could have found, could have found out, 
but I suspect if it’s done now, it will look like a deliberate attempt to sabotage the 
treaty�” Kissinger then noted—perhaps presciently—that the U�S� position “in 
fact means they [the Senkakus] are going to Japan because nothing short of war 
is ever going to get them off these islands�”
Afterward Peterson relayed the outcome to Kennedy in Taipei� “After lengthy 
discussion, the President’s decision on the islands is that the [Okinawa rever-
sion] deal has gone too far and too many commitments made to back off now� � � � 
The President was deeply regretful that he could not help on this, but he felt that 
the decision was simply not possible�”107 With so little time remaining before 
signing the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, Nixon was unwilling to withhold 
the Senkakus from Japan and upend the progress made over many years toward 
returning Okinawa�
Several days later, Robert I� Starr, the legal adviser to the State Department’s 
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, assessed the legal aspects of Taiwan’s 
claim and concluded that the government of Taiwan “is not without legal argu-
ment under its 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan � � � to call upon the [government 
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of Japan] to settle the Senkakus dispute by negotiation or by other pacific means 
including third party adjudication�” He went on, however, to outline legal and 
political obstacles to U�S� involvement� “It is open to serious doubt whether � � � 
the [U�S� government] may properly raise the Senkakus issue with Japan” through 
mechanisms provided by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, because Taiwan was 
not a signatory to that treaty� Furthermore, “it is the firm policy of the [U�S� 
government] to take no position on the merits of the dispute�” He added that 
“there are other considerations which may also bear upon the question of the ap-
propriate [U�S� government] posture on this matter,” specifically the importance 
of U�S�-Japan relations and that “Japan obviously attaches great significance to 
the impending return of Okinawa, including the Senkakus�” His memo records 
that in response to pressure from Taiwan, the United States had only “asked the 
[government of Japan] to agree to discuss the matter with the [government of 
Taiwan]�”108 Thus, legal considerations apparently were not compelling enough 
to outweigh the political impetus to revert Okinawa�
United States–China Rapprochement: Incalculable Consequences
The U�S� response to China’s claim on the Senkakus is more difficult to assess, 
largely because the United States neither recognized the PRC nor had normal 
diplomatic relations with it but secretly sought rapprochement with the regime� 
This goal in effect was hidden from the normal back-and-forth of the policy pro-
cess� If participants across the government had been aware of President Nixon’s 
intent to open relations with China, then perhaps Senkakus policy could have 
been developed with that in mind� Instead, U�S� policy makers were cognizant 
of Beijing’s claim but were unsure about how to treat it, particularly since some 
perceived it as intertwined with Taipei’s claim�
China announced its claim on the Senkakus in December 1970, only six 
months before the signing of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement� Yet even within 
this short period, U�S� policy makers considered the implications of China’s claim� 
The previously mentioned June 1971 memo by State Department legal adviser 
Starr not only assessed the legality of Taiwan’s claim but pointed out that China 
had a stake in the outcome as well� “Then too, there is the position of [China] to 
consider� � � � If we press the [government of Japan] to negotiate with the [govern-
ment of Taiwan], we run the risk of aggravating unnecessarily the state of both 
the [U�S� government’s] and [the government of Japan’s] relations with Peking� It 
is difficult to imagine any conceivable benefit in terms of our relations with the 
[government of Taiwan] that would justify such a risk, the full consequences of 
which may not even be calculable at this time�”109
This memo was written a month before Kissinger’s secret July 1971 visit to 
China, so it was understandably difficult for State Department officials to better 
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envision the impact of a less ambiguous policy on the Senkakus� Nevertheless, 
the risks of antagonizing China further did not seem to outweigh the possible 
benefits of encouraging Tokyo and Taipei to negotiate about the Senkakus�
The uncertain future of Japan’s relations with China may have similarly influ-
enced how Tokyo dealt with Beijing and Taipei on the Senkakus in this period� In 
a December 1970 cable, a U�S� diplomat in Taiwan described this interaction with 
a Japanese counterpart� “Japan would never, [the Japanese diplomat] repeated, 
never negotiate [the sovereignty of the Senkakus] seriously with [the govern-
ment of Taiwan], because of the PRC�” According to the Japanese diplomat’s 
perspective, negotiations with Taiwan “would involve and thereby commit the 
[government of Japan] to and with the [government of Taiwan] in this area, and 
preclude involvement and commitment to the PRC in this area�”110 Similarly, the 
Central Intelligence Agency assessed in 1971 that “Japan finds itself caught in a 
painful dilemma” regarding whether and how to deal with Taipei and Beijing on 
the Senkakus� “To the extent that Tokyo solves its problems with Taipei, it dam-
ages its long-range hopes of improving relations with Peking�”111
The United States appears to have been trapped in a similar dilemma between 
the two Chinese capitals, and arrived at a compromise solution that would have 
the least impact on both, while still completing the Okinawa Reversion Agree-
ment with Japan� During Nixon’s June 7, 1971, meeting with Kissinger and Peter-
son, Kissinger briefly described how he thought China would react if the United 
States sided with Taiwan on the Senkakus� “The Senkaku Islands, strangely 
enough, as far as our relations with Communist China are concerned, wouldn’t 
bother them because they’d prefer them part of Taiwan because they could then 
grab them [the Senkakus] if they think they can grab Taiwan�”112 There was no 
discussion, however, about how China might respond if the United States main-
tained its ostensibly hands-off approach� President Nixon was aware that the 
outcome of the Senkakus negotiations with Tokyo could have some bearing on 
the secret discussions with Beijing, but he did not direct any changes to the policy 
of noninvolvement in Senkakus sovereignty claims�113
If the United States in fact was trying to curry favor with China, a more con-
certed effort might have been made to withhold the Senkakus from Japan to 
benefit this budding, but closely held, relationship� No evidence suggests that U�S� 
leaders were any more interested in acceding to Beijing’s claim than they were 
to Taipei’s� In fact—likely because of the secrecy surrounding the pending rap-
prochement—most U�S� policy makers negotiating the return of Okinawa could 
only speculate about the impact of their Senkakus position on China� The clan-
destine nature of the effort to improve relations with China may have removed it 
from the normal policy process and simultaneously prevented U�S� policy makers 
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from analyzing more thoroughly the expected impact of U�S� decisions regarding 
the Senkakus�
OUTCOME: OKINAWA REVERSION AGREEMENT AND  
THE SENKAKUS
On June 18, 1971, the U�S� Secretary of State in Washington and the Japanese 
foreign minister in Tokyo signed the Okinawa Reversion Agreement in simul-
taneous ceremonies coordinated by a satellite television connection�114 Over the 
objections of both Chinas, the United States returned administrative control 
over the Senkakus to Japan and took no position on the competing sovereignty 
claims� U�S� Secretary of State William P� Rogers defended the policy in testimony 
to the U�S� Senate ahead of the treaty’s ratification� “We have made it clear that 
this treaty does not affect the legal status of [the Senkaku Islands] at all� Whatever 
the legal situation was prior to the treaty is going to be the legal situation after 
the treaty comes into effect�”115 Robert Starr, the State Department legal adviser, 
submitted to the Senate a letter more formally describing the U�S� government’s 
position on the Senkakus�
The United States believes that a return of administrative rights over those islands 
to Japan, from which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underly-
ing claims� The United States cannot add to the legal rights Japan possessed before it 
transferred administration of the islands to us, nor can the United States, by giving 
back what it received, diminish the rights of other claimants� The United States has 
made no claim to the Senkaku Islands and considers that any conflicting claims to 
the islands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned�116
On May 15, 1972, Japan resumed its sovereignty over Okinawa and the 
Ryukyu Islands and received administrative control over the Senkakus� To this 
day, U�S� policy regarding the Senkakus’ sovereign status remains consistent with 
Starr’s letter�
The U�S� policy of noninvolvement was an imperfect compromise among 
conflicting interests, including Okinawa reversion, textile negotiations, and the 
secret rapprochement between the United States and China� Among these objec-
tives, returning Okinawa to Japan and reinforcing the U�S�-Japan alliance appear 
to have been very consequential in the decisions about the status of the Senkaku 
Islands� Textile negotiations with Taipei and future U�S� relations with Beijing—
the other claimants for attention—weighed on policy makers to some degree, 
but did not scuttle the first priority of reverting Okinawa and all other islands 
under U�S� administrative control to Japan� In the end, the U�S� policy was accept-
able to the Japanese while providing enough ambiguity to avoid roiling relations 
with Taiwan and China� In retrospect, Charles Schmitz described how he and 
other U�S� negotiators working on the Okinawa Reversion Agreement “felt stuck 
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and vulnerable to attack from all sides�” He believed that the U�S� position was a 
“middle road” that “neatly extracted us from the middle of a Japanese-Chinese 
set-to” while still successfully reverting Okinawa to Japan�117
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY POLICY:  
REDUCING THE RISK OF CONFLICT
Why should we understand how the United States arrived at its Senkaku Islands 
policy over four decades ago? Why should we plumb the complexities of govern-
ment behavior regarding these uninhabited islands? First, doing so demonstrates 
how existing explanations are incomplete� Second, doing so provides needed his-
torical context for a particularly thorny contemporary policy issue in which the 
United States is more closely involved than many appreciate� Lastly, this historical 
background provides a foundation on which to build a better-informed strategy 
toward the Senkaku Islands and maintain peace and stability in East Asia�
First, several theories seek to explain why the United States chose an ostensibly 
neutral position on the Senkakus that was, according to Kissinger at the time, 
“nonsense since it gives [the] islands to Japan�”118 Some analysts and the govern-
ment of China divine that Cold War power politics drove this decision� Kissinger 
believed that bureaucrats in the State Department forced a fait accompli on Presi-
dent Nixon� Both of these theories are incomplete and too narrow, because they 
do not consider the evidence that points to a more complex explanation within 
the broader context of returning Okinawa to Japan�
In many respects, realpolitik considerations drove U�S� decision-making, but 
American strategy centered on whether to retain Okinawa for its bases or revert 
it to Japan to improve relations� The question of the Senkaku Islands was only one 
among many challenging incidental issues negotiated prior to reversion� Deci-
sions regarding the Senkakus appear to have been made while holding the goal 
of reverting Okinawa foremost in mind� U�S� negotiators crafted a policy that was 
within the bounds of their negotiating instructions, was consistent with existing 
policy, and achieved the goal of reverting Okinawa while retaining flexible basing 
rights� This policy output was subject to the normal policy processes within the 
U�S� government and among other claimants� Particularly in the example of the 
potential textiles deal with Taiwan, proponents of this policy squared off against 
advocates of other approaches and forced a presidential decision� Conversely, 
there was perhaps a missed opportunity for healthy intragovernmental bargain-
ing regarding China’s claim on the Senkakus because many U�S� policy makers 
were in the dark about Nixon’s intentions toward Beijing�
Second, history is an ever-present factor in international affairs, but it is par-
ticularly relevant in East Asia, and especially with regard to the numerous mari-
time disputes along the region’s periphery� The legacy of Japanese aggression in 
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   127 5/2/19   11:35 AM
133
Naval War College: Summer 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 1 2 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
the early twentieth century, for instance, still colors Tokyo’s relations with other 
capitals in East Asia�119 President Xi Jinping of China has wielded history in his 
relations with President Donald J� Trump, first lecturing him during a 2017 sum-
mit in Florida about China’s historical role on the Korean Peninsula and then 
impressing him with China’s long history during a state visit to Beijing later that 
year; both efforts may have been intended to shape Trump’s perception of China 
and its role in Asia�120 History’s influence does not end at the water’s edge� In 
the South China Sea, China claims “historical rights” to numerous islands and 
islets�121 Other Southeast Asian states dispute these claims and lodge their own 
historically informed counterclaims� In the East China Sea, China might not limit 
its claims to just the Senkaku Islands; some Chinese academics cite Okinawa’s 
historical relationship with China to argue that Beijing could claim Okinawa and 
others among the Ryukyu Islands as well�122
It is essential that contemporary U�S� policy makers understand and appreciate 
the U�S� role in the dispute over the Senkaku Islands� Unlike the case with any 
other modern East Asian territorial dispute, the United States not only once con-
trolled these disputed islands; it also made decisions that perpetuated the dispute 
and—by pledging to include the islands in treaty obligations to Japan—arguably 
compounded it� Because of this intimate and unique historical relationship be-
tween the United States and the Senkakus, Washington should bear more of the 
burden for either encouraging the claimants to settle the dispute or ensuring that 
this political conflict does not lead to a war�
Furthermore, any of the three claimants to the Senkakus could misrepresent 
the historical record and the U�S� position on the Senkakus’ sovereignty to advo-
cate its position or debase a competing claim� China does just that, for example, 
in arguing that the United States arbitrarily expanded its definition of the Ryukyu 
Islands with the 1953 USCAR Proclamation 27� The historical record, as shown 
on the map, confirms that the United States considered the Senkaku Islands to 
fall under its administration of the Ryukyus after Japan’s surrender in 1945� Each 
time the United States redefined its conception of the Ryukyu Islands, it included 
the Senkakus�
Third, the U�S� policy of not recognizing any of the claims to the Senkakus may 
have helped achieve U�S� foreign policy goals in East Asia in the 1970s, but U�S� 
ambiguity left an unresolved territorial dispute among China, Taiwan, and Japan� 
This territorial dispute—particularly between Japan and an increasingly asser-
tive China—risks becoming a flash point of war� It seems increasingly likely that 
Kissinger was right when he told Nixon in 1971 that “nothing short of war is ever 
going to get [Japan] off these islands�”123 How should the United States—as an ally 
of Japan and the country that ceded administrative control to it—minimize the 
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risk of such a war? How can the United States mitigate the strategic risk caused 
by a decision deferred almost five decades ago?
Past and present experience with other disputed islands on China’s maritime 
flanks offers valuable guideposts� Analyzing the territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea, Ely Ratner, an NSC official under President Barack H� Obama, writes 
that “U�S� policymakers should recognize that China’s behavior in the [South 
China] sea is based on its perception of how the United States will respond� The 
lack of U�S� resistance has led Beijing to conclude that the United States will not 
compromise its relationship with China over the South China Sea�”124 The United 
States should not let China draw a similar conclusion about the Senkaku Islands�
To paraphrase Schelling, the Senkakus could become a modern “ragged edge,” 
about which U�S� intentions risk being ambiguous� Although the United States 
publicly asserts that the Senkaku Islands fall within the U�S� treaty commitment 
to defend Japan, Washington’s ambiguity on their sovereignty could undermine, 
in the perceptions of all three claimants, the credibility of Washington’s com-
mitment� Domestically, it also may be difficult to convince the U�S� public that 
the uninhabited and distant Senkaku Islands are worth fighting for, which could 
weaken further foreign perceptions of U�S� credibility�
To reduce these risks, the Trump administration should heed Schelling’s ob-
servation that “ritual and diplomacy can enhance or erode” U�S� security commit-
ments�125 Senior U�S� leaders, including the president, should continue to assert 
publicly and privately to all claimants that, while the United States is agnostic 
on Senkaku sovereignty questions, Japan administratively controls the Senkakus 
and, because of treaty obligations, the United States will defend the islands� Yet, 
while necessary, “ritual and diplomacy” alone may be insufficient� U�S� strategy 
should include continued and comprehensive bilateral (U�S�-Japan) military 
cooperation, multilateral (U�S�-Japan-China-Taiwan) diplomatic efforts, and per-
haps a fundamental reevaluation of the U�S� political stance toward the Senkakus�
Militarily, visible but quietly executed demonstrations of the U�S� intention 
and capability to defend Japan’s administrative control of the Senkakus should 
continue� Able to project power in the region and operate with Japanese forces, 
the U�S� military plays a vital role in demonstrating U�S� commitment� B-52 
bombers challenged China’s East China Sea ADIZ within days of its announce-
ment in November 2013�126 More recently, in March and August 2017, B-1B 
bombers have participated in bilateral exercises with Japan Air Self-Defense 
Force F-15 fighters near the Senkaku Islands “to demonstrate the solidarity 
and resolve we share with our allies to preserve peace and security in the Indo-
Asia-Pacific�”127 The U�S� Navy routinely operates at sea in the western Pacific 
and conducts exercises with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force�128 The U�S� 
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Marine Corps and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force since 2006 have held annual 
exercises that have evolved from demonstrating humanitarian relief operations 
to practicing “recapturing invaded islands�”129 These military operations and 
exercises should continue, both for the political signal they send and to improve 
U�S�-Japanese interoperability�
The United States also should support Tokyo’s ongoing efforts to strengthen 
Japan’s capability to defend the numerous isolated islands in its remote “south-
western region,” which includes the Senkakus�130 This approach could include 
encouraging Japan to invest in weapon systems and training that would enable it 
better to conduct routine operations around the distant Senkakus in peacetime, 
and in wartime to project defensive military power or to sustain its defenses un-
til U�S� forces could intervene�131 This equipment could include high-endurance 
coast guard cutters, long-range fighter aircraft, maritime-patrol aircraft, subma-
rines, aviation-capable ships, and upgrades to existing systems� Some changes, for 
example, could help Japan use its force more efficiently� Japan’s defense minister 
explained in January 2018 that the planned acquisition of two land-based Aegis 
Ashore ballistic-missile-defense (BMD) systems could free up Japan’s BMD-
capable destroyers for use in the southwest rather than being tethered to BMD 
operating areas closer to Japan’s home islands� Japan has considered other force-
structure changes that the United States should endorse, such as modifying its 
two largest helicopter carriers to operate the Joint Strike Fighter and purchasing 
standoff air-to-surface missiles that could be used to fend off amphibious as-
saults�132 Particularly if an evaluation of Japan’s strategy for defending against 
an increasingly capable Chinese threat informs weapons-procurement and 
-modernization decisions, these steps could improve Japan’s ability to deter con-
flict over the Senkakus and to operate effectively alongside the United States�133
Diplomatically, the United States should encourage communication and co-
operation among all three claimants to the Senkakus� Optimistically, President 
Trump could emulate U� S� Grant’s efforts during his 1879 visit to East Asia and 
encourage all claimants to meet and resolve their differences� However, the posi-
tions of the claimants may be too entrenched� Japan is unlikely to leave the islands 
voluntarily and neither China nor Taiwan appears ready to bargain away what 
Beijing calls “an inherent territory of China�” Furthermore, Beijing or Taipei or 
both may not view Washington as an honest broker� More practically, the United 
States should help the claimants maintain a stable political equilibrium regard-
ing the Senkakus, which could include advocating bilateral discussions between 
Japan and China about managing the Chinese fishing fleets operating near the 
Senkakus or establishing communications protocols for Chinese and Japanese 
naval and coast guard vessels to use while operating near the islands�134
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The United States may find, however, that treaty commitments, military pos-
turing, and diplomatic entreaties cannot curb China’s assertiveness toward the 
Senkakus� While Chinese fishing and other maritime activity near the Senkaku 
Islands generally has been nonconfrontational in recent years, the January 2018 
patrol near the Senkakus by a Chinese warship and submarine and the February 
2018 incursion by three Chinese patrol ships into Japan’s claimed territorial wa-
ters indicate that China easily could resume a more forceful approach�135
If China increases political, military, and economic pressure on the Senkaku 
Islands, the United States should consider dropping the fig leaf of not taking a po-
sition on their sovereignty� Although the approach is politically convenient and 
consistent with U�S� policy for other maritime sovereignty disputes in East Asia, 
it may frustrate efforts to deter China and to assure Japan credibly of U�S� com-
mitment�136 At the very least, letting China know that this option is “on the table” 
may demonstrate to Beijing that destabilizing actions could elicit significant 
political responses short of war� It could be argued that taking a position on the 
Senkakus’ sovereignty might expose the United States to demands that it weigh in 
on other territorial disputes, particularly others involving Japan, such as Dokdo/
Takeshima with South Korea and the Southern Kurils / Northern Territories with 
Russia� The Senkakus case is unique, however, because it involves the only dis-
puted territory that the United States administered previously� Overwrought fear 
of setting a precedent should not preclude the United States from finally making 
a decision it deferred nearly fifty years ago�
U�S� decisions in returning the administration of the Senkaku Islands to Japan 
likely were not motivated by a desire to use the Senkakus to shape the western 
Pacific security environment, whether by driving a wedge between Japan and 
China or favoring one claimant over the other� Neither was it the result of a 
bureaucracy run amok� Instead, evidence suggests that it may have been an out-
come of U�S� government decision-making that was oriented toward the goal of 
returning Okinawa to Japan and strengthening the U�S�-Japan alliance� Nearly a 
half century later, these uninhabited islands remain a challenge for U�S� political 
leaders, who should reaffirm and strengthen expectations of U�S� intentions to 
deter challenges by Beijing and reassure Tokyo� These steps also may spur U�S� 
domestic interest and better inform the public about U�S� security obligations 
in Asia� Effective “ritual and diplomacy,” complemented by a more robust U�S�-
Japan military posture and a political willingness to wrestle with a long-deferred 
decision, could make the Senkakus less of a “ragged edge” for the United States in 
Asia and increase the likelihood of continued calm in the East China Sea�
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“THEY WERE PLAYING CHICKEN”
The U.S. Asiatic Fleet’s Gray-Zone Deterrence Campaign  
against Japan, 1937–40
Hunter Stires
 The United States is facing a significant strategic challenge to its interests, al-lies, and leadership of the liberal world order from an increasingly wealthy, 
well-armed, and assertively nationalistic China� Whether through the seizure of 
maritime features and the construction of artificial island fortifications in the 
South China Sea, the aggressive use of maritime law enforcement to articulate 
and impose its nationalistic territorial claims on its neighbors, or attempts to re-
strict military and civilian freedom of navigation in international waters, Chinese 
forces are working to undermine and revise the political and geopolitical status 
quo in East Asia�1 These subtly assertive steps, which stop short of open warfare, 
constitute a category of activity known to contemporary military thinkers as 
gray-zone aggression�2 Current U�S� policy makers and the forces at their com-
mand struggle to find effective countermeasures 
against this strategy, which operates by incre-
mental “salami-slice” actions that individually fall 
below the thresholds that normally would justify 
a military response but cumulatively achieve the 
political-strategic revision to the status quo that 
conventional deterrence aims to prevent�3
However, this is not the first time the United 
States has faced such a destabilizing challenge in 
the western Pacific� Starting in 1937, Japanese 
forces invading metropolitan China undertook 
a concerted campaign to expel U�S�, British, and 
other Western interests from that country as part 
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of imperial Japan’s broader effort to dominate East Asia and actualize the popu-
lar jingoistic slogan of “Asia for the Asiatics�”4 Japanese moves against the West 
during this period bear striking resemblance to those of China today, including 
blockades of key foreign outposts, attempts to infringe on free navigation in rec-
ognized international waterways, and the harassment (and at times open attack) 
of foreign warships�5
Against this Japanese gray-zone campaign stood the U�S� Navy’s small but 
highly experienced forward-deployed contingent in the western Pacific, the U�S� 
Asiatic Fleet, with its thirty-nine warships and five thousand “old China hands” 
under the command of longtime Asia specialist Admiral Harry E� Yarnell, USN� 
With a combination of individual initiative and delegated authority from Wash-
ington, Yarnell adopted a policy that U�S� naval forces would protect American 
citizens in China wherever they were in danger for as long as necessary and as-
sume a forward-leaning force posture of deterrence through persistent presence 
and engagement� During the period of its implementation between 1937 and 
1940, Yarnell’s assertive and dynamic approach was markedly successful at pro-
tecting American nationals and comprehensively deterring Japanese encroach-
ments against American interests� Eighty years on, the dynamics of imperial 
Japan’s gray-zone aggression against the United States and its Western partners 
during the invasion of China and the U�S� Asiatic Fleet’s experience in countering 
these efforts offer an important, yet thus far little-known, case study for contem-
porary American policy makers and commanders seeking to contextualize and 
find solutions to twenty-first-century gray-zone challenges�
CHINA AS CHESSBOARD
An examination of the operating environment in 1930s China provides impor-
tant points of comparison to circumstances prevailing now� Although that era 
is remembered (not least by today’s ruling Chinese Communist Party) for the 
colonized-colonizer relationship between a largely prostrate China and the for-
eign powers that had dominated it since the nineteenth century, China in its weak-
ness was also very much a playing field among the imperial powers themselves�
Position of the Foreign Powers in China
With the virtual elimination of German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian impe-
rial influence from China following the First World War and the Bolshevik Revo-
lution, the chief foreign powers in China in the 1930s were Japan, Great Britain, 
the United States, and France� Each of these countries had significant economic 
interests in China and maintained forward-deployed military and naval forces for 
their protection� As Yarnell reported in a January 1938 letter to U�S� High Com-
missioner for the Philippines Paul V� McNutt, before the start of Sino-Japanese 
hostilities in the July 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan had the largest 
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foreign presence, with one hundred thousand nationals living in China and three 
hundred million yen (roughly U�S�$89 million) in trade with China in 1934�6 By 
Yarnell’s assessment, Great Britain was next in importance, with fifteen thousand 
nationals in-country, one thousand business firms, and one billion dollars in 
investment� After Japan and Britain came the United States, with ten to eleven 
thousand citizens and $230 million in investment, including the property of two 
to three thousand missionaries� France was a distant fourth, with three thousand 
citizens and two hundred firms� Germany and Italy also were present, but to a 
lesser degree�7
By 1937, the foreign powers maintained two general international settlements 
in China, one at Shanghai on the south shore of the Whangpoo River and one 
at Amoy on the island of Kulangsu, as well as a number of national concessions, 
particularly the British and the French at Canton and the British, French, and 
Italians at Tientsin�8 According to Kurt Bloch, writing for the Institute of Pacific 
Relations’ Far Eastern Survey in May 1939, “the bulk of China’s foreign trade is 
handled by foreign and Chinese merchants resident in concessions and settle-
ments� Indeed, for eighty years prior to the outbreak of the present conflict, no 
less than 50% of China’s foreign trade passed through Shanghai alone�”9
Rights of Foreign Powers in China Enshrined by Treaty—Relevant Analogue to 
Today’s International Legal Landscape
In its capacity as a chessboard, China held a unique legal status as an imperial—if 
not quite global—commons that contributes to its usefulness as an analogue to 
the present� In that era, the process of formal codification of global international 
law had progressed primarily to issues of nationality and armed conflict rather 
than the more expansive system today that seeks to regulate state conduct across 
a far wider spectrum of activities�10
However, international law was codified more extensively inside China than it 
was outside, with imperial activity in China regulated through a series of treaties 
between China and the great powers that expressly delineated foreign rights and 
privileges there� This patchwork body of accumulated bilateral and multilateral 
jurisprudence operated on a general international basis in accordance with the 
accepted principle of equal opportunity and equal treatment of foreign powers 
and citizens engaged in commerce in China� This had key implications for ques-
tions of freedom of navigation and maritime law in particular�11 Unlike on the 
broader oceans, which remained subject only to customary international law 
until the postwar United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, on Chinese 
waterways international freedom of navigation was enshrined specifically as far 
back as the Tientsin Treaties of 1858–59�12 International settlements and conces-
sions were given similar legal recognition�13 Accordingly, Japanese gray-zone ag-
gression and attempts at coercion took place against a backdrop of the defenders’ 
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explicit legal rights—as Chinese gray-zone aggression and coercion in the South 
and East China Seas typically do today�
The U.S. Asiatic Fleet in 1937: Strategic Predicament of Western  
Forward-Deployed Naval Forces
During the interwar period, the Asiatic Fleet was the latest incarnation of the U�S� 
Navy’s forward-deployed force in the western Pacific, maintained continuously 
since 1835 except for a brief interruption during the American Civil War�14 In 
1937, the Asiatic Fleet was composed of thirty-nine ships: two cruisers, thirteen 
aging destroyers, six small submarines, three oceangoing gunboats, seven river 
gunboats, three minesweepers, two tankers, two tenders, and one armed yacht�15 
Although its nominal area of responsibility stretched from the Persian Gulf to the 
international date line, its limited resources meant that the Asiatic Fleet’s chief 
purpose was of a diplomatic and constabulary nature—specifically, safeguarding 
American interests in East Asia�16 “Interests” were taken to mean lives, property, 
commerce, diplomatic outposts, treaty rights, and, after 1898, colonial posses-
sions in the Philippines, which the U�S� Asiatic Squadron under Commodore 
George Dewey first acquired in the opening action of the Spanish-American War� 
The Asiatic Fleet’s focal point was unquestionably China, given the significant 
American economic and diplomatic interests and foreign imperial activity there�
Despite its small size, after 1919 the Asiatic Fleet’s commander was always a 
four-star admiral, one of just four in the U�S� Navy at the time� This practice was 
meant to ensure that the senior American naval representative in China would 
not be outranked by his European and Japanese naval and military counterparts 
in the vital diplomatic exchanges that were at the center of the Asiatic Fleet’s 
role�17
Western forward-deployed naval forces, specifically the U�S� Asiatic Fleet, the 
Royal Navy’s China Station, and the French navy’s Far East Squadron, faced a 
strategic situation that starkly resembles the one faced by the Japan-based ele-
ments of the U�S� Seventh Fleet today� Each of these formations were and are rela-
tively small contingents of large but distant navies, facing down the concentrated 
forces of an increasingly avaricious, regionally based peer competitor whose 
heavy battle squadrons would take only hours to sortie from their home bases to 
the locations of the interests at stake, as opposed to the weeks of steaming time 
that separated—and continues to separate—the China seas from major Western 
fleet concentration areas on the U�S� West Coast and in the Mediterranean� As a 
result, the Western fleet commanders were faced with the challenge of safeguard-
ing their nations’ interests and international treaty law from an unescapable 
position of local material disadvantage and military inferiority in the event of a 
hostile contingency�
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Militant Ultranationalism and Lack of Civilian Oversight as  
Sources of Factional Complexity, Unaccountability, and Danger
Over the course of the interwar period, Japan was riven by political turmoil and 
spates of assassinations fomented and conducted by nationalist and pan-Asianist 
officers in the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy (IJA and IJN, respectively)� 
This was followed in 1931 by the IJA’s abandonment of any remaining pretense 
of subservience to civilian authority when it seized Manchuria from China on 
its own initiative—and, according to Yarnell, “without the knowledge or consent 
of the Premier or responsible civil officials in Tokyo�”18 In the interim between 
the takeover of Manchuria and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the IJA and IJN 
secured near-complete domination over the political scene at home, with the IJA 
the more powerful of the two rival services� The civilian government, although 
nominally still in charge, was essentially powerless and largely blind to the ac-
tions being taken in its name� This had significant implications for American 
diplomacy, as Yarnell observed in July 1939:
During the present controversy, the rights of Americans in the Far East have been 
upheld vigorously by the State Department� Had our notes been addressed to a 
government which retained control over its armed forces, some recognition of our 
rights might have been obtained� � � � It should be recognized however that the Tokyo 
government is generally impotent to deal with or give decisions regarding affairs and 
incidents in China� In many cases it is entirely ignorant of what is going on� It has 
been stated on good authority that the Foreign Minister was not aware of the seizure 
of the Spratley [sic] Islands by the Japanese Navy until a few hours before a protest 
was made by the French Ambassador�19
Beyond the breakdown in Japanese civil-military relations, the Japanese 
armed forces, and the IJA in particular, were themselves split between higher-
ranking commanders and their virulently nationalistic field-grade subordinates� 
The latter sought to dictate strategy, and at times even national policy, through 
their actions in the field� Yarnell wrote:
The “younger officer” element in the Army, and to a lesser extent in the Navy, is a 
factor which renders uncertain any policy which may be formulated by officials in 
Tokyo� These officers may in certain cases dictate to their superiors as to policies to 
be followed� Failure to be guided by the young officers may result in assassination� 
Conservative or liberal minded senior officers of the Army and Navy naturally hesi-
tate to assert themselves and may in self defense be forced to assume a chauvinistic 
attitude�20
These twin dynamics had several important implications for Yarnell and 
the Asiatic Fleet� First, State Department channels to the civilian govern-
ment in Tokyo would have little impact and could not be relied on to produce 
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material results in the operational theater� Military-to-military diplomacy among 
in-theater commanders would be considerably more valuable from a practical 
standpoint, thereby stressing the function of the Commander in Chief, Asiatic 
Fleet as naval diplomat� At the same time, however, interacting with and affect-
ing the calculus of leaders on the strategic level would not be enough to deter 
Japanese field-grade subordinates from taking local, aggressive actions against 
American interests� The combination of the lack of political oversight with the 
independence of Japanese officers at low levels of command reduced account-
ability, increased situational uncertainty, and raised the risks associated with U�S� 
deterrent actions, while accentuating the need for effective U�S� deterrence down 
the chain of command to a very localized scale�
Today, although Chinese president Xi Jinping has been at least outwardly suc-
cessful in his campaign to subordinate the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to the 
Chinese Communist Party and his own will, there are in contemporary China 
some disturbing echoes of the conditions that led to interwar Japan’s breakdown 
in civil-military relations and command and control� From an institutional orga-
nization standpoint, there is but one civilian (Xi Jinping) in the Central Military 
Commission atop the PLA chain of command, which is a tenuous arrangement 
for the oversight of an armed force with a long-standing independent streak that 
now is being repressed severely by that lone civilian autocrat�21 Xi and his close 
uniformed partner, Central Military Commission vice-chair General Xu Qiliang, 
have purged over sixty generals as part of the national anticorruption campaign, 
which reports indicate already has contributed to an atmosphere of restiveness 
and instability in the ranks, officer corps, and associated civilian elites�22 On the 
grassroots level, the Chinese Communist Party since 1989 has used a heavy hand 
inculcating popular nationalism to legitimate its rule to the generation that has 
grown up since the Tiananmen Square crackdown and now has begun entering 
the junior levels of the PLA�23
With the present strongman-oriented governmental organization and nation-
alist propaganda campaign likely to persist in the short-to-medium term, the 
combination of weak institutional civilian oversight and popular nationalism in 
the ranks could prove explosive� Recent military veteran protests against poor 
retirement benefits and job prospects similarly bode ill for stability across China’s 
broader military community�24 This combination of factors leaves open the like-
lihood that Xi and Xu’s personal vise grip on China’s armed forces conceivably 
could weaken over the course of their tenure or fail to transfer to their successors, 
all the while agitating those officers desiring more political autonomy or more 
hardheaded nationalism in Chinese policy abroad than the party leadership is 
willing to countenance� Such a situation could lead to an increase in incidents 
involving subordinate PLA commanders taking aggressively risky independent 
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action or to a potentially dangerous PLA institutional move back toward inde-
pendence from civilian political control�25 Given these presently existing circum-
stances in China today, the case study of the military and civil-military politics 
of interwar imperial Japan and the resulting dynamics for foreign forces is worth 
consideration, both now and in coming decades�
JAPAN INVADES CHINA
“A Short, Sharp Campaign”: Then and Now
In July 1937, the IJA embarked on what its general staff envisioned would be a 
limited expeditionary operation to seize five northern Chinese provinces, an op-
erational concept that Yarnell later characterized as “a short, sharp campaign of 
two or three months�”26 Yarnell’s analysis of imperial Japanese anticipation (and, 
ultimately, wishful thinking) of a brief rather than a protracted military action 
would be echoed hauntingly in the Chinese context in 2014 by Captain James 
E� Fanell (USN, Ret�), then deputy chief of staff for intelligence and information 
operations for the U�S� Pacific Fleet� On a panel at the 2014 WEST Conference, 
Fanell publicly stated his assessment that the contemporary PLA “has been given 
a new task: to be able to conduct a short, sharp war to destroy Japanese forces 
in the East China Sea, followed by what can only be expected [to be] a seizure 
of the Senkakus or even the southern Ryukyus, as some of their academics write 
about�”27
In 1937, however, Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek defied mis-
guided Japanese expectations that he would either consent to the seizure of his 
northern provinces or fight Japan’s preferred limited, localized war in the remote 
north�28 Chiang instead surprised the Japanese by laterally escalating the conflict, 
sending his best divisions to attack the small IJN garrison in Shanghai� The Japa-
nese then counterescalated vertically by significantly increasing the resources 
allocated to China and expanding Japanese war aims to include the occupation 
and domination of China in its entirety and the destruction of the Nationalist 
Chinese government�29 After two months of intense urban combat in Shanghai, 
Chiang’s forces were compelled to withdraw, and as winter approached the Japa-
nese moved inland toward the Nationalist Chinese capital at Nanking�
Japan Enters the Gray Zone
The above sequence of events is remembered in hindsight as the initial phase of 
the conflict known as the Second Sino-Japanese War� Yet this modern nomencla-
ture is largely retrospective� When the Japanese invaded China in 1937, neither 
side formally declared war, so the fighting, despite its high intensity and heavy 
casualties, was referred to in Japanese (and later also American) writings as a 
Sino-Japanese “incident,” with the rhetorical implication that this outbreak was 
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just the latest in a long sequence of local clashes between an imperial power and 
a country under varying degrees of foreign occupation and domination�30 This 
seemingly euphemistic terminology had implications for the conflict’s legal status 
and, by extension, for the conduct of the belligerents and the neutral powers� By 
not declaring war, both Japan and China legally denied that one existed, forgo-
ing for themselves any claim to “belligerent rights,” such as the right to declare a 
blockade and enforce it on neutral commerce� The unique landscape of interna-
tional law in China also was unaffected by hostilities, declared or undeclared� All 
past agreements and treaties providing for international freedom of navigation 
on Chinese rivers remained in effect, and indeed stipulated that neutral powers 
could continue to sail Chinese waters even if China was in a declared state of war 
with another foreign power�31
In this legal environment, Japanese attempts to dictate affairs in the interna-
tional settlements or impose restrictions on neutral freedom of navigation in 
Chinese waterways under Japanese military control were neither in accordance 
with law nor legally binding on neutral powers� Therefore, Japanese revisions 
to the status quo vis-à-vis neutral Western powers in China would require ei-
ther the use of force to compel change or the de facto assent of a cooperative 
adversary� Since the greater portion of the Japanese officer corps, apart from 
the most extreme, recognized the at least momentary undesirability of open war 
with the West, Japan’s revisionist gray-zone campaign against Western interests 
manifested itself in a mixture of outwardly innocuous requests, more-menacing 
impositions, and occasional outright intimidations designed to gain this assent�
Japan’s gray-zone assertions against neutral powers started in August 1937, 
around the time its forces began to gain the upper hand in Shanghai� These early 
probing actions took the form of attempts to impose Japanese will in various 
respects on the other powers� For example, they closed the area of the Shanghai 
international settlement normally patrolled by Japanese forces in peacetime to 
nationals of other powers, and then after the fighting had moved on they required 
passes and permissions for residents to reenter to inspect or remove their prop-
erty�32 This action disregarded rights to free movement within the international 
settlement and infringed on the administration of the multinational Shanghai 
Municipal Council�33
More pressingly, the Japanese attempted to restrict international navigational 
rights—which soon became a key sticking point� These restrictions began with a 
proclamation by Vice Admiral Kiyoshi Hasegawa, commander in chief of Japa-
nese naval forces in the Shanghai area, without advance notice to Yarnell or any 
of the other foreign admirals in China, of a “peacetime blockade” of the China 
coast, directed against Chinese shipping, with the caveat that foreign ships “will 
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be liable to boarding by Japanese naval authorities bent on ascertaining their true 
nationality in case of doubt�”34 Hasegawa followed with a request on September 
1, 1937, in response to an inquiry on the matter from Yarnell, for notification 
of movements by American vessels in the proscribed zone�35 Most importantly, 
with the victory in Shanghai and movements west toward Nanking, the Japanese 
gained military control of the Yangtze River and began to assume the right to 
grant or refuse permission to navigate it to other powers—contrary to treaty 
rights�36 This issue would become the key point of gray-zone contention between 
Japan and the West between late 1937 and mid-1939�
The gray-zone confrontation took on new urgency as Japan and China reached 
a battlefield stalemate between 1938 and 1939� After a series of operationally suc-
cessful Japanese offensives nevertheless failed either to bring the Chinese govern-
ment to terms or to impose Japanese control over the restive countryside, the 
Japanese came to regard the Nationalist Chinese bullion reserves, some of which 
were held in the vaults of Western banks within the international settlements and 
concessions, as a potential means of forcing an end to the war through economic 
strangulation� In mid-1939, therefore, the Japanese embarked on their most ag-
gressive gray-zone offensive yet: blockading the British and French concessions 
in Tientsin, introducing landing troops into the foreign concession on Kulangsu 
in Amoy Harbor, and seeking to close China’s last open seaports—Swatow, 
Foochow, Wenchow, and Ningpo—to foreign shipping� According to Yarnell, 
“the taking over of these Concessions, giving them absolute control of [China’s] 
trade and finance, and the capture of the silver stocks now in Concession banks 
would be equivalent to many victories on the battle field�”37
THE YARNELL STRATEGY AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
Yarnell’s responses to the spectrum of Japanese impositions show a consistent 
approach of polite but firm resolve, characterized by
• Continuous military-to-military diplomatic contact asserting American 
rights and challenging Japanese infringements on the spot
• Persistent physical U�S� force presence at the point of Japanese gray-zone 
attack
• Development of the Asiatic Fleet’s organizational culture around the prin-
ciples of forward presence, particularly regarding the exercise of independent 
judgment and action by on-scene commanders and subordinates
With these approaches, Yarnell accepted inherent risk attendant to maintaining 
presence in war zones and defending U�S� interests against gray-zone aggressions 
from a malignant, militaristic force unchecked by civilian control�
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Sending U.S. Force Presence toward the Sound of the Guns
Backed by an American national policy of “standing adamantly on all American 
rights of property and person,” Yarnell laid out the foundations of his strategy in 
a statement of policy of the U�S� Asiatic Fleet on September 22, 1937�
The policy of the Commander in Chief during the present emergency is to employ 
U�S� naval forces under his command so as to offer all possible protection and assis-
tance to our nationals in cases where needed� Naval vessels will be stationed in ports 
where American citizens are concentrated and will remain there until it is no longer 
possible or necessary to protect them or until they have been evacuated� This policy  
� � � will continue in full force even after our nationals have been warned to leave 
China and after an opportunity to leave has been given� � � � In giving assistance and 
protection our naval forces may at times be exposed to dangers which will in most 
cases be slight, but in any case these risks must be accepted�38
This approach was assertive and forward leaning, placing U�S� warships in the 
midst of active combat to protect American interests� Indeed, Yarnell deployed 
the bulk of the Asiatic Fleet to Shanghai within hours of the initial outbreak of 
fighting there� Charles Henry Kretz, who served between 1937 and 1938 as first 
lieutenant and gunnery officer of the destroyer USS Bulmer (DD 222), offers a 
vivid account of his ship’s arrival at Shanghai on September 1, 1937� The ship 
entered the mouth of the Yangtze
during the actual landing of the Japanese at Woosung� We went right through the 
Japanese fleet as they were bombarding the shore, with troops along the shore and 
landing craft on the beach� � � � We were right in the middle of the combat, with shells 
flying around all around us� We proceeded on up the Whangpoo River to the Texaco 
compound, where we moored to a pontoon � � � to guard the Texaco compound� We 
were there for months � � � we were right in the midst of most of the fighting� It was all 
around us� � � � The Japanese would come up with their destroyers and cruisers firing 
point-blank into the opposite bank of the river� When they’d get near us, they’d stop 
firing, turn around and salute us, and as soon as they passed, open fire again�39
As the Japanese expanded the conflict beyond Shanghai to different ports, U�S� 
Asiatic Fleet ships would steam toward the sound of the guns, shadowing Japa-
nese operations and taking up station to guard American interests and maintain 
comprehensive deterrence�
Presence operations of this type proved their value in 1939 with the start of the 
Japanese economic strangulation campaign against the Western concessions and 
the remaining open Chinese ports� An illustrative example is the Swatow incident 
in June of that year, when a Japanese expeditionary force took the treaty port of 
Swatow, where approximately forty American and eighty British missionaries 
resided, and demanded the withdrawal of the destroyers USS Pillsbury (DD 227) 
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and HMS Thanet� Yarnell replied by ordering Pillsbury to remain; dispatching a 
second U�S� destroyer to the scene (a move that the British emulated); and com-
municating to his Japanese naval counterpart, Admiral Koshiro Oikawa, “that the 
paramount duty of the United States naval vessels is the protection of American 
citizens and that they will go wherever necessary at any time to carry out that 
mission and will remain in such place as long as American citizens are in need 
of protection or assistance�”40 Faced with this unambiguous commitment, the 
Japanese relented�
Operational Hazards from Both Mistaken and Intentional Attack
The dangers of accidental damage or mistaken attack during these operations 
were considerable—during the first phase of the battle of Shanghai, U�S� warships 
were bombed mistakenly five times by Chinese aircraft and struck by errant an-
tiaircraft shells and shrapnel on numerous occasions� Yarnell’s flagship, USS Au-
gusta (CA 31), was nearly a victim of a Chinese bomb that fell just twenty yards 
wide of the ship, less than half an hour after arriving at the mooring buoy on the 
Whangpoo on the afternoon of August 14, 1937� It suffered one man killed and 
seventeen wounded when an antiaircraft shell exploded on the ship’s well deck 
six days later�41 In October of that year, Yarnell himself was conversing with his 
chief of staff on Augusta’s bridge wing when a piece of shrapnel wounded a radio-
man standing between them� Most infamously, Japanese naval aircraft mistakenly 
bombed and sank the gunboat USS Panay (PR 5) on December 12, while Panay 
was escorting three merchantmen engaged in noncombatant evacuation opera-
tions from Nanking�42
The pursuit of Yarnell’s strategy frequently required Asiatic Fleet ships to place 
themselves in tactically vulnerable positions as they interposed themselves be-
tween a militaristic, unpredictable, aggressive adversary and coveted objectives� 
The risk to American forces was only “slight” so long as the Japanese—which is 
to say, whichever Japanese officer happened to be in tactical command in the 
vicinity—did not choose to start a fight with the United States by simply destroy-
ing the vulnerable American unit before them� While the bombing of Panay 
was a genuine case of misidentification by overzealous Japanese fliers without a 
strike plan, outright deliberate attacks did take place�43 Earlier on December 12, 
an ultranationalist Japanese artillery officer, Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto, chose 
to open fire on a pair of British gunboats operating off Wuhu, and subsequently 
sent soldiers under his command to machine-gun the decks of the sinking Panay 
a few hours later�44
At the time of the attack on Panay, the destroyer Bulmer was riding at anchor 
in Tsingtao between two Japanese cruisers� According to Kretz’s later recollec-
tion, Bulmer’s crew was acutely aware of the ship’s all-but-certain fate should 
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war break out between the United States and Japan at that juncture: “When we 
learned of the sinking of the Panay, we immediately put warheads on our torpe-
does� We kept six torpedoes trained on each of these Japanese cruisers day and 
night� � � � They didn’t have the torpedoes, but they had their guns � � � they were 
trained on us� But if we weren’t going to get out, there were two Japanese cruisers 
that weren’t going to get out either�”45
Deploying Four Stars
Yarnell was particularly effective in his use of the diplomatic stature associated 
with his own four-star rank to assert American rights in the face of Japanese navi-
gational restrictions and blockades� In June 1938, the Japanese delivered letters to 
U�S� ambassador to China Nelson T� Johnson requesting that neutral ships evacu-
ate a 326-mile zone of the Yangtze between Wuhu and Hankow and provide no-
tification of future movements� In addition, in light of past difficulties regarding 
identification of neutral vessels from the air, the letters expressed that Japanese 
air commanders “earnestly hope[d] � � � that the Powers concerned would find out 
a new method to make their vessels more distinguishable, for example, such as 
painting the greater part of the vessels SCARLET [emphasis original] or in other 
colours�”46 Yarnell flatly refused to repaint or restrict the movements of U�S� war-
ships on the Yangtze and reiterated that Japanese forces must hold themselves 
accountable for damage to American lives and property�
Later that month, Yarnell cruised aboard the Asiatic Fleet’s armed yacht and 
relief flagship USS Isabel (PY 10) from Shanghai without Japanese naval escort to 
Nanking, downriver of the purported “danger zone” but nevertheless penetrat-
ing an area that the Japanese previously had pronounced impassable to foreign 
shipping�47 Yarnell then repeated the maneuver with U�S� consul Clarence Gauss 
aboard in January 1939, proceeding as far as Wuhu and proclaiming to report-
ers that, in light of the area’s lack of fighting, clearance of previous navigational 
barriers, and presence of many Japanese transport ships on the river, he saw no 
reason why the Yangtze should not be open to international shipping�48 Since the 
Japanese could not well impede the passage of an American four-star admiral on 
an inspection tour without causing a serious incident, Yarnell used himself as a 
powerful diplomatic chess piece to ensure the success of what today would be 
labeled “freedom of navigation operations” that asserted American navigational 
rights on the Yangtze while undermining the public Japanese position that the 
river was not physically safe�
Fostering a Mission Command Culture
Yarnell also harnessed and nurtured his force’s distinctive organizational culture, 
which encouraged independent action and judgment on the part of relatively 
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junior officers in high-stakes political-military-diplomatic situations� This sen-
sibility was inculcated well down the chain of command, as was the case with 
Kretz’s ship, USS Bulmer, at Amoy in July 1938� The Japanese had conducted 
an amphibious landing on Amoy Island in early May of that year, leading to a 
significant exodus of civilians from Amoy into the international settlement on 
the adjacent island of Kulangsu� Japanese troops occupied Amoy Island, while 
the Chinese held the shore of the mainland� Yarnell sent Bulmer to relieve the 
destroyer Edsall (DD 219) at Amoy in early July with broad, mission-type orders, 
which Bulmer’s commanding officer, Walter Ansel, later recounted were simply 
“‘to protect American interests’ � � � that’s all I could get out of him�”49 Ansel de-
scribed his approach to this tasking with a frank, clear-eyed assessment of the 
potential range of action open to on-scene commanders with such instructions 
and of the implications of a captain’s performance on his career prospects: “If 
you protected them [American interests] and met emergencies which couldn’t be 
anticipated and you did something that was a little extreme or maybe impulsive 
and succeeded, you were a duke� But if it turned out sour and you caused trouble, 
if the problem intensified, why, of course, you � � � weren’t doing very well and you 
could be yanked out�”50
The anchorage for U�S� station ships in Amoy was chosen to ensure line of 
sight to the two major American interests in the vicinity: the U�S� consulate fac-
ing Amoy on Kulangsu and a Standard Oil installation on the Chinese mainland 
on the far side of Kulangsu from Amoy (see figures 1 and 2)�51 With Bulmer 
anchored in this key position, Japanese artillery began to fire directly over the 
American ship to hit purported Chinese positions on the mainland, and as Kretz 
later explained, “periodically, they’d land a shell as close to us as they possibly 
could�”52 On the third day, Ansel resolved as follows:
It was obvious to me that they were shooting to get me out of that anchorage, just to 
show me they could do it� So I got in my gig, with my dress clothes on, my sword, and 
a pennant flying and landed on the Japanese shore� � � � There was a Japanese naval 
aide � � � and they [the aide and an interpreter] carried me up to the boss Admiral� I 
told him that shells were flying every day right over my ship� � � � The admiral asked 
right away, is it interfering with any of your instruments? I said, ‘No, we have no in-
struments that shelling could hurt� However, if one of your gunners makes a mistake 
and the shell doesn’t go over us, I would have to reply with everything that the United 
States ship Bulmer has� � � �” And he said, ‘I have great confidence that we will never 
make a mistake like that�’ I had to reply that I had great confidence in the capabilities 
of the United States ship Bulmer to defend herself, and we looked at each other and 
laughed� They didn’t fire over us again�53
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Ansel’s narrative is not, however, the whole story� While the captain and the execu-
tive officer were meeting with the Japanese, Kretz, as first lieutenant, had com-
mand of the ship� Kretz recounts that, during this period while the senior officers 
were engaged in their diplomatic tête-à-tête ashore, “the Japanese let one go right 
on our bow�”54 Accordingly, Kretz demonstrated his own Asiatic Fleet initiative 
and steely nerve: “I went to general quarters and aimed our 5-inch guns on this 
gun emplacement, which I could see not more than 500 yards from us� And they 
stopped firing on us�” Reminiscing years later, Kretz aptly described the deterrence 
dynamics at work both in this specific situation and more broadly in the Japanese 
gray-zone campaign with a succinct summation: “they were playing chicken�”55
JAPAN EXITS THE GRAY ZONE
Despite its successes on the operational level at checking and deterring Japanese 
gray-zone aggression against American interests in China, the small Asiatic Fleet 
FIGURE 1
ENVIRONS OF AMOY
This figure shows detail of environs of Amoy. The Standard Oil plant is at the terminus of the railway (black line) marked Seng-su, to the west of Kulangsu. 
Sources: An Official Guide to Eastern Asia, vol. 4, China (Tokyo: Imperial Japanese Government Railways, 1915), available at www.lib.utexas.edu/; P. W. 
Pitcher, In and about Amoy (Shanghai: Methodist Publishing, 1910), pp. 215, 266, e-book.
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nevertheless was subject to the larger political and strategic forces that were 
impelling the United States and Japan toward a direct confrontation� It was not 
long after Yarnell handed off command of the Asiatic Fleet to his Naval Academy 
classmate Admiral Thomas C� Hart, USN, in July 1939 that Japan’s ally Germany 
opened hostilities in Europe with its invasion of Poland, deepening the interna-
tional crisis� With the sudden collapse of France in midsummer 1940, one of the 
major European powers in China and Southeast Asia effectively became neutral-
ized� Hart and his fleet worked successfully to ensure that the Japanese would not 
use that occasion as an opening to move on French and other Western interests in 
China� But Hart’s fleet was not in a position to stop the Japanese from seizing the 
American consulate marked, facing Amoy across Amoy Harbor. Approximate distance from Kulangsu to Amoy is one-half mile. Standard Oil plant on 
mainland at Seng-su is one mile to the west of Kulangsu (not on map). U.S. destroyers seeking to maintain line of sight to both the consulate and Standard 
Oil therefore had to moor to the north of Kulangsu, close to Amoy Island; as Kretz indicates, Bulmer was five hundred yards from the offending Japanese 
artillery position at the time of the shelling incident in July 1938. 
Source: U.S. Army Map Service, 1945, available at www.lib.utexas.edu/.
FIGURE 2
HSIA-MEN (AMOY), 1945, DETAIL OF KULANGSU
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northern part of France’s colony in Indochina, the first step on Japan’s southward 
advance toward Malaya and Singapore�
With tensions on the rise between the United States and Japan, Hart reached 
the difficult conclusion that the strategic competition with Japan soon would 
change the Asiatic Fleet’s mission from contesting subtle yet aggressive Japanese 
moves to fighting Japan in overt hostilities� He later described his reasoning: “By 
mid-October, 1940, I became convinced that the place for me was with the Fleet, 
and for the Fleet in the Philippines, that our main job was to get ready for war; 
that being on the China Coast protecting American interests and all that was not 
reduced in importance, but it was no longer the main issue; that as such it must 
be dropped; that I myself should get south with the Fleet and get ready for the 
war which I felt more and more every day was coming�”56
With strategic-level conditions darkening the clouds over the Pacific, Hart 
discontinued his predecessor’s strategy for countering Japan’s creeping aggres-
sion against U�S� interests and withdrew his force to Philippine waters to begin 
working up for combat�
Hart was proved prescient a little over a year later in December 1941, when the 
Asiatic Fleet was one of the few Allied formations in the Pacific to weather the 
initial wave of Japanese attacks unsurprised and relatively unscathed�57 However, 
the Asiatic Fleet subsequently would be lost after the inexperienced and incom-
petent Dutch vice admiral Conrad Helfrich politically engineered Hart’s removal 
from command in February 1942 and threw the combined Allied naval forces in 
Southeast Asia into the poorly conceived and badly planned battle of the Java Sea� 
Helfrich gave no regard for the logistical and command-and-control arrange-
ments needed for an ill-equipped, multinational, multilingual fleet to achieve 
victory against a homogeneous, well-coordinated foe with numerous advantages 
over the Allied striking force, including superior scouting and night-fighting 
capabilities, powerful (and reliably functional) ship-launched torpedoes, and 
near-complete control of the air�58 The Java Sea action and those that followed 
led to the vast majority of the U�S� naval losses in the Philippines and Dutch East 
Indies campaigns, totaling twenty-two ships sunk, 1,826 men killed or missing, 
and 518 sailors captured by the Japanese�59
There are several takeaways from this study of Japanese gray-zone aggression 
against the West and the U�S� Asiatic Fleet’s actions to deter it� The situation 
among the imperial powers in China in the 1930s is, in several important ways, 
similar to contemporary conditions� Japan’s gray-zone efforts against the other 
treaty powers sought to subvert a well-codified and unambiguous international 
law environment inside China that bears a close resemblance to key elements of 
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the current worldwide international legal architecture, particularly with respect 
to the law of the sea�
Many of Japan’s maneuvers in the 1930s should be recognizable to contem-
porary China observers� China today demands prior notification of transit and 
insists on a right to grant explicit permission to foreign warships and aircraft 
conducting innocent operations in Chinese territorial waters and exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs)�60 China has made assertive increases in maritime law-
enforcement and naval patrols around disputed maritime features and—similarly 
to the Japanese blockade at Tientsin—physically interposed China Coast Guard 
and PLA Navy assets to harass U�S� and allied ships and aircraft during routine 
operations in EEZs and international waters�61 Chinese forces even attempted a 
strategic-level version of the 1938 Bulmer shelling affair at Amoy with their in-
famous (and politically counterproductive) firing of ballistic-missile salvos into 
the approaches of major Taiwanese ports, endeavoring to disrupt commercial 
shipping traffic and influence an upcoming Taiwanese election during the third 
Taiwan Strait crisis, in 1996�
Admiral Yarnell’s policy—that “United States naval vessels � � � will go wherever 
necessary at any time � � � and will remain in such place as long as American citizens 
are in need of protection or assistance”—can be characterized as the imperial era’s 
equivalent to the modern American mantra that “the United States will fly, sail, 
and operate wherever international law allows�”62 Yarnell’s strategy for gray-zone 
deterrence—incorporating continuous military-to-military communication, 
persistent physical forward presence, and the inculcation of a culture of indepen-
dent judgment and mission command down to junior levels of responsibility— 
allowed the Asiatic Fleet to “punch above its weight” by leveraging all its assets, 
from its commander’s four-star rank to the adaptive thinking and independence 
of its junior officers on the spot� Although political and strategic dynamics be-
yond the control of forward-deployed naval forces would lead the United States 
and Japan into an open conflagration in late 1941, the Asiatic Fleet’s counter-
gray-zone campaign against the Japanese in China between 1937 and 1940 offers 
a valuable case study with critical insights for those seeking to craft strategies to 
deter and defeat gray-zone aggression in the contemporary western Pacific�
N O T E S
  For place-names in China and similar 
references, this article uses the names used 
in U�S� and Western sources from 1937 to 
1940, which tended to follow the Wade-Giles 
system of romanization of Mandarin�
 1� James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Small 
Stick Diplomacy in the South China Sea,” Na-
tional Interest, April 23, 2012, nationalinterest 
�org/�
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 2� Philip Kapusta [Capt�, USN], “The Gray 
Zone” (white paper, U�S� Special Operations 
Command, September 9, 2015), p� 1, available 
at info�publicintelligence�net/� Kapusta’s white 
paper was the first document to popularize 
the term gray zone in the modern military 
context� He defines gray-zone challenges as 
“competitive interactions among and within 
state and non-state actors that fall between the 
traditional war and peace duality. They are 
characterized by ambiguity about the nature 
of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, 
or uncertainty about the relevant policy and 
legal frameworks� � � � [G]ray zone chal-
lenges rise above normal, everyday peacetime 
geo-political competition and are aggressive, 
perspective-dependent, and ambiguous” (em-
phasis original)�
 3� The specific phrase “salami tactics” report-
edly was coined by Hungarian communist 
Mátyás Rákosi in the late 1940s to describe 
his consolidation of power� “HUNGARY: Sa-
lami Tactics,” Time, April 14, 1952, available 
at content�time�com/�
 4� “‘Asia for Asiatics’ Is Japan’s Slogan,” The Mail 
(Adelaide, SA, Austral�), April 22, 1933, avail-
able at trove�nla�gov�au/�
 5� Michael Green et al�, Countering Coercion 
in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice 
of Gray Zone Deterrence (Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies, May 2017), pp� 52–65, 148–68, 169–201, 
available at www�csis�org/�
 6� Lawrence H� Officer, “Exchange Rates be-
tween the United States Dollar and Forty-One 
Currencies,” MeasuringWorth, 2017, www 
�measuringworth�com/; Harry E� Yarnell 
[Adm�, USN] to High Commissioner Paul 
V� McNutt, January 20, 1938, p� 3, in Sino-
Japanese Incident (1937): Correspondence of 
C-in-C, Asiatic Admiral H� E� Yarnell, U�S�N�, 
box 18, folder 3, Record Group [RG] 8, Naval 
Historical Collection, Naval War College, 
Newport, RI�
 7� Yarnell to McNutt, January 20, 1938, pp� 9–11� 
Germany had 2,700 citizens and 340 firms in 
China but no combat forces present to protect 
them� Although nominally allied with Japan 
through the Anti-Comintern Pact, Germans 
in China were disposed more toward China 
than Japan, and Germany sent a military 
mission that gained a trusted advisory place 
in Chiang Kai-shek’s government� The best 
Chinese divisions, sent to Shanghai in 1937, 
were German trained� Italy in 1936 was 
reported to have 756 citizens and thirty-three 
business firms in all of China and the Regia 
Marina had gunboats on the Yangtze� In 1937, 
Italy used the pretext of the protection of its 
140 citizens at Shanghai to send a cruiser and 
eight hundred troops there� Yarnell observed 
to McNutt that the Italians “are making the 
most of their alliance with Japan, and are de-
manding representation on the Shanghai Mu-
nicipal Council and have hopes of obtaining a 
concession in Shanghai in the final settle-
ment�” On account of this close relationship 
with Japan, Yarnell quickly discounted Italy as 
a useful partner in maintaining neutral rights 
in China�
 8� William C� Johnstone, “International Rela-
tions: The Status of Foreign Concessions and 
Settlements in the Treaty Ports of China,” 
American Political Science Review 31, no� 5 
(October 1937)� By way of definition, accord-
ing to Johnstone: “The terms ‘settlement’ and 
‘concession’ have often been used indiscrimi-
nately, but the word ‘settlement’ has most 
often been applied to a foreign-controlled 
area in which all the Treaty Powers have equal 
rights� Such an area is governed by a locally 
elected municipal council of foreigners� � � � Its 
chief characteristic is the fact that land can be 
leased by foreigners directly from the Chinese 
owner, the deeds being registered through 
the consulate of the foreigner and with the 
local Chinese authorities� The term ‘conces-
sion,’ on the other hand, has been applied to a 
grant of land by the Chinese government to a 
single foreign nation, either directly by treaty 
or indirectly under general treaty terms by 
the local Chinese authorities� A concession is 
governed by the consular representative of the 
nation controlling the grant, sometimes with 
the assistance of an elected municipal council� 
The chief characteristic of a national conces-
sion is that the grant is in the form of a long-
term or perpetual lease on which the nation 
concerned pays a nominal ground rent to the 
Chinese government� The nation controlling 
the concession, in turn, acts as landlord by 
sub-leasing plots to individuals, either foreign 
or Chinese�”
 9� Kurt Bloch, “The Basic Conflict over Foreign 
Concessions in China,” Far Eastern Survey 8, 
no� 10 (May 10, 1939), pp� 111–16�
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   156 5/2/19   11:35 AM
162
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/1
 S T I R E S  1 5 7
 10� “Origin and Background: League of Nations 
Codification Conference,” International Law 
Commission, July 31, 2017, legal�un�org/�
 11�  Westel W� Willoughby, Foreign Rights and 
Interests in China (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins Univ� Press, 1920), chap� 9�
 12� “Old Treaty Permits U�S� Patrol; Ships Not 
on Aggressive Mission,” New York Times, 
December 13, 1937� The Treaties of Tientsin 
between 1858 and 1859 formally granted 
Great Britain, France, the United States, and 
Russia freedom of navigation on the Yangtze 
and access to Chinese ports�
 13� Johnstone, “International Relations�”
 14� Robert Erwin Johnson, Far China Station: 
The U.S. Navy in Asian Waters 1800–1898 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 
e-book� From 1835 to 1861 the force was 
known officially as the East India Squadron; 
from 1868 to 1901 the force was known of-
ficially as the Asiatic Squadron�
 15� “39 U�S� Warships Ready off China,” New York 
Times, August 15, 1937�
 16� Reminiscences of Henri Smith-Hutton [Capt�, 
USN (Ret�)], vol� 1, p� 112, U�S� Naval Institute 
Oral History Program, accessed at Naval 
Historical Collection, Naval War College, 
Newport, RI�
 17� Reminiscences of Thomas C� Hart [Adm�, 
USN (Ret�)], Columbia University Oral His-
tory Research Office (New York), microfiche, 
accessed at Naval Historical Collection, Naval 
War College, Newport, RI�
 18� Yarnell to McNutt, January 20, 1938, p� 6�
 19� Memorandum by Harry E� Yarnell [Adm�, 
USN] to the Secretary of the Navy, “Far 
Eastern Situation,” July 20, 1939, p� 10, box 
18, folder 1, RG 8, Naval Historical Collec-
tion, Naval War College, Newport, RI� The 
IJN seized control of the Spratly Islands in 
February 1939�
 20� Yarnell to McNutt, January 20, 1938, p� 4�
 21� “CMC,” ChinaMilitary.com, english�chinamil 
�com�cn/�
 22� Bill Gertz, “China’s Most Powerful General, a 
Xi Jinping Henchman, Meets Mattis,” Wash-
ington Free Beacon, July 2, 2018, freebeacon 
�com/�
 23� “575: Poetry of Propaganda,” December 18, 
2015, in This American Life, produced by 
WBEZ Chicago and distributed by Public Ra-
dio Exchange, podcast, www�thisamericanlife 
�org/�
 24� Chris Buckley, “Marching across China, 
Army Veterans Join Ranks of Protesters,” New 
York Times, June 25, 2018, www�nytimes 
�com/�
 25� Robert Farley, “USS Cowpens Incident: Rule 
Bending in the South China Sea,” The Diplo-
mat, December 25, 2013, thediplomat�com/�
 26� Yarnell, “Far Eastern Situation,” p� 4�
 27� U�S� Naval Institute, “WEST 2014: What 
About China?,” YouTube, February 13, 2014, 
video, www�youtube�com/�
 28� In his July 1939 farewell memo to the 
Secretary of the Navy, Yarnell characterizes 
the Japanese general staff as having “showed 
incredible stupidity and ignorance in assum-
ing that the Chinese would not fight, or if 
they did, that their resistance would not be 
serious�” Yarnell, “Far Eastern Situation,” p� 4�
 29� Yarnell reported at the end of his tenure in 
July 1939 that Japan had sent eight hundred 
thousand to one million soldiers to China and 
had engaged approximately one-quarter of 
its merchant marine, or one million tons, in 
transport duty� Ibid�, p� 6; Yarnell to McNutt, 
January 20, 1938, p� 5�
 30� William A� Angwin, “The China Incident,” 
1938, Harry E� Yarnell Papers, box 13, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, DC�
 31� Treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce [also 
known as Sino-American Treaty of 1858], 
China-U�S�, art� XXVI, June 18, 1858, T�S�  
No� 46�
 32� Angwin, “China Incident,” pp� 60–63�
 33� See Johnstone, “International Relations,” note 
8, for more on municipal councils�
 34� Harry E� Yarnell [Adm�, USN] to Vice Admi-
ral Kiyoshi Hasegawa, August 28, 1937, quot-
ing an item from the North China Daily News, 
August 27, 1937, “Communications regarding 
Japanese Blockade,” Harry E� Yarnell Papers, 
box 13, folder 1, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress, Washington, DC�
 35� Angwin, “China Incident,” p� 78�
 36� Ibid�, p� 80�
 37� Yarnell, “Far Eastern Situation,” p� 8�
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   157 5/2/19   11:35 AM
163
Naval War College: Summer 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 1 5 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 38� Angwin, “China Incident,” pp� 1–2�
 39� “Movements of Naval Vessels,” New York 
Times, September 2–3, 1937; Dictionary of 
American Naval Fighting Ships, s�v� “Bulmer 
(DD-222),” www�history�navy�mil/; Reminis-
cences of Charles H� Kretz Jr� [Capt�, USN 
(Ret�)], pp� 49–51, U�S� Naval Institute Oral 
History Program, accessed at the Naval 
Historical Collection, Naval War College, 
Newport, RI�
 40� “Admiral Yarnell, U�S� Sentry in the Far East,” 
and “Mounting Japanese Pressure Strains 
Patience of British,” Newsweek, July 3, 1939, 
Harry E� Yarnell Papers, scrapbook of clip-
pings, box 13, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress, Washington, DC�
 41� Angwin, “China Incident,” pp� 22–24, 27�
 42� Kemp Tolley, Yangtze Patrol: The U.S. Navy in 
China (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
1971), chap� 7, e-book�
 43� Ibid�; Masatake Okumiya, “How the Panay 
Was Sunk,” U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings 
79/6/604 (June 1953)�
 44� Hallett Abend, “Rift in Army Seen,” New York 
Times, December 20, 1937; Tolley, Yangtze 
Patrol, chap� 7� Hashimoto, “the artilleryman 
who gave the order to ‘fire on anything that 
moves on the river[,]’ was a dedicated, ascetic, 
supernationalist member of a secret organiza-
tion that was above government—The Black 
Dragon Society� Hashimoto was proved by 
events to be untouchable, both by General 
Matsui, the CinC in China, and by the War 
Minister�” In 1936 Hashimoto had been a 
prime mover in a failed coup d’état against 
the civilian administration, which resulted in 
the sole repercussion of being placed into the 
reserve before he was remobilized as part of 
the Japanese war effort in China�
 45� Reminiscences of Kretz, p� 64�
 46� Text of letters addressed to Ambassador 
Johnson by Mr� Tani, Japanese Minister Pleni-
potentiary, June 11, 1938, Harry E� Yarnell 
Papers, box 13, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress, Washington, DC�
 47� “Japanese Warning Is Rejected by U�S�,” New 
York Times, June 14, 1938�
 48� “Thousands Leave Chungking in Raids,” New 
York Times, January 24, 1939�
 49� “Movements of Naval Vessels,” New York 
Times, June 30 and July 6, 1938; Reminis-
cences of Walter C� W� Ansel [Rear Adm�, 
USN (Ret�)], p� 65, U�S� Naval Institute Oral 
History Program, accessed at Naval Historical 
Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI�
 50� Reminiscences of Ansel, pp� 65–66�
 51� Ibid�, p� 66�
 52� Reminiscences of Kretz, p� 66�
 53� Reminiscences of Ansel, p� 67�
 54� Reminiscences of Kretz, p� 66�
 55� Ibid�
 56� Reminiscences of Hart, pp� 131–32�
 57� Thomas C� Hart [Adm�, USN], “Narrative of 
Events, Asiatic Fleet Leading Up to War and 
from 8 December 1941 to February 15, 1942,” 
p� 37, manuscript item 603, Naval Historical 
Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI�
 58� Jeffrey Cox, Rising Sun, Falling Skies: The 
Disastrous Java Sea Campaign of World 
War II (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp� 
129, 250–53� The Dutch officer in question, 
Vice Admiral Conrad Helfrich, had never 
commanded a ship and had limited to no 
experience commanding task forces at sea� 
Thomas C� Hart [Adm�, USN], “Supplemen-
tary Narrative,” pp� 37–41, manuscript item 
603, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War 
College, Newport, RI�
 59� 126 Cong� Rec�, p� 1896 (March 1, 2000) 
(statement of Senator Durbin)�
 60� John Burgess et al�, eds�, Law of the Sea: A 
Policy Primer (Medford, MA: Fletcher School 
of Law and Diplomacy, 2017), chap� 3, avail-
able at sites�tufts�edu/�
 61� “No� of Vessels Identified within the Contigu-
ous Zone (Total/Month),” Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, December 8, 2017, www 
�mofa�go�jp/�
 62� “Carter Says U�S� Will Sail, Fly and Operate 
Wherever International Law Allows,” Reuters, 
October 13, 2015, www�reuters�com/�
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   158 5/2/19   11:35 AM
164
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/1
REVIEW ESSAY
challenges to european democracy
Don Thieme
The New Totalitarian Temptation: Global Governance and the 
Crisis of Democracy in Europe, by Todd Huizinga� New York: 
Encounter Books, 2016� 272 pages� $23�99�
Todd Huizinga writes that there is an emergent trend threatening to reverse some 
of the hard-won gains of democracy in Europe� He builds his critique on three 
lines of analysis: social-benefit-oriented governance, demography, and morality� 
Put differently, those might be money, people, and religion� It may be, Huizinga 
notes, that there is a “loss of faith and civilizational exhaustion” (p� 202) on both 
sides of the Atlantic, but it is more pronounced in Europe�
This should not be seen, though, as a book that bashes Europe or the European 
Union (EU)� From start to finish, Huizinga evinces a strong admiration for Eu-
rope in both its collective and individual aspects� Instead, his purpose is twofold: 
(1) to explore the adjustment of politics and policies in Europe, and (2) to analyze 
what the implications for the United States might be� Huizinga frames the issue 
as Europe’s pursuit of what he labels a “soft utopia” that seeks compromise over 
confrontation and consensus over division�
To this end, Huizinga organizes his work into 
six sections: one section each on the definition of 
soft utopia, the consequences of it, and case stud-
ies on it; one detailing an emergent approach to 
human rights; next, one covering the expansion 
of the Eurozone idea; and finally, one that circles 
back to soft utopia at a crossroads, in which he as-
sesses the decisions the EU must make� He starts 
by noting that the EU is “exceedingly opaque, 
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Scholar, an MIT Seminar XXI fellow, a Council on 
Foreign Relations term member, and a foreign area 
officer for Eastern and Western Europe. In addition 
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to his retirement.
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dauntingly complex, and full of mutually opposing currents and interests” (p� vii)� 
This is not a unique observation, but the angle of analysis that Huizinga follows, 
seeking intersections of individuals, finances, and observed religion (sometimes 
more in the breach than in actual practice), frames the European experiment in 
progress�
The first step of Huizinga’s approach is to define what the EU is not: not uni-
form, not even, not equal, and not religious, with regions and peoples differing 
in degree in all these characteristics� At the same time, he highlights that the EU 
is a supranational organization with significant clout derived from its population 
base, its economy, and its research-and-development prowess, which enables the 
EU to attain greater influence than population or trade figures would indicate� 
His overarching point, though, is not the power of the EU considered in isola-
tion but how that power evolves, its implications for Europe, and the possible 
lessons it provides for democratic traditions around the world� The unevenness 
of democracy across Europe, from Budapest to Bath, challenges governance and 
participatory politics that struggle with vox populi beliefs as they are, not as what 
Huizinga frames as the “EU elite” might wish them to be�
Huizinga’s background is in economics and policy, and the central third of 
The New Totalitarian Temptation focuses on the politics of the euro� This theme 
echoes throughout the work, and for those of an economic predilection, this is 
a quick, albeit fascinating, read� This focus, though, is diluted by interspersed 
observations and comments about a postreligious kultur in Europe that pro-
motes individual rights at the expense of Christian values� While detractors may 
well point out that prior to the convulsions of the twentieth century the greatest 
bloodshed in Europe occurred during wars of religion, Huizinga’s point seems 
to focus at least as much on the transitive process as the morals (or lack thereof) 
themselves� When Huizinga stays focused on “euro-policies” he is on steadier 
political-philosophy grounds�
The unanswered questions of and competing visions for the future of Europe 
occupy a central space in Huizinga’s review of democracy under stress in this 
work� As a result of the “serious divergence of opinion—even diametric opposi-
tion” (p� 15), the cleavages among different nations, different classes, and dif-
ferent backgrounds are more pronounced, even as the EU seeks a homogenized 
political kultur� “The decades long trend [of] the destabilization of established 
politics [is] more apparent throughout Europe” (p� 192)� This, however, raises 
the question left unanswered in Huizinga’s work: Given all the challenges of the 
European experiment in “deepening and widening,” what alternate pathways 
might take Europe toward a less totalitarian future? While he may be correct 
that the Rousseau-like tyranny of the majority is induced through malaise and 
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bureaucratic ossification, proponents of the EU point toward the overall main-
tenance of peace and prosperity over several decades� And, as some from the 
Visegrád nations observe, the closer one lives to the former Soviet Union, the 
better the EU looks�
Huizinga signals a philosophical approach—in addition to his religious and 
political economic approach—by drawing Jürgen Habermas into the discourse 
on the future of Europe� There is a David Hume–esque quality to this careful 
consideration of the “EUropean” experiment, which Huizinga does a good job of 
exploring, especially in chapter 3� This chapter in turn sets up the next section, 
which looks at the origins of political and economic organizational thought in the 
post–World War II decade� As Huizinga notes, there was a Kantian element to the 
pragmatic beginnings in steel and coal, seeking economic means to ensure per-
petual peace, or at least to sustain reduced tensions� As much as Kant, however, 
John Maynard Keynes informed the “soft utopianism” of the Schuman declara-
tion (May 9, 1950) with his thoughts in The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
(1919)� Keynes did not survive to see the Marshall Plan, Berlin airlift, Warsaw 
Pact, or NATO, but three decades earlier he accurately had forecast the econom-
ics that drove the creation of what eventually would become the EU� Huizinga 
incorporates these themes in his exposition of a nuanced understanding of the 
flexible philosophy of the EU�
Yet the EU continues to face, and adapt to, challenges� The fall of the Soviet 
bloc; the rise of the euro; and the waves of migration, first from east to west, 
then from south to north, all challenge the EU in policy and practice� As Anne 
Applebaum suggests in “A Warning from Europe: The Worst Is Yet to Come” (The 
Atlantic, October 2018), eternal democracy is not guaranteed; rather, it must be 
nourished and reinforced through each crisis and in each generation� The pur-
poseful ambiguity in each of the successive additions to the EU political structure 
reflects the convergences between the ideals of Schuman and the realities at the 
time of each new piece of proposed legislation� With each successive generation, 
Huizinga implies, the harsh memories of World War II and the decade of auster-
ity and political challenge that followed war termination fade, and successive 
generations—motivated perhaps more by la dolce vita and less by fear—interpret 
anew just what liberté, égalité, and fraternité mean in application more than prin-
ciple� The challenge, as Huizinga notes, is to stay focused on what makes the EU 
work as an enduring concept while remaining flexible enough to deal with the 
inevitable vagaries of fortune�
Huizinga develops a core distinction between religiosity and postmodern poli-
tics throughout his book that might best be summarized as “Europe’s new religion is 
human rights�” Huizinga traces the fallout of the French Revolution in the concept 
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of laïcité, the severance of religion from public life� Yet Europeans still need a core 
identity that extends past August vacations and André Rieu concerts, pleasant as 
those might be� The struggle—both in governance and in daily life—for Europeans, 
unable to define Homo europaeus in a manner that includes all and insults none, 
is the search for a common, bonding identity� Huizinga is harsh in his assess-
ment of this attempt, calling it “bloodless and rootless, vague and vapid � � � 
satisfying no one” (p� 64)� He attempts to paint a cautionary tale for the United 
States and other democracies, implying that the Peace of Westphalia (1648) is 
not dead just yet and that much work remains to be done as ruling elites balance 
pragmatic realities against enduring ideals�
In section 6, “Soft Utopia at a Crossroads,” Huizinga hints at Europe’s core 
challenge: the ability to sustain this soft utopia even as demographics, both in-
side and outside Europe, challenge some of the core preconditions to sustained 
wealth, increased health, and prolonged prosperity in a postindustrial era� The 
three chapters in the concluding section clearly identify existential challenges 
to the European experiment� While perhaps sounding the tocsin of alarm too 
harshly, Huizinga nonetheless provides the reader with a succinct summary of 
the extant problems threatening the delicate balance of European customs, his-
tory, geography, and demography� How to engage with the challenges while cre-
ating opportunities that will enable the expansion of Europe’s social structures, 
avoiding both war and poverty, is the complex problem facing both the local 
denizens and Strasbourg Eurocrats�
As Huizinga underscores, there are no certain predestined outcomes in Eu-
rope, and in a continent of such varied peoples, places, and policies, neither the 
pathway nor the end state is clearly visible� Europe, large and small, will continue 
to face complex problems� On a continent of such diversity, however, the pros-
pect of a Brussels-led totalitarian system is unlikely, even as individual European 
nations, all dealing with politics as they are in their own states and nearby re-
gions, contend with their own potential domestic impulses toward preserving 
sovereignty, redefined and reinforced� In illuminating this dichotomy with both 
promise and peril, Huizinga provides no small service for the discerning reader 
in The New Totalitarian Temptation: Global Governance and the Crisis of Democ-
racy in Europe�
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BOOK REVIEWS
BATTLE ON MANY FRONTS
The American Military: A Concise History, by Joseph T� Glatthaar� New York: Oxford Univ� Press, 
2018� 152 pages� $18�95�
Often, good things come in small pack-
ages� Joseph T� Glatthaar’s The American 
Military: A Concise History is one of 
those works that might be overshadowed 
by the larger volumes on one’s bookshelf� 
At a mere 127 pages of text, the reader 
sprints through American military histo-
ry, hitting the highlights of familiar U�S� 
wars while absorbing the importance of 
lesser-known internal service battles and 
political skirmishes that served as the 
connective tissue among major conflicts� 
This study covers four successive phases 
of American military historical develop-
ment: the rise and resourcing of the 
American citizen-soldier, the profession-
alization of the force, the transformative 
effects of technological achievement in 
warfare, and the struggle to recognize 
the limits of American military power�
Notably, the book serves as an excellent 
historical primer for American military 
development� It provides insight into 
why things are by explaining the way 
things were� Glatthaar argues convinc-
ingly that American militarism played 
a role from the very beginning, citing 
the first settlers’ notion of collective 
security at Jamestown� Although 
George Washington is often considered 
America’s original citizen-soldier, the 
first settlers followed a philosophy of 
self-defense rooted in English traditions 
dating back to King Henry II (ca� 1181) 
that would serve as the core principle 
for centuries to come� Certainly the 
role militias played in the American 
Revolution is remembered favorably, but 
the citizen-soldier concept also served 
to ballast the threat to liberty from a 
standing army, paving the way for an 
American democracy nearly free of mili-
tary influence� As the fledgling country 
grew, with trade and expansion to the 
west requiring protection, a permanent 
military appeared to be the solution�
The challenge of developing an Ameri-
can profession of arms arose with the 
standing army� Internal and external 
struggles shaped the development of 
a professional corps of commissioned 
and noncommissioned officers in the 
nineteenth century� By midcentury, the 
initial establishment of professional mili-
tary education, the refinement of tactics, 
and a test case of sorts in the Mexican-
American War generated a professional 
cadre of soldiers, sailors, and Marines� 
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Professionalism was limited to the small 
corps of permanent leadership, on the 
assumption that the United States could 
call on its population of citizen-soldiers 
when necessary (as proved the case 
in the ensuing Civil War)� The post–
Civil War era produced domestic laws 
defining the use of the military within 
U�S� borders (e�g�, the Compromise of 
1877, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878), 
while further economic expansion 
demanded the growth of a viable Navy 
by 1900� The arrival of the twentieth 
century further bolstered professional-
ism at the highest political level with 
structural and doctrinal modifications 
strengthened by the establishment of 
a joint Army-Navy board for planning 
and coordination, an Army general staff, 
and the establishment of service war 
colleges for higher education of officers�
While professionalization was taking 
shape, the military generally continued 
“old world” ways of waging war� 
Glatthaar contends that the harsh 
effects of technological advancements of 
World War I drove wholesale organiza-
tional changes within the U�S� military, 
requiring the translation of professional 
military conduct into effective military 
practice� Moreover, the American 
tradition of fighting independently—not 
embedded with allied forces—began at 
this time owing to the U�S� desire to have 
a viable role in the postwar world order� 
Throughout postwar demobilization, 
America remained reliant on the citizen-
soldier now turned National Guards-
man; however, new technologies (e�g�, 
armor, aircraft) demanded personnel 
specialization and retention, along with 
the creation of new military branches� 
These developments accelerated during 
the next world war, eventually yielding 
the creation of the U�S� Air Force and 
new civil-military organizations to 
safeguard a new Cold War world order� 
If the lessons and policies arising out of 
World War II cemented the importance 
of the citizen-soldier concept, military 
professionalization, and the impact of 
technology on waging war, then the 
conflicts that followed would illustrate 
the limits of American military power�
The postwar U�S� geopolitical position 
required a permanent military-industrial 
complex to support it—with centralized 
planning at its core� Massive (to include 
nuclear) retaliation, total war, and 
mass mobilization eventually yielded 
to the concept of flexible response and 
then an all-volunteer force complete 
with family-support mechanisms� The 
post-Vietnam era brought further 
professional development and improve-
ments in the conduct of joint operations 
and unified command structures with 
the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act in 1986� However, as the forces 
continued to mature and strengthen, 
limitations on military power can be 
seen not only in what the military 
could accomplish for national interests 
abroad in the new framework but 
also in how political interests could 
limit the use and application of military 
forces in conflicts within a larger 
context of international relations�
This is not an exhaustive volume of U�S� 
military history packed with endless 
detail� It is, however, a thoughtful 
overview that is relatively rich in 
explanation, reads like a well-written 
narrative, and offers an excellent—and 
compact—history of the develop-
ment of the American military�
MARC BEAUDREAU
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Like War: The Weaponization of Social Media, by 
P� W� Singer and Emerson T� Brooking� Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2018� 416 pages� $28�
An old adage states that truth is the 
first casualty of war� P� W� Singer and 
Emerson T� Brooking argue in Like 
War that this is especially true of social 
media wars� Singer and Brooking detail 
the systematic ways in which both 
state and nonstate actors use social 
media to alter the accepted narrative 
of truth—with profound implications 
for international and domestic politics� 
Drawing from psychology, sociology, 
and the history of technology, the 
authors trace the rise of social media, 
offer an explanation for its power, and 
look at its political effects� In their final 
chapters, they examine the business 
model of social media firms, looking at 
the difficulties it poses for states seeking 
to defend against social media informa-
tion and disinformation campaigns 
and how it makes change unlikely�
The goal of weaponized social media is 
not to replace the truth with a single, 
coherent lie� Instead, it is to sow doubt 
and confusion about what is true and 
what is not� Referring specifically to 
Russian disinformation efforts, one 
expert describes the goal as “foment-
ing confusion, chaos, and distrust� 
They spin up their audience to chase 
myths, believe in fantasies, and listen 
to faux � � � ‘experts’ until the audience 
simply tunes out” (p� 108)� This theme 
emerges consistently as one of the most 
powerful aspects of social media: the 
ability to obscure objectivity and enable 
exploitation of preexisting biases�
The title of the book is a two-level 
pun, alluding to both the competition 
for social media “likes” and the 
similarities in political effect between 
social media and military campaigns� 
The authors focus on how social media 
can be used to affect the “will” leg 
of the Clausewitzian trinity of force, 
chance, and will� They detail efforts of 
authoritarian regimes, including those 
of China, Russia, and Syria, to control 
domestic and international political 
messaging through social media� They 
document the role of social media in 
recruiting fighters and raising money 
for Daesh (ISIS, ISIL)—and the way in 
which states and advocacy groups have 
used social media to undercut Daesh’s 
Internet messaging and entice fighters 
away from the group� They provide a 
detailed account of Russia’s disinforma-
tion efforts using government-employed 
“trolls” and quasi-media organizations, 
such as Russia Today (RT)� Citing an 
expert from the Atlantic Council, the 
authors identify four principles of 
Russian disinformation: “dismiss the 
critic, distort the facts, distract from the 
main issue, and dismay the audience” 
(p� 107)� To these “4 Ds” the authors 
add a fifth to describe Russia’s political 
warfare campaigns: divide the target 
population� Anyone who has engaged 
in a political argument on social media 
will recognize these principles—which 
highlights the success of these efforts 
in shaping U�S� political discourse�
The analogy to war is not limited to 
the domain of will, however� Singer 
and Brooking chronicle the very real 
contributions of social media cam-
paigns to battlefield outcomes in 
Israel, Ukraine, and Syria� They also 
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document the way in which China is 
incorporating social media into the 
work of its security services, creating 
a socially enabled totalitarianism�
Like War is a work of journalism, 
not social science� Readers seeking 
original research or big-data analysis 
in support of the authors’ conclusions 
will be disappointed� The book’s 
source notes frequently cite blog posts 
alongside peer-reviewed studies, with 
no obvious distinction in how much 
weight is given to each� Still, Singer and 
Brooking have done thorough research 
into the psychology and sociology of 
how and why messages become viral 
and what gives viral messages power, 
as well as numerous interviews with 
a variety of actors in the social media 
space� They have assembled a compel-
ling anecdotal narrative with short, 
evocative profiles and vignettes that 
bring texture and life to their story�
The most disappointing omission from 
the book is any concrete sense of what 
can be done to counter the pernicious 
effects of social media� The authors 
conclude with a call for readers to be 
discerning consumers of news—a call 
that feels both pro forma and inadequate 
to the threat they describe� Singer and 
Brooking have illuminated an important 
problem but offer little cause for hope 
or optimism about its resolution�
Like War enters a crowded field of books 
on the political impact of social media� 
It is distinguished by its readability and 
thorough research� I highly recommend 
it to policy makers and military officers 
seeking a better understanding of the 
information forces that are shaping 
contemporary and future battles�
DOYLE HODGES
Champion of the Quarterdeck: Admiral Sir Eras-
mus Gower (1742–1814), by Ian M� Bates� Po-
mona, QLD, Austral�: Sage Old Books, 2017� 384 
pages� $38�
Admiral Sir Erasmus Gower is, perhaps, 
the least known of all the British admi-
rals during the age of Nelson� Although 
little known today as a naval officer, his 
name is indeed on the map: Cape Gower 
in China, Gower Harbour in Papua New 
Guinea, Gower Island in the Solomon 
Islands, Gower Lake in Newfoundland, 
Gower Point in British Columbia, 
and Gower Street in Saint John’s, 
Newfoundland� A man of such note is 
undoubtedly worthy of a biographical 
study� Ian M� Bates, who retired after a 
career with Australia’s Department of 
External Territories in the public service 
of Papua New Guinea, has taken up the 
challenge and produced this extensively 
researched study of Gower’s naval career�
A modest man, Erasmus Gower left 
neither a memoir nor personal files of 
correspondence, leaving Bates to ferret 
through masses of archival material to 
piece the story together from official 
documents to verify and expand on 
the few printed notices of his life that 
appeared in the contemporary Naval 
Chronicle� Born in Wales in 1742, Gower 
joined the Royal Navy at the age of 
thirteen in 1756 and served until 1807, 
when he retired as a vice admiral, and 
later rose to admiral of the white on 
the retired list� Bates has summarized 
Gower’s varied and extensive career in 
the following lines: “No other contem-
porary officer approached his accumu-
lated experience or could claim to have 
completed two circumnavigations of 
the world� Crossed the equator eighteen 
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times, the Atlantic twenty-four times, 
the Pacific twice, been shipwrecked and 
stranded, conveyed a first-of-its-type 
diplomatic mission, served in the 
Caribbean, East Indies, and China, 
three times in the Mediterranean and 
Newfoundland, numerous times off the 
French, Portuguese, and Spanish coasts� 
Add to this, inclusion amongst those 
more widely celebrated naval officers 
for cutting out expeditions under heavy 
fire, being wounded in battle, receiving 
the thanks of both houses of Parliament, 
[and] sharing in the capture of more 
than fifty ships” (p� 1)� Bates provides 
a highly detailed narrative description, 
with extensive quotations from original 
documents, describing Erasmus Gower’s 
naval career� The volume has twenty-
five chapters, with five appendices, 
which include a handy section of 
short biographical sketches of people 
closely associated with Gower and an 
annotated list of all the ships that Gower 
served in, commanded, or captured�
The book offers much detail of great 
interest to specialists in naval history� 
General readers are likely to be in-
terested in the chapters on Gower’s expe-
riences with Carteret’s voyage (1766–69), 
his subsequent shipwreck in HM sloop 
Swift, and the two chapters that describe 
the naval aspects of Earl Macartney’s 
voyage to China as Britain’s ambassador 
in 1792–94� During the voyage to China, 
Sir Erasmus Gower commanded the 
flagship, the sixty-four-gun HMS Lion, 
which, along with two accompanying 
vessels, carried the embassy to and from 
China. In telling this story, Bates has 
used Gower’s previously unpublished 
manuscript journal now held at Cornell 
University Library� The final chapters 
of the book discuss Gower’s final 
active-duty assignment as commodore 
and governor of Newfoundland� Some 
prominent naval officers held the post of 
commodore-governor of Newfoundland 
between 1729 and 1825, but in most na-
val histories and biographies, historians 
typically summarize their roles in only a 
few lines� Additionally, the battle of Tra-
falgar dominates most naval history for 
the years 1804–1806� It is beneficial to 
find in this volume a detailed account of 
Erasmus Gower’s work in civil, military, 
and naval administration as well as fish-
ery protection during these same years�
All in all, Bates’s volume on Admiral 
Gower sheds light on the life and 
career of a very interesting and 
highly accomplished naval officer whose 
experiences scholars have overlooked 
for too long� The volume makes a 
valuable addition to the extensive 
literature on the age of Nelson and a 
useful reference volume for any library 
collection in that area of naval history�
JOHN B� HATTENDORF
Tidal Wave: From Leyte Gulf to Tokyo Bay, by 
Thomas McKelvey Cleaver� New York: Osprey, 
2018� 320 pages� $32�
Tidal Wave covers well-trodden ground, 
looking at the final nine months of 
World War II� With so much previously 
written, finding a new angle is chal-
lenging, and Cleaver sets up to focus 
on the epic battle between the Japanese 
special-attack units—the kamikaze—and 
the U�S� Third/Fifth Fleet� Unfortu-
nately, Tidal Wave fails to deliver new 
analysis� Insightful in spots, the book 
wanders to earlier battles to trace the 
lineage of aviation squadrons and 
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individual pilots� The book’s staccato, 
sometimes frenetic, pace is challenging 
also, and it leaves readers wondering 
where they are in time and space�
The book begins with the end: the 
final operations of the American fast-
carrier task forces over the skies of the 
Japanese home islands� Jumping back 
in time, Cleaver provides an interesting 
description of the birth of the Japanese 
tokubetsu kogeki tai (special-attack 
units), commonly called kamikaze by 
the Americans� Envisioned before the 
American invasion of the Philippines 
(where they were first introduced into 
combat), the kamikaze grew into Japan’s 
primary offensive weapon after the 
destruction of the Combined Fleet at 
Leyte Gulf� This growth, while illogical 
to the Americans, is rational within 
the Japanese Bushido warrior code�
The chapter showing the most promise 
to address the struggle between the two 
forces is entitled “Big Blue Blanket�” 
American naval ace and air theorist 
Commander (later Admiral) John S� 
Thach Jr� addressed the new Japanese 
tactics, recommending significant 
changes to American carrier air wings 
aimed at defeating this new threat� 
Cleaver covers Thach’s plan and 
explains why it was not implemented 
immediately, but then abandons this 
discussion for several chapters� 
Instead of fully exploring the evolution 
of American defenses against the 
kamikaze and the Japanese response, 
the narrative returns to accounts of 
individual battles, with limited analysis 
of their contribution to the overall 
war effort� Cleaver ultimately fails to 
connect Thach’s initial proposal to the 
eventual implementation of the ideas 
he championed—a missed opportunity 
to investigate the operational-level 
duel between the two belligerents�
Tidal Wave explores one area that might 
be new to the American audience: 
the contribution of the Royal Navy 
(RN) in the Pacific War� In a chapter 
entitled “The Forgotten Fleet,” Cleaver 
summarizes how the British Far Eastern 
Fleet was manned, equipped, and 
operated as it joined the fight in the 
Pacific� There were limited examples of 
RN carriers integrating with American 
task groups; instead, the majority of RN 
operations occurred under a separate 
task force within the American Third/
Fifth Fleet, assigned unique missions 
independent of American task groups�
Oddly, the penultimate chapter is 
entitled “Finale,” and while it recounts 
the closing days of naval combat in 
the Pacific it does not include the final 
battles, the dropping of the atomic 
bombs, nor the end of the war� One ac-
tion covered is the foray of nine Ameri-
can submarines (“Hydeman’s Hellcats”) 
into the Sea of Japan, demonstrating 
the vulnerability of this previously safe 
haven for Japanese logistics shipping� 
The bombardment of Japanese coastal 
industry by American battleships and 
cruisers—a subject often not included in 
other narratives—is discussed as well�
The final chapter is titled “Gyokusen”— 
or “dancing fan,” in Japanese� Thinking 
gyokusen might have some significance 
pertaining to the end of the war, I 
asked several Japan experts� The 
best we could determine is that the 
chapter should have been titled gyokusai, 
meaning “shattered or crushed jewels,” 
a term used in Japan to describe the 
hopeless defeats and massacres of 
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Japanese soldiers and sailors on distant 
battlefields� Gyokusai objectifies fighting 
to the last while giving and accepting 
no quarter, and is sometimes used to 
describe the national annihilation many 
Japanese leaders advocated at the end of 
the war, which is the focus of the final 
chapter of Cleaver’s book� (For more 
information on gyokusai, see Rodney 
James Szas, “Gyokusai” Shattered like a 
Jewel: Last Stands of the Japanese Soldier 
in Their Own Words, shatteredjewels 
�wordpress�com/�) Like most of the 
book, this last chapter ranges across 
time and space from sixteenth-century 
Nagasaki to an American pilot buzzing 
USS Missouri (BB 63) in Tokyo Bay� 
Analysis of war-ending decisions is 
limited and, in several cases, carries 
forward a singular view about the role 
of Russian entry into the war and its 
impact on American and Japanese 
decision-making without acknowledg-
ing counterviews on the subject�
Cleaver is an experienced author 
with over forty years of publishing 
experience and has written extensively 
on American naval air combat in the 
Pacific� The intended audience for 
this book is, however, hard to gauge� 
With a bibliography of only twenty 
secondary sources—Cleaver apparently 
consulted no primary sources—there is 
little revealing information or original 
analysis that might interest scholars and 
academics� At the same time, the choppy 
narrative and lack of connective tissue 
might well turn off casual readers� Naval 
air combat enthusiasts might find inter-
est in the extensive air battle accounts, 
but, given the sources cited, these tales 
likely are presented in other fora�
JAMES P� MCGRATH III
One Nation under Drones: Legality, Morality, and 
Utility of Unmanned Combat Systems, ed� John E� 
Jackson� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2018� 256 pages� $29�95�
“Something for everyone” are words 
that come to mind after reading One 
Nation under Drones� Americans have 
developed an avid interest in drones 
and unmanned aerial vehicles and their 
myriad potential uses� Scientists, histo-
rians, ethicists, and others are trying to 
determine not only the proper roles for 
this new technology but how to address 
the ethical, privacy, and related challeng-
es this technology presents� One Nation 
under Drones takes all these factors into 
account while focusing on “how these 
revolutionary systems are reshaping 
the legal, ethical, and operational 
nature of both war and peace” (p� 21)�
In addition to his introductory and con-
cluding chapters, Jackson has compiled 
eleven chapters written by other experts 
in various aspects of the drone field� 
Taken together, they provide a truly 
comprehensive overview of, as the sub-
title implies, the legality, morality, and 
utility of unmanned combat systems� 
Noted techno-strategist P� W� Singer 
joins his New America Foundation 
colleague Konstantin Kakaes in an early 
chapter that addresses how the prolifera-
tion of drone technology has led to new 
questions in relation to military tactics, 
privacy laws, and airspace accident 
potential� Singer and Kakaes provide a 
useful backdrop for subsequent chapters�
For example, Dan Gettinger traces the 
growth of the existence of drones from 
home garage prototypes to the role 
drones now play in disaster response and 
border security—and, most importantly, 
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how they have become standard equip-
ment for militaries around the world� 
From there, the other chapters further 
explore a range of military applica-
tions, including the U�S� Navy’s use of 
unmanned systems on the surface of the 
seas, underwater, and in the skies above�
Other applications the authors consider 
include the 2018 Navy Ghost Fleet 
program, intended to develop “a ‘fleet-
integrated’ operational prototype drone 
to fill a range of existing roles” (Arthur 
Holland Michel); how robotic weapons 
might constitute “the future of war” 
(Robert Sparrow and George R� Lucas); 
and the U�S� Marine Corps’s use of 
drones (Robbin Laird)� Other chapters 
address the law of armed conflict as it 
relates to drones as a weapon system 
(Christopher Ford), advantages of 
small unmanned systems (Dillon 
Patterson), and the international law 
aspects of drone operations (Michael 
Schmitt)� Tied to the legal issues is the 
plight of the noncombatants discussed 
in Ron Arkin’s chapter, which sees 
in the technology the promise of 
aiding “the plight of noncombatants 
through the judicious deployment of 
these robotic systems, if done care-
fully and thoughtfully” (p� 173)�
Interestingly, Joseph Chapa—who 
teaches philosophy at the U�S� Air Force 
Academy—considers issues related to 
psychological distancing that remote 
pilots may experience� With traditional 
notions of self-defense absent, Chapa 
wonders whether these pilots might face 
a higher probability of moral injury�
Finally, Brian Wynne returns the 
reader to the civilian aspects of 
drones—seemingly a long way from 
the garage creation of drones noted in 
an earlier chapter� Wynne discusses the 
role of drones in the current world in 
relation to law-enforcement support, 
search-and-rescue missions, advanced 
scientific research, humanitarian 
assistance, agriculture, real estate—and 
the ever-talked-about delivery 
services that unmanned systems are to 
provide to entities such as Amazon�
Jackson has sequenced this collection 
skillfully, so that going from one chapter 
to the next flows well, allowing the 
reader to connect the dots among the 
subjects discussed� Moreover, the con-
tributors offer such a rich range of ex-
pertise in unmanned systems that it both 
highlights their differing perspectives 
and allows a reader to focus easily on the 
chapters most appealing to him or her�
Yet, while the book is comprehensive, it 
is a collection of various aspects of drone 
research and applications rather than 
an in-depth focus on any one aspect 
of unmanned systems� This might be 
considered a weakness by some experts 
in the drone field� At the same time it is 
also a strength, especially for those read-
ers who are relatively new to the field 
and wish to acquire more knowledge�
Jackson and his fellow authors provide 
helpful perspective while explaining 
the deep-rooted values and concerns 
related to the use of drones� No one 
can leave One Nation under Drones 
without having his or her presupposi-
tions about drones challenged� This 
book is an invaluable summation of the 
current state of drones in the civilian 
and military sectors as well as the ethics 
attendant to their use� There is no better 
compendium of the thoughts of so 
many significant thinkers in the field� 
This well-written book makes for both 
informative and entertaining reading�
LUCIE-ANNE DIONNE-THOMAS
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The ’Stan, by Kevin Knodell, David Axe, and 
Blue Delliquanti� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2018� 128 pages� $16�95�
The ’Stan is among the initial offerings 
of Dead Reckoning, the new graphic-
books imprint of the Naval Institute 
Press� This is a bold and welcome step, 
comparable to the institute’s decision to 
offer works of fiction, beginning with 
Tom Clancy’s Hunt for Red October 
(1984). Graphic books always will be 
associated with the comics industry; 
however, since the groundbreaking pub-
lication of Art Spiegelman’s Maus (1980), 
followed by such works as Marjane  
Satrapi’s Persepolis (2000) and John  
Lewis’s trilogy March (2013–16), the 
genre increasingly has been seen as seri-
ous literature� Although graphic novel still 
describes the genre, it long ago ceased 
to encompass works of fiction alone�
The ’Stan is a glossy, full-color collection 
of seventeen separate personal vignettes, 
gathered primarily during the first ten 
years of the war in Afghanistan� These 
are soldiers’ stories told in soldiers’ 
language� They mainly reflect the 
experiences of junior, enlisted, U�S� 
ground-force personnel, although at 
least one story belongs to a Special 
Forces master sergeant, and two are 
from junior officers� A Marine and a 
former Afghan interpreter are given 
shared credit for one vignette and one 
story comes from a former Taliban 
ambassador and Guantánamo detainee�
The stories are snapshots in time, 
most taken through a very narrow 
lens� Although they are true to an 
individual’s recollection of experience, 
there is usually minimal or no context 
into which to place these accounts� A 
soldier’s observation that the members 
of her unit taped individual knives to 
their weapons does not mean the Army 
has stopped manufacturing weapons 
with bayonet lugs or that there were no 
U�S� bayonets in Afghanistan� A single 
recollection of a weapon malfunction 
cannot be a legitimate indictment of the 
quality of all U�S� equipment� However, 
many of the stories are thought provok-
ing, and all have the potential to raise 
larger questions pertaining to the war�
Readers will process the stories through 
the lens of their own perceptions, and 
each story will be some reader’s “favor-
ite�” In this reviewer’s opinion, among 
the most notable of the minimemoirs are 
“Commando Shopping Spree” by Master 
Sergeant Scott Satterlee, USA; former 
U�S� Army specialist Alison Parton’s 
“From Hooters Waitress to Soldier”; 
and coauthor Kevin Knodell’s “War 
and Fireworks�” The most enigmatic 
offering is “Operation Donkey Haul,” 
an anonymous contribution featuring 
a handful of soldiers belonging to the 
U�S� Army’s 10th Mountain Division�
In this genre, no one carries more 
responsibility than the illustrator� Blue 
Delliquanti is an established author and 
artist� She delivers an acceptable, if not 
breathtaking, product� Her style in The 
’Stan is identical to that in her comic 
O Human Star and her coauthored 
graphic novel The Accidental Candidate. 
In The ’Stan, human figures, especially 
U�S� military personnel, are blocky and 
somewhat identical� Delliquanti uses a 
muted color palette that makes vibrant 
primary colors all the more striking 
when they do appear� Her depiction of 
violence falls somewhere between the 
abstract and the exceptionally realistic� 
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Given that Delliquanti has collaborated 
with coauthor David Axe before, it 
would be interesting to learn why the 
authors picked her for this task�
Coauthors Kevin Knodell and David 
Axe are both freelance journalists / 
war correspondents� Axe has produced 
graphic novels before, most notably 
his extremely self-focused, slightly 
fictionalized War Is Boring (2010). 
Knodell currently produces the Acts 
of Valor comic series for Naval History 
magazine� Axe provides the preface 
to The ’Stan. To his credit, he is quite 
candid about his feelings about the war 
and his condemnation of the actions of 
the United States� His position is strong 
enough to raise legitimate questions 
regarding The ’Stan’s potential political 
agenda, the possibility of cherry-picked 
memoirs, pointed sequencing of 
stories, and so on� Neither Knodell nor 
Delliquanti gets a similar opportunity 
to address the reader� This is a missed 
opportunity both for The ’Stan and for 
Dead Reckoning� Without a preface, the 
memoirs would have at least appeared 
to stand or fall on their own merit� Had 
Knodell and Delliquanti provided their 
points of view, either separately or in 
conjunction with Axe, questions regard-
ing agendas and biases might be fewer� 
It is also understandable that many 
readers would want to know more about 
how the authors selected the stories and 
collaborated on the book� Why were 
other stories discarded, if they were? 
Delliquanti’s voice potentially would be 
more welcome than Axe’s, as she, more 
than anyone, brings the memoirs to life�
The ’Stan represents a notable effort� 
Although readers’ opinions about its 
overall quality will vary, it deserves 
an audience� More importantly, 
Dead Reckoning and the U�S� Naval 
Institute deserve applause for tak-
ing this first step� It will be very 
interesting to see what comes next�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Bombs without Boots: The Limits of Airpower, by 
Anthony M� Schinella� Washington, DC: Brook-
ings Institution, 2019� 300 pages� $44�99�
In our war colleges, professional 
journals, the halls of Congress, and 
countless bars and ready rooms, the 
argument has been running since the 
early twentieth century with Italian 
general Giulio Douhet and General 
William “Billy” Mitchell, USA� On one 
side, advocates of airpower offer a 
vision of rapid and potentially low-cost 
warfare; on the other, critics assert 
that boots on the ground remain the 
essential standard of military control�
Anthony Schinella has waded into 
this fray and, while unlikely to end 
the debate, his book Bombs without 
Boots offers a new and thoughtful 
discussion of the limitations and utility 
of airpower when used without com-
mitment of ground forces� Carefully 
constructed and exquisitely sourced, 
Bombs without Boots is an exemplar of 
what analysis of a thorny and funda-
mental military issue should look like�
Schinella frames his arguments around 
five case studies spanning almost twenty 
years: Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), 
Afghanistan (2001), Israel in Lebanon 
(2006), and Libya (2011)� Schinella 
describes, with extraordinary thorough-
ness, the strategic, geographic, and po-
litical situation that confronted airpower 
planners in each case� He then explains 
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why decision makers chose airpower as 
a tool, to what end, and to what effect� 
The resulting analysis goes well beyond 
the military, ultimately assessing impacts 
across the entire strategic spectrum�
Despite the title, ground forces feature 
in every case study� Indeed, that basic 
observation is central to Schinella’s 
argument� In each case study, although 
the intervening power focused on using 
airpower, that airpower supported 
ground forces present at the scene� This 
observation holds true even in cases in 
which the stated intent of the interven-
ing powers was not to provide support 
for any particular faction in the conflict� 
Schinella asserts that the goals, behavior, 
and effectiveness of these proxies must 
be understood to assess fully the impact 
of airpower� For example, employment 
of NATO airpower in Libya blunted the 
Qaddafi regime’s battlefield advantages, 
while Libyan geography allowed NATO 
airpower to create a de facto sanctuary 
where nascent opposition forces could 
coalesce� These opposition ground forces 
eventually toppled the regime� The 
result, he asserts, should be called “a vic-
tory made possible by airpower” rather 
than “a victory by airpower” (p� 286)�
In cases in which the application of 
airpower achieved battlefield success, 
Schinella observes that it has been 
largely ineffective in giving intervening 
powers a voice in what follows the 
conflict� Even a successful case of 
“bombs without boots,” he suggests, may 
require “boots after bombs” to shape the 
peace and secure the desired strategic 
end state� Across his five case studies, 
Schinella observes a strong pattern of 
air forces exhausting the fixed targets 
associated with an adversary, as well as 
available stocks of precision munitions, 
early in the conflict� He also notes the 
importance of strategic patience for the 
intervening powers� Time can allow 
airpower to enable and shape proxies, 
who then can have impact on the 
ground in ways that airpower cannot�
While this book is about airpower, the 
specific tools of airpower or the tactical 
nuances of its employment consume 
little of the volume� This strategic 
view serves the reader well, with the 
exception that drones—perhaps the 
most novel and distinctive application 
of airpower in the last two decades—do 
not factor into these case studies, 
and thus hardly are mentioned�
In a debate marked by over a century 
of passion, this volume is notable for 
its objectivity� Schinella’s professional 
role as the National Intelligence Officer 
for Military Issues within the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence 
makes him the most senior official in 
the U�S� Intelligence Community who 
focuses purely on understanding foreign 
military institutions, capabilities, and 
operations� He has an insider’s deep 
understanding of U�S� and foreign 
styles of warfare, while at the same 
time he has no allegiance to any 
particular military branch or tribe�
In the end, Schinella concludes that 
“airpower interventions can succeed 
without committing ground troops—but 
only under the right circumstances” (p� 
287)� Even in these cases, however, “it is 
never as easy as you think�” His clear and 
thoughtful consideration of how and 
when “bombs without boots” can serve 
the national interest is why this book de-
serves a place in the collection of every 
professional and strategist tasked with 
employing airpower to its full potential�
DALE C� RIELAGE
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The Free Sea: The American Fight for Freedom of 
Navigation, by James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo� 
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018� 416 
pages� $39�95�
For most of its 235 years of independent 
existence, the United States has been a 
continental power� The period when it 
can be viewed reasonably as a maritime 
power ended during the Civil War, 
although admittedly its maritime roots 
stretch back far into the colonial era� It 
is therefore remarkable that it should 
have remained a strong defender of 
the freedom of the seas without inter-
ruption from its origins to the present 
day� James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, 
two writers and legal advocates well 
known for their robust defense of 
that freedom, have written a history 
explaining the main events that have 
driven generations of policy makers 
to support what may be regarded as 
America’s oldest and most consistently 
held foreign policy objective, and why 
that support remains vital today�
That consistency, however, hides shifting 
motivations� In the decades following 
independence, trade was essential if 
the United States was to survive� Wars 
were fought with France (the Quasi-
War), with Barbary, and with Britain 
to defend America’s right as a neutral 
to trade with whomever it pleased�
Kraska and Pedrozo move without 
comment from 1812 to 1914, jumping 
a near century of momentous change� 
For America, trade, once a necessity for 
survival, became the key to vast wealth� 
U�S� goods carried in U�S� ships fanned 
out across the world’s oceans� Irritations 
with Britain persisted—entirely to be 
expected between competitors—but 
then so did episodes of cooperation� The 
main reason why Americans were free to 
trade globally was the Royal Navy’s en-
forcement of Pax Britannica and Britain’s 
adoption of free trade in 1846� However, 
Britain’s agreement to the Declaration 
of Paris in 1856 had possibly the most 
significant effect on U�S� shipping and 
the U�S� Navy� In it, Britain surrendered 
its asserted right to institute paper 
blockades of enemy ports and search 
neutral shipping for contraband—that 
is to say, for goods that Britain defined 
as being of use to an enemy in wartime� 
The result of this agreement was to turn 
the naval order of the oceans on its head�
Neutral states, instead of combining 
to limit British naval power—a very 
risky undertaking—now had Britain 
on their side� The United States, having 
built its navy on the twin pillars of 
coastal defense and guerre de course, 
was stripped of its main strategic 
weapon� A decade later, following the 
Civil War—during which Confederate 
privateers had driven much of America’s 
merchant navy to seek the protection 
of the British flag—the nation turned 
its commercial attention away from the 
sea� It was never to return, as the nation 
looked instead to the vast, endless acres 
west of the Mississippi and the creation 
of an industrial heartland beyond 
the Appalachians� Yet it is never wise 
to say never in politics or history�
The real target of Kraska and Pedrozo’s 
book is contemporary China, which, 
after it emerged from its own civil war 
in 1949, decided to become a maritime 
power� By this it meant a power 
capable of exploiting every economic 
and political advantage the sea offered� 
Although its progress was hindered by 
the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) and 
other upheavals, it continued to inch 
toward its goal� Now it is advancing its 
agenda rapidly, on multiple fronts�
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The United States, after the American 
Civil War, took a different course, aban-
doning its maritime heritage and replac-
ing it with a naval form of the militarism 
that was gaining ground in Germany, the 
other rising industrial power, by adopt-
ing the battle fleet theories of Mahan, 
Luce, Fiske, and others� It was a turn that 
served the Navy well for most of what 
remained of the twentieth century, as the 
service used its vastly superior material 
resources to overwhelm its symmetrical 
opponents� In the process, freedom of 
the sea, particularly after 1945—the 
period from which the authors draw 
most of their examples—ceased to be 
about trade, becoming rather about 
the freedom of naval forces to go 
where they needed to project power�
China presents a different challenge� 
Germany, Japan, and Soviet Russia were 
all economic autarkies; China is the 
opposite� It now has the world’s second-
largest economy and is the largest trad-
ing power; it uses its growing navy as 
just one of a set of political, diplomatic, 
industrial, technological, informational, 
and legal tools to advance its interests�
Kraska and Pedrozo have looked at the 
legal challenge with a gimlet eye� They 
have provided not only an invalu-
able description of the threat China 
presents to the U�S� Navy but a guide 
to legal ripostes to Chinese behavior 
that can be implemented now� They 
have written a handbook for action 
and a historical justification that all 
officials working on China must read�
Their analysis and the prescription it 
generates must, however, be read in 
context� Like Britain in Paris in 1856, 
we need the vision, flexibility, and 
guile to win all nations with maritime 
interests over to our side� We need 
to be their champion, as Woodrow 
Wilson purported to be in 1918, when 
he made freedom of the seas one of his 
Fourteen Points� More than that we 
need to begin thinking and acting like a 
maritime nation again� Maybe then we 
can stay one step ahead of China at sea�
MARTIN N� MURPHY
Maritime Strategies for the XXI Century: The Con-
tribution of Admiral Castex, by Lars Wedin� Paris: 
Nuvis, 2016� 233 pages� $30�
It is a matter of interest when an author 
is willing to break out some of the 
older volumes on maritime strategy and 
reexamine them in the light of current 
concerns, attempting to determine 
whether some nugget of interest has 
been passed over inadvertently� Lars 
Wedin’s Maritime Strategies for the XXI 
Century: The Contribution of Admiral 
Castex is such a work� Wedin examines 
the writings of French admiral Raoul 
Castex (1878–1968) for their applicabil-
ity in creating maritime strategies for 
the present millennium� This is not 
an easy task� Castex was a voluminous 
writer throughout his naval career, 
authoring five books on strategic theory; 
two additional volumes of collected 
articles were compiled posthumously� 
As a naval officer serving on escort 
ships during the First World War, 
Castex had the practical experience of 
observing what actually worked—above 
and beyond what any academician 
might propose� Following that conflict, 
Castex appreciated the opportunities 
that technological advances in aircraft 
and submarines might provide to the 
future naval commander� Given his 
lengthy naval career, wartime experi-
ence, and attentiveness to technological 
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improvements, Castex should have been 
a worthy successor to previous naval 
strategists such as Mahan and Corbett�
As Wedin points out, this was not 
always the case� The sheer immensity 
of Castex’s work makes it daunting for 
even the dedicated reader to digest� His 
writing style was ponderous, considering 
both the perspective of a practitioner 
and that of a theorist, without privileg-
ing either� Finally, Castex modified some 
of his views over the decades of author-
ing his volumes� Within that discourse, 
though, there are numerous ideas in the 
rough that are of interest to the modern 
naval strategist and policy maker�
Wedin does a credible job of bringing 
Castex into the new millennium, 
showing where Castex was on-target, as 
well as where his commentary does not 
pass the test of time� Castex was accurate 
on many things regarding the current 
character of maritime competition and 
conflict� His concept of strategy was not 
limited exclusively to the use of military 
power to gain political objectives during 
time of war� Attention to the naval forces, 
as well as the industry that built the ships 
and the organizations that produced the 
sailors to operate them, required over-
sight and direction during peacetime as 
well� A strategy of morale was necessary 
to keep the population committed 
to the policies of the government—a 
highly Clausewitzian notion�
As a practitioner, Castex wrote about 
the notion of constraints that would 
prevent military commanders from 
taking extreme action in pursuit of mere 
military aims� There were always limits, 
both political and legal, that mitigated 
such excesses, particularly in peacetime� 
Failure of the national leadership to 
maintain an interest in the maritime 
environment in peacetime could lead 
to defeat in time of war� Instead, a 
maritime strategy that coordinated 
actions by industry, national military, 
and security forces was essential to 
build the wealth and power of the state� 
These were still primarily wartime 
concerns for Castex, for both the 
preparation for and conduct during 
hostilities, but he was prescient about 
the growing importance of the linkages�
Yet Castex was not infallible, as Wedin 
illustrates� The “infrastructuration” 
of the ocean with new facilities to 
gain wealth from the sea, such as oil 
platforms, wind turbine farms, or 
ocean floor mining, portends a greater 
economic interest in the ocean above 
and beyond that of shipping flows that 
support the globalization of commerce� 
This, of course, opens up different 
avenues for disruption of the enemy 
beyond the mere destruction of shipping 
that Castex had observed in World 
War I� Land attack from the sea, while 
possible, did not seem likely to succeed, 
perhaps owing to the poor Allied 
performance at Gallipoli� Subsequently, 
World War II showed that Castex was 
too pessimistic on this subject� Castex 
also underestimated the role of navies 
in operations below the threshold of 
armed conflict� The constraints of legal 
regimes, such as the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, affect naval 
operations in both peace and conflict 
to greater degrees than Castex would 
have believed possible� The maritime 
component of strategy must now include 
consideration of new strategies (cyber 
and space) on the basis of technologies 
that were nascent in Castex’s lifetime� 
This hardly can be considered seri-
ous criticism of Castex, as the world 
certainly has changed since he consid-
ered the foundations of naval strategy�
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For a readership well versed in the views 
of British- and American-centric theo-
rists and historical operations, this book 
is a welcome exposure to other nations’ 
perspectives and conclusions regarding 
the exercise of maritime power in peace 
and war� Wedin is Swedish and Castex 
was French, resulting in a distinctly 
European view of sea power� Wedin’s 
analysis of Swedish maritime policy in 
light of Castex’s ideas is also valuable, 
but this is not always an easy path� The 
translation and organization of the book 
require the reader’s concentration� These 
are surmountable obstacles in Wedin’s 
efforts to bring Castex into the current 
era and evaluate his strategic insights 
for consideration by an already time-
constrained officer corps� He has done 
the tough plowing of Castex’s work so 
the main furrows have been established, 
allowing in-depth analysis of the 
particularly interesting spots in the field�
PAUL A� POVLOCK
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
Marc Beaudreau, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, is a military professor in the Strategy and Policy 
Department at the Naval War College�
Lucie-Anne Dionne-Thomas retired from the Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps as a captain fol-
lowing active- and reserve-duty service� She has been a civilian attorney for the Veterans Adminis-
tration as well as the Navy’s Office of the General Counsel at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center�
John B. Hattendorf is the Ernest J� King Professor Emeritus of Maritime History at the Naval War 
College� He is the author, coauthor, editor, or coeditor of more than forty books on British and 
American maritime history and naval warfare�
Doyle Hodges is an associate professor for the National Security Affairs Department in the College 
of Distance Education at the Naval War College� He retired from the Navy as a commander in 2013�
James P. McGrath III, Captain, USN, a nuclear-trained surface warfare officer, is a military profes-
sor of joint military operations at the Naval War College� He commanded Maritime Expeditionary 
Squadron 7 and has served on the staffs of the Seventh Fleet and European Command, as well as 
the Joint Staff�
Martin N. Murphy is a research fellow at the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at King’s 
College London and an associate fellow of the Royal United Services Institute�
Richard J. Norton is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College� His most recent 
publications include articles in the Naval War College Review and Marine Corps University Journal.
Paul A. Povlock is a retired naval officer and associate professor of joint military operations at the 
Naval War College�
Dale C. Rielage serves as director for intelligence and information operations for the U�S� Pacific 
Fleet� He is the author of Russian Supply Efforts in America during the First World War�
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
HISTORY THROUGH SYMONDS’S EYES
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
 When readers undertake a search for books in the specialized areas of na-val and military history, they often find a number of authors who merit 
special attention owing to their level of scholarly research and prolific publishing 
history� One such author is Dr� Craig L� Symonds� He now serves as the Ernest J� 
King Distinguished Professor of Maritime History at the U�S� Naval War College, 
as well as Professor of History Emeritus at the U�S� Naval Academy, where he 
taught for thirty years and served as department chair�
Symonds is the author or editor of more than twenty books, including Deci-
sion at Sea: Five Naval Battles That Shaped American History (2005), which won 
the Theodore and Franklin D� Roosevelt Prize, and Lincoln and His Admirals: 
Abraham Lincoln, the U.S. Navy, and the Civil War (2008), which won the Lincoln 
Prize, the Barondess Award, the Laney Prize, the Lyman Award, and the Abraham 
Lincoln Institute Book Award� His most recent books are on the Second World 
War, notably The Battle of Midway (2011) and Neptune: The Allied Invasion of Eu-
rope and the D-day Landings (2014), which won the Barry Prize and the Samuel 
Eliot Morison Prize�
Of particular note for professional mariners are the following: 
• Decision at Sea: Five Naval Battles That Shaped American History, which 
offers readers some “exceptionally well written and fascinating accounts” of 
five highly significant naval battles, according to a book review by William 
Lloyd Stearman in the Winter 2007 issue of the Naval War College Review. 
The battles analyzed are Perry’s defeat of the British on Lake Erie in 1813; the 
Battle of Hampton Roads in 1862, which pitted the first ironclad ships in the 
United States against each other; the Battle of Manila Bay, in 1898; the Battle 
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
of Midway, in the Pacific in 1942; and Operation PRAYING MANTIS in the 
Persian Gulf in 1988�
• The Civil War at Sea, in which Symonds examines the naval and riverine
elements of the war� He relates the Union naval strategies that led to victory,
including the naval blockades that thwarted the South’s economy and how
control of its rivers effectively divided the South’s territory, limiting com-
merce and mobility� He also examines how the industrial era then beginning,
particularly the use of steel and steam, transformed the nature and function
of warships�
• The Battle of Midway, a detailed examination of the battle that was a turning
point in the war in the Pacific� At the outset, the Japanese possessed signifi-
cant advantages, while the U�S� Navy was vulnerable in the wake of the Pearl
Harbor attacks; after one day of battle, however, the tide had turned, and
the U�S� Navy gained the upper hand, putting the Japanese on the defensive
thereafter and limiting their foothold to the region’s perimeter� Symonds
argues that individual decision-making was the primary factor in this come-
back story, and he offers portraits of the key persons involved, including
Japanese naval commander in chief Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto; U�S� Chief
of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J� King; and Admiral Chester W� Nimitz,
commander in chief of the U�S� Pacific Fleet�
• Neptune: The Allied Invasion of Europe and the D-day Landings, in which
Symonds turns his eye to D-day and the Allied forces, addressing the strate-
gies and naval operations that made the D-day landings a success� Getting
troops onto the beaches of Normandy was the first, and most pivotal, D-day
offensive, and plans to accomplish these landings were known as Operation
NEPTUNE� Symonds offers a comprehensive overview of the plans and prepa-
rations involved in the operation� The naval invasion itself was preceded by
myriad special training sessions and the development of amphibious landing
craft created specifically for D-day�
Symonds’s newest book is World War II at Sea: A Global History; it was re-
leased in May 2018� About it, Amazon�com writes as follows:
Symonds has established himself as one of the finest naval historians at work today� 
World War II at Sea represents his crowning achievement: a complete narrative of 
the naval war and all of its belligerents, on all of the world’s oceans and seas, between 
1939 and 1945�
Opening with the 1930 London Conference, Symonds shows how any limitations on 
naval warfare would become irrelevant before the decade was up, as Europe erupted 
into conflict once more and its navies were brought to bear against each other. World 
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War II at Sea offers a global perspective, focusing on the major engagements and per-
sonalities and revealing both their scale and their interconnection: the U-boat attack 
on Scapa Flow and the Battle of the Atlantic; the “miracle” evacuation from Dunkirk 
and the pitched battles for control of Norway’s fjords; Mussolini’s Regia Marina—at 
the start of the war the fourth-largest navy in the world—and the dominance of the 
Kidö Butai and Japanese naval power in the Pacific; Pearl Harbor, then Midway; the 
struggles of the Russian Navy and the scuttling of the French Fleet in Toulon in 1942; 
the landings in North Africa and then Normandy� Many have argued that World War 
II was dominated by naval operations; few have shown how and why this was the 
case� Symonds combines precision with story-telling verve, expertly illuminating not 
only the mechanics of large-scale warfare on (and below) the sea but offering wisdom 
into the nature of the war itself� 
Library shelves around the world are filled with books; some are good, some 
are better—and some are great� Since life is short, it can be helpful to narrow the 
search to find the books that best enrich our professional and personal lives� A 
great place to start is with the books highlighted above�
JOHN E� JACKSON
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